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Abstract. 
This thesis is a qualitative study of chronic benign low back pain (CBLBP). 
Psychological factors play an important role in the genesis and maintenance of 
CBLBP but the processes involved are poorly understood. The meaning of the pain 
for the sufferer is considered to be important and more research into this area that 
takes an idiographic approach is recommended in the literature. Three empirical 
studies are reported which employ Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to 
explore the personal experience of CBLBP. A range of themes are discussed that 
capture the meaning of the pain for the sufferer and help to understand the dynamic 
relationship between the pain sensation, distress and disability. The first study is 
exploratory, the participants' struggle to make a coherent sense of their pain is 
revealed along with the related personal and social implications. In the second study 
the experience of pain itself is focused on more closely in the context of a simple 
intervention. Descriptions of the pain are given which reveal its threatening aspect 
and suggest that the participants' self-appraisal in the face of this threat is important. 
The factors underlying change are discussed and the contribution of contextual factors 
is emphasised. The first two studies indicated that the self-concept was worthy of 
further study and it became the explicit focus of the third study. The relevance of the 
self was highlighted and it was shown to be indivisible from the lived experience of 
CBLBP. The three studies reveal the multi-dimensional complexity of CBLBP and 
highlight how its inherent `unpleasantness' represents more than a noxious sensory 
experience but unfolds within a dynamic personal and social context. The emergent 
themes are reviewed and discussed in relation to the literature and implications for 
further research and clinical practice are suggested. 
Acknowledgements. 
I would like to acknowledge primarily the support and effort put in by my supervisor, 
Jonathan Smith, but also to Chris Spencer who would probably argue himself that he 
did very little but whose presence in the background was always very helpful. 
The thesis is dedicated to Ieuan and Tom but most importantly to Helen Maria, whom 
I love dearly. 
Papers published during the work on this thesis: 
Osborn, M. (1995). Personal Experiences of Chronic Pain. Health Psychology 
Update, 19,38-41. 
Osborn, M. and Smith, J. A. (1998). The personal experience of chronic benign lower 
back pain: An interpretative phenomenological analysis. British Journal of Health 
Psychology, 3,65-83. 
Smith, J. A., Jarman, M. and Osborn, M. (1999). Doing Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis. In, Murray, M. and Chamberlain, K. (eds. ), Qualitative 
Health Psychology pp 218-240. London: Sage. 
Smith, J. A., Flowers, P., and Osborn, M. (1997). In, Yardley, L. (ed. ), Material 
Discourses of Health and Illness pp 68-91. London: Routledge. 
Contents. 
Page 
No. 
Chapter One. 
Introduction. 
The Personal Experience and Meaning of Chronic Benign Low Back Pain. 01 
Chapter Two. 
The Psychology of Pain. 
- Review of the Literature 07 
- What is pain? 08 
- The development of a definition and theory of pain. 10 
- Gate-control theory of pain 15 
- What is chronic benign pain? 18 
- The impact of chronic pain: affective and cognitive. 23 
- Psychological processes and theories of chronic pain: the maintenance of 
chronic pain and chronic pain syndrome. 28 
- Behavioural theories. 30 
- Cognitive theories. 33 
- Chronic benign low back pain: fear-avoidance beliefs 35 
- The concept of coping. 36 
- Other theories of chronic pain. 42 
- Chronic pain management - pain management programmes. 45 
Chapter Three. 
Qualitative Research and Chronic Pain 
Introduction. 52 
- Rationale for the adoption of a qualitative approach. 54 
- Getting at the meaning of pain. 54 
- Anecdotal studies. 58 
- This research project. 64 
- Empirical qualitative studies in chronic pain. 67 
- Summary of the literature. 73 
Chapter Four. 
The Qualitative Approach. 
- Introduction. 76 
- Qualitative and quantitative psychology. 78 
- Critique of the quantitative approach. 83 
- Qualitative approaches. 87 
- Phenomenology. 88 
- Symbolic interactionism. 91 
- Qualitative methods. 93 
- Phenomenological method. 93 
- Grounded theory. 95 
- Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). 97 
- Discourse analysis. 100 
Chapter Five. 
Method. 
- Introduction. 103 
- Participants. 105 
- Ethical approval. 108 
- Data collection. 109 
- Maintaining quality within the analysis. 110 
- Interpretative phenomenological analysis: the process of analysis. 112 
Chapter Six. 
Study One. The Personal Experience of Chronic Benign Low Back Pain. 
- Introduction. 125 
- Method. 127 
- Analysis. 130 
- Searching for an explanation. 132 
- Comparing this self with other selves. 133 
- Not being believed. 138 
- Withdrawing from others. 141 
- Discussion. 143 
- Searching for an explanation. 143 
- Comparing this self with other selves. 146 
- Not being believed. 149 
- Withdrawing from others. 151 
- Strengths and weaknesses of the study. 152 
- Conclusions. 153 
Chapter Seven. 
Study Two. The Personal Experience of Chronic Benign Low Back Pain: The 
change in its meaning before and after a simple hypnotic pain management 
exercise. 
- Introduction. 156 
- Method. 160 
- Analysis. 165 
- Pre-intervention 165 
- Pain taxonomy. 166 
- Mechanisms and causes. 170 
- Intrusion. 174 
- Post -intervention. 178 
- Pain taxonomy and mechanisms and causes. 178 
- Intrusion. 180 
- Active ingredients and processes. 183 
- Discussion. 186 
- Strengths and weaknesses of the study 193 
- Conclusions. 194 
Chapter Eight. 
Study Three. Chronic Benign Low Back Pain and the Self. 
- Introduction. 197 
- Method. 208 
- Analysis. 211 
- Living with an unwanted self. 212 
- The social aspect of the self: dealing with other people. 222 
-A self that cannot be understood or controlled. 229 
-A body separate from the self. 235 
- Discussion. 240 
- Living with an unwanted self: the assault on the self. 242 
-A self that cannot be understood or controlled: maintaining the self. 245 
- The social aspect of the self: dealing with other people. 247 
- Living with a body separate from the self: the self and the body in pain. 253 
- Strengths and weaknesses of the study. 255 
- Conclusions. 255 
Chapter Nine. 
Conclusions and General Discussion. 257 
- Quality in qualitative work. 263 
- Personal reflection on the thesis. 267 
- Strengths and weaknesses of the thesis. 272 
- Clinical implications. 273 
- Future research. 277 
- Conclusions. 279 
References. 281 
Appendix 306 
Ethical approval letter 307 
Patient consent form 309 
Patient information form 310 
Chapter One. 
Introduction. 
The Personal Experience and Meaning of Chronic Benign Low Back 
Pain. 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the lived experience of chronic benign low back 
pain, that is to describe and articulate it from the perspective of the sufferer and go 
some way toward divining the meanings that it holds for them. In doing so it is hoped 
to develop our understanding of the subject and explicate some of the processes 
involved in the complex relationship between chronic pain sensation, distress, 
disability and organic damage. 
Chronic benign low back pain is a considerable problem to western industrialised 
societies and despite substantial research directed toward both understanding and 
treating it, it remains elusive. Chronic pain of all kinds and benign low back pain in 
particular is typified by its unpleasantness, unpredictability and idiosyncracy. 
Psychological factors have been shown to have an important effect on the ultimate 
experience of chronic pain and it represents a major challenge to psychological 
research. It represents one of the most intriguing and fascinating subjects for a 
psychologist to explore. It can be both a symptom and a condition in its own right. It 
is deeply personal but also universal and exists as a multi-dimensional phenomenon 
that has social, cultural, physical and historical elements. 
Chronic pain defies a simple description and yet there is such a social and cultural 
consensus about it that if you said you had it, almost everyone you met would know 
what you meant to some degree. The non-verbal expression of pain is perhaps even 
more universal, it stands in contrast to the subtlety and variety of language that is 
employed to achieve its description, but often considered by the sufferer to be 
inadequate in that regard. 
The focus of this thesis will be benign chronic low back pain. That is pain that has 
persisted for over six months (chronic), where all the associated organic tissue 
damage is considered to have healed and no active disease process is in place (benign) 
(I. A. S. P., 1986,1994). Key to the phenomenon and definition of chronic pain is that it 
feels like acute pain but it cannot be cured and despite everyones' best attentions, it 
persists. The primitive and behavioural components of pain, to escape and protect the 
individual from its unpleasantness, are not satisfied and the sufferers are compelled to 
escape their pain, but never do. As if in room 101 from George Orwell's `1984' 
(Orwell, 1949), they are trapped with it until they have developed a whole new 
repertoire of pain management strategies to palliate the situation. This may seem 
overly dramatic and not everyone in chronic benign low back pain suffers such a 
degree of pain sensation, distress and disability, but a significant number do, they are 
considered to have chronic pain syndrome (IASP, 1994) and they are the participants 
in the studies in this thesis. 
The approach adopted in this thesis will be qualitative, and in particular the method 
will be exclusively Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Smith, 1995b). 
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IPA is a psychological method and is dedicated to articulating and learning from the 
individual's personal view of the subject and its social, cultural and physical 
connectedness. IPA has recently developed a tradition of research in health and social 
psychology and displays considerable utility and value in this area. It is ideal for the 
study of dynamic, multi-dimensional phenomenon where the individual inter-relates 
with a range of physical, social and cultural processes and it is the meaning inherent 
in the experience that is important. 
The call for idiographic and phenomenological research into chronic benign low back 
pain does not just come from advocates of the qualitative approach, but is present in 
the conclusions and recommendations of many quantitative studies that argue it is an 
important area to develop if our understanding of chronic benign low back pain is to 
progress. 
In chapter two `The Psychology of Chronic Pain', chronic benign low back pain and 
the problems it causes are described in depth. The literature on the psychological 
components of chronic benign low back pain is reviewed, including a brief history of 
the development of the definition of pain which highlights the puzzle pain has always 
posed. The relevant psychological theories are summarised and the argument for 
attending to the personal meaning of pain is developed. 
In chapter three `The Qualitative Approach', the background to the qualitative 
approach is described and it is contrasted with the mainstream quantitative method. 
The intention in this chapter is not to dismiss the value of quantitative research, which 
has already revealed much about chronic pain, but to develop the argument for the 
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value and importance of using qualitative methods that offer an alternative 
perspective on the subject. Qualitative research methods are not reviewed 
encyclopaedically as it is not a unitary approach. It is typified by the wide variety of 
methods that can be employed and four examples are described, the 
phenomenological method, grounded theory, IPA and discourse analysis. IPA in 
particular is shown as an approach that can both complement and relate well to the 
extant chronic pain literature and this will be evident in the range of other studies that 
are referenced throughout the thesis. 
Chapter four, `Existing Qualitative Research on Chronic Pain', reviews the limited 
number of empirical qualitative studies that have been published and shows how little 
has been done to date. That which has been written is either sociological in focus, or 
researches other chronic illnesses and this reinforces the pressing need for more 
qualitative study in this area. 
In chapter five, the method that is employed in each of the three studies is described 
in detail. The method of IPA is given here in as much detail as possible to help the 
reader understand how the final write-up emerged. 
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The three study chapters then follow, which are: 
Study One. The Personal Experience of Chronic Benign Low Back Pain. 
This study was an initial reconnaissance and exploration of the individual sufferer's 
experience of pain to see what psychological themes emerged as central to their 
experience. 
Study Two. The Personal Experience of Chronic Benign Low Back Pain: Chronic 
pain and the change in its meaning before and after a simple hypnotic 
pain management exercise. 
The aim of this study was to explore the participant's experience of chronic pain from 
a different perspective by examining it as it changed whilst they went through a 
simple hypnotic pain management exercise. The efficacy of the intervention was not 
the focus of the study, which was to explore how a change in the meanings related to 
the participants' pain informed us about the nature of their pain. 
Study Three. Chronic Pain and the Self. 
In the first two studies it appeared that the impact of the chronic pain on the sufferer's 
sense of self, or self-concept was important and worthy of further study. As a 
consequence the third study focused on how their experience of their pain had 
influenced the way they defined or saw themselves. 
In each of the studies the important themes are reviewed and discussed in relation to 
the extant literature. The aim of this thesis is to explore the patient's experience of 
chronic benign low back pain and by taking such an idiographic approach to see how 
this develops our understanding of the experience of chronic benign low back pain, 
and the complex relationship between pain sensation, distress and disability. 
Although this may have clinical implications, and these will be discussed, the focus 
will be on getting close to and explicating the participants experience of their pain, 
rather than defining the utility of any clinical interventions. The findings from this 
thesis will be discussed within each of the study chapters and in a final brief 
discussion chapter at the end. 
Chapter Two. 
The Psychology of Chronic Pain. 
Review of the Literature. 
A range of approaches were applied to reviewing the literature over the life time of 
the thesis and in response to the emergent themes in the analyses of the three studies. 
Principal in these were regular formal literature searches which began using PsychLit 
on CD-Rom, progressed to using the BIDS facility and finally the Web of Science 
online database. In addition other publications were reviewed on an ongoing basis. 
These included: 
The journals - Pain, Spine, British Journal of Health Psychology, British 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, British Journal of Medical Psychology, Sociology of 
Health and Illness and Social Science and Medicine. 
All new health and pain related publications by - International Association 
for the Study of Pain, British Psychological Society, Open University Press, Guilford 
Press, Sage, Wiley and Routledge. 
Conference reports from - British Psychological Society (BPS), BPS 
Division of Health Psychology, International Association for the Study of Pain and 
The Pain Society. 
The main focus for the literature searches was `chronic benign low back pain' and 
`chronic pain', this was extended to include other terms such as `chronic illness', 
`qualitative health research' and other key words related to the themes that emerged 
from the empirical studies. 
What is Pain? 
Pain is notable for its paradoxical and elusive nature. Although it does serve a 
primitive protective function at times this does not apply. In certain situations 
significant injury to the body produces no pain, whilst at others severe and crippling 
pain can be present in the absence of any disease or acute tissue damage. Pain is a 
universal phenomenon but also one which is private and subjective. It is 
fundamentally unpleasant and experienced in a wide variety of forms. Pain cannot be 
measured directly but is inferred and interpreted from the sufferer's observable 
behaviours, self-reported cognitions and affect. Although there is a broad consensus 
with regard to its description and sensation in that most people know what you mean 
when you say you have pain, it is typified by its idiosyncracy, variability and a weak 
correlation between the pain sensation, distress, disability and any objective measures 
of peripheral tissue damage. 
One of the challenges of pain is how to understand something so ubiquitous, so 
universal and yet due to its personal, individual and changeable nature so difficult to 
access or describe. The list of English words that could be used as pain descriptors is 
extensive and runs into the hundreds yet despite this range of options sufferers often 
struggle to find the words that they feel would do justice to their pain and the 
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language of pain has been found to serve no useful or stable diagnostic function 
(Melzack and Torgerson, 1971). 
Most pain is associated with a disease process or tissue damage. When this happens it 
signals the presence of such damage or the threat of injury, triggers a range of escape 
or protective behaviours and affect and subsides as the related organic damage heals. 
This is not always the case however. In some instances pain persists after the 
peripheral healing process is complete or emerges in the absence of any disease 
process and ceases to function as a warning of an ongoing biomedical problem. 
Pain has always been a puzzle that has not conformed to a bio-medical model that 
treated it solely as an alarm mechanism. In 60% of cases of chronic benign low back 
pain there is no recognisable organic pathology. There are also other types of pain 
such as causalgia, neuralgia and phantom limb pain that can either persist for months 
after the original tissue damage has healed or are triggered by non-aversive stimuli i. e. 
that which does not cause any tissue damage (Melzack and Wall, 1988). In the case 
of phantom limb pain the sufferer experiences pain from a part of the body that no 
longer exists and this supports the case for the importance of higher cortical processes 
related to pain. 
The considerable variability in the perception and expression of pain is such that it 
can change over time despite no evidence of parallel or contemporaneous organic 
change and can appear to be very different between people with the same injury. 
Beecher (1956) in a classic study showed that, despite suffering extensive tissue 
damage soldiers, wounded in battle required less analgesia than their civilian 
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counterparts with similar organic pathology as a result of surgery. Beecher's 
observations showed how the context and meaning of the pain to the sufferer was an 
important mediating factor in their pain experience and one which at times was more 
pivotal than the bio-medical factors involved. Put crudely, the battlefield casualties in 
his study were relieved not to be dead and looked forward to going home away from 
the conflict, whilst the civilian surgical patients felt no such relief and did not 
welcome their convalescence in the same way. The experience of pain symbolised a 
very different future to the two groups, one positive for the soldiers and one more 
fearful for the civilian patients. Similarly, the two groups regarded themselves 
differently. The soldiers saw themselves perhaps as healthy men who had been 
injured whilst the civilian patients saw themselves as unhealthy with a more uncertain 
future. Each appeared to appraise their pain within a markedly different historical and 
social context. 
The Development of a Definition and Theory of Pain. 
Pain has proved hard to define over the years but this is not because as an experience 
it is uncommon. On the contrary, with the exception of a few rare cases where people 
are born impervious to pain and suffer due to the absence of its protective function 
(Melzack and Wall, 1988), each person has experienced pain to some extent with 
varying degrees of sensation, distress and disability. It's notable that despite this 
universality a definition of pain that encompassed its complex nature successfully was 
not established until relatively recently IASP (1986,1994). 
10 
Pain has been recognised and written about since historical records began and 
reference to it was recorded on Egyptian papyrus in 4000BC (Rey, 1993; Gatchel, 
1999). At the time of Aristotle, it was considered to be discrete from the five senses 
and classed as a `passion', something related to the soul. This was very much in line 
with the thinking of the time which considered the relationship between the body and 
the mind to be fundamental in medicine. Eventually these holistic ideas were 
overhauled as a result of the technological and philosophical developments that took 
place during the Renaissance. The mechanistic approach of modern medicine 
emerged and adhered to a more Descartian and dualistic division between the mind 
and the body. Pain was defined in purely stimulus-response terms and considered to 
serve as a warning signal of actual or potential harm to the body. It was confined as a 
phenomenon to the body and a direct and an unmediated pathway was thought to run 
directly from the source of the damage to the brain. 
During the nineteenth century an increased sophistication in physiology led to the 
developments of theories such as Von Frey's Specificity Theory and later on other 
theories such as Pattern theories (Goldscheider, 1920). These attempted to explain 
pain phenomena as the result of specific nerve impulses that culminated in a cortical 
event and were then perceived as a sensation of pain. This introduced the idea of pain 
as a phenomenon that involved several stages and different processes of transduction, 
nociception and perception. It discriminated between the peripheral and central 
nervous system but still could not explain the presence of any pain that was not a 
direct index of injury or disease. 
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Historical definitions and their related explanatory models developed our 
understanding of pain but failed consistently to explain all of the different kinds of 
chronic pains, the variability of acute pain or how certain serious disease processes 
could give rise to very little pain. Sternbach (1968) continued the evolution of the 
definition of pain and summarised it as a phenomenon consisting of three things, 
which were; a stimulus indicating tissue damage, a sensation of hurt and a collection 
of behaviours designed to defend the organism from further harm. 
This definition introduced the concept of pain as a multi-dimensional phenomenon i. e. 
something that included a protective behavioural and affective component as an 
integral part of the experience of pain. It also established it as a subjective `personal' 
and `private' experience. Still however there remained the need for a definition that 
allowed both for the presence of chronic or phantom pains where peripheral damage 
was not present and for when disease or injury did not produce pain. 
Subsequent to the acceptance of Gate-Control Theory as the central theory of the pain 
system (outlined below) the current pain definition encompassed both the 
psychological dimensions of pain and its individual variability. The International 
Association for the Study of Pain, (I. A. S. P., 1986) stated formally that: 
Pain is an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated 
with actual or potential tissue damage or described in terms of such 
damage. (p s217) 
In this definition although pain was still defined in relation to organic pathology it 
was recognised that it could occur in the absence of any ongoing peripheral tissue 
damage. 
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The I. A. S. P (1986) also made an important distinction at that point and stated that: 
Activity induced in the nociceptor and nociceptive pathways by a 
noxious stimulus is not pain, which is always a psychological state, 
even though we may well appreciate that pain most often has a 
proximate cause. (p. s217) 
This allowed pain to be conceived as a psychological experience, not a physiological 
event and represented a challenge to psychological research to help develop the 
understanding of pain more fully. Nowhere is this more necessary than in chronic 
benign low back pain as it is these cases that organic pathology is notable for its 
absence and a medical cure is unavailable. Chronic benign low back pain is 
sometimes called colloquially `medically resistant pain' as it persists despite the best 
attention and therapies of the medical profession who have admitted readily that 
complete pain relief is not always possible: 
the medical profession has had to come to the unpalatable conclusion that its 
innate capacity for providing analgesia is severely flawed. (p. 63) 
Budd (1993) 
The definition of pain remains the focus of debate and it is likely it will continue to 
evolve. Price (1999) was dissatisfied with the IASP definition of pain as he felt it was 
not grounded in the experience of pain enough. To him it remained unclear whose 
point of view defined the association between tissue damage and pain sensation. This 
ambiguity meant it could still be possible to declare that if an observer could not 
determine this relationship then the experience was not pain. Anand and Craig (1996) 
were also critical of the accepted definition as they felt it was too reliant on self-report 
and description and so could not be applied to living organisms that were incapable of 
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communicating in such a way. To Price (1999) the association between sensation, 
suffering and tissue damage in the current definition was still too strong and he 
proposed a definition where there was no need for the observer to determine the 
presence of any actual or potential tissue damage. The modified definition he 
developed retained the primacy of pain as a psychological experience and pain was 
determined as: 
A somatic perception containing (1) a bodily sensation with qualities like 
those reported during tissue-damaging stimulation, (2) an experienced threat 
associated with this sensation, and (3) a feeling of unpleasantness or other 
negative emotion based on this experienced threat. (pl) 
Current definitions and models encompass the wide variety of pain phenomena and 
acknowledge it as a multi-dimensional phenomenon that involves processes of 
mediation, perception and appraisal that take it beyond a simple biological stimulus- 
response mechanism. The `puzzle' of pain that has been referred to earlier and was 
highlighted by Melzack and Wall (1965) is perhaps only a puzzle if explained using a 
reductive, bio-medical model. Melzack and Wall changed the name of their classic 
text from the `The Puzzle of Pain' (1965) to `The Challenge of Pain' (1988) perhaps 
to reflect the progress in our understanding over the time that had passed, much of it 
due to them. 
What has been retained throughout the history of the definition and explanation of 
pain and is key to appreciating the nature of pain is its inherent `unpleasantness'. This 
term helps to convey the discomfort of pain, that it hurts, is noxious or 
`physiologically offensive' (Fernandez and Turk 1995) and so demands of us an 
escape or protective response. The term `unpleasant' does not perhaps capture how 
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extreme pain can be but it establishes it as something antithetical to functioning or 
quality of life. 
Gate-Control Theory of Pain (Melzack and Wall, 1965a, 1965b) 
Possibly the single most significant development in the understanding of pain in the 
last century was the gate-control theory of pain. The paradoxes and anomalies of pain 
that have been detailed above led Melzack and Wall (1965a, 1965b) to develop a 
theory which remains the most popular for our understanding of the various aspects of 
pain. They viewed pain phenomena as something consisting of several components 
that were discriminable in space, time and intensity and had an essential aversive 
cognitive and emotional component that led to behaviour designed to escape or avoid 
the stimulus. 
Different physiological mechanisms were described for each system and the 
subjective and psychological nature of pain was considered to be an integral part of 
the whole pain process. 
Gate-Control theory proposed that the action system responsible for a pain experience 
involved a `gating mechanism' based in the spinal cord which, when open, 
transmitted a signal to the brain that would be perceived and interpreted as pain. The 
gate was triggered when the integrated firing level of the dorsal horn T-cells in the 
spinal cord reached or exceeded a critical threshold. This triggering threshold was 
mediated by the dynamic relationship between three inputs: 
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(i) Descending central inhibitory control processes from the brain. 
(ii) Large, myelinated fibres (which normally transmit innocuous sensory 
information). 
(iii) Small, nociceptive afferent fibres. 
With this theory it was now possible to explain how certain information could be 
`gated out' and the experience of pain blocked or how the gate could remain open 
such that the pain became magnified or chronic. In Gate Control Theory the 
experience of pain is not mediated by a single disease process or peripheral injury but 
in part by the degree to which the pain gate is open or closed. 
More than any other theoretical approach gate-control theory emphasized how 
psychological variables could influence the individual's experience of pain via a 
descending inhibitory control pathway from the cortex. Melzack and Wall showed 
that descending efferent fibres could influence afferent conduction at the earliest 
synaptic levels of the pain system and that it was possible for brain activities related 
to attention, anxiety, depression, anticipation and memory for pain to exert some 
control (albeit unconscious at times) over the contemporary experience of pain. 
Melzack and Wall postulated the concept of a `central control trigger' (based in the 
dorsal column projection system of the spinal cord) that mediated the activity of the 
pain gate. This trigger defined the degree to which the gate was open and the 
message transmitted to a higher cortical level. In this process signals from the body 
would be identified, evaluated in terms of prior and contemporary experience, 
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localised and if necessary inhibited or enhanced before the action system responsible 
for pain perception and response was activated. 
There is evidence that if the gating system is subject to a particular and persistent 
level of nociceptive input, then the central control triggering mechanism can become 
sensitised or `wound up' and activate the pain gate on a persistent basis creating 
chronic pain (Jessop, 1993; Davies and Lodge, 1987). As a consequence persistent 
pain could occur that was resistant to medical treatment, existed in the absence of any 
peripheral tissue damage and changed over time independent of a disease process. 
The challenge is to understand what psychological factors maintain the pain system in 
this hyper-sensitive state and how it can be influenced. 
Evidence for the physical existence of a gating mechanism is not conclusive and 
reflects the difficulty of imaging structures in the spinal cord in action but it 
represented a substantial development in the explanation of pain and informs much of 
the research and clinical activity that is undertaken today. 
Subsequent to developing the Gate-Control theory Melzack (1999,1990), looked at 
the relationship between the pain-gate and the higher cortical areas and developed the 
Neuromatrix theory of pain. This proposed that, at a higher cortical level to the pain 
gate, pain was produced by a characteristic `neurosignature' pattern of nerve impulses 
that were generated by a widely distributed neural network, termed the `body-self 
neuromatrix', in the brain. The particular nature of pain that was experienced at any 
one time was produced, mediated and maintained by the output of a widely distributed 
neural network in the brain that related to the pain-gate. This development reinforced 
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the importance and relevance of psychosocial factors in the experience of pain and 
highlighted the sophistication and fluid dynamism of the pain system. 
What is Chronic Benign Pain? 
Chronic pain is any pain that has persisted for longer than 6 months (I. A. S. P., 1986). 
This is the period of time after which it is considered that all relevant peripheral tissue 
damage will have healed. Acute pain refers to any pain that has been experienced for 
under 3 months, or 6 months (sub-acute). Chronic benign low back pain refers to any 
pain located in the lower back that is not related to an ongoing disease process but is 
the result of the `wind-up' and sensitisation of the central nervous system structures 
related to the pain system. It can be related to a precipitating injury or disease but 
most often simply emerges over time for no acute reason. 
In acute pain the pattern and presentation of the pain most often indicates the 
underlying organic cause in the form of an injury or disease. With chronic pain this is 
not the case, chronic pain lacks this functional element or `biological utility' (p413) 
(Gatchel and Epker, 1999) and is not diagnostic. 
An important fact of chronic benign low back pain is that, although painful, in the 
majority of cases there is no peripheral structural damage to the spine that would be 
exacerbated by movement. Movement may well promote further pain and usually 
does but it would be unlikely to cause any damage as it might in an acute situation 
where rest and temporary immobility would be recommended. Chronic benign low 
back pain is incurable and to treat it as acute pain would be destructive. To restrict 
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movement often creates the conditions that can exacerbate the chronic pain and 
sufferers are at risk of more serious problems if strong analgesics, extensive 
convalescence and inactivity are prescribed (Main and Spanswick, 2000; Hanson and 
Gerber 1990). 
Despite such a contrast in acute and chronic pain, to the sufferer the sensation feels 
the same and compels them to respond in the same manner, to protect and escape 
from the pain. Chronic pain emerges from an initial six month acute episode during 
which disease or injury may well have been present or implicated. It will appear to 
the sufferer as the seamless persistence of their acute pain as there would have been 
no distinguishable discontinuity between the acute and chronic phase. This can be a 
source of confusion. 
As they develop chronic pain the sufferer endures a persistent pain, one that has been 
resistant to a medical cure and may well make no biological or diagnostic sense to 
them. Most notably it will not have responded in the manner they might have 
expected from acute pain in that rest and other escape or protective behaviours will 
not have secured relief. Chronic and persistent pain cannot be escaped but the 
inherent motivational and behavioural components of pain toward escape remain. 
This primitive urge to seek relief and protection does not succeed and is frustrated 
constantly. 
Chronic benign low back pain is one of the prime examples of the complexity of pain. 
There is considerable individual variability in chronic pain according to its context 
and the meanings it holds for the sufferer (Hanson & Gerber, 1990; Turk & Flor, 
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1984; Holzman & Turk, 1986). It is typified by its unpredictability over time as it can 
switch in intensity and quality at any point to give the sufferer a range of experiences 
from `good days' to `bad days' Charmaz (1991). 
The challenge in chronic benign low back pain is to understand the relationship 
between pain sensation, distress and disability, which is neither linear nor causal but 
dynamic and multi-dimensional (Waddell, 1987). Chronic benign low back pain is 
not synonymous with psychological and physical dysfunction as many people with 
frequent pain continue to work and rarely seek health care assistance (Turner and 
Romano, 1984). Even though chronic pain can cause inactivity and disability many 
people learn to function fairly normally (Doleys et al., 1982). However a significant 
population of people with chronic pain do report high levels of pain sensation, distress 
and disability and these cases are often referred to as suffering from Chronic Pain 
Syndrome (IASP 1994; Hanson and Gerber, 1991). Turk and Flor (1999) identified 
the inadequacy of a biomedical model to explain the interaction between these 
elements and why there is this difference in the experience of chronic pain: 
from the biomedical model it would be predicted that there would be a highly 
significant if not isomorphic relationship between objective pathology and 
disability, yet this is patently not the case. (p19) 
The dynamic nature of chronic pain has highlighted the importance of the personal 
psycho-social factors involved and they have been recognised to have a major 
mediating influence in the person's ultimate experience of their pain sensation, 
distress and disability (Melzack and Wall, 1988; Waddell, 1987; Turk and Gatchell, 
1999). 
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The consistent struggle to both treat chronic pain successfully and explain its 
presentation, coupled with the development of the application of Gate-Control theory 
and other mainstream psychological research led to the development of the 
biopsychosocial model as an alternative to the traditional bio-medical approach (Turk 
et al., 1983). This established the importance of the psycho-social elements that had 
been implicated in the genesis, maintenance and treatment of chronic benign low back 
pain (Waddell, 1987; Waddell et al., 1984,1992). 
The bio-psycho-social model emerged as a better way to understand the phenomenon 
of chronic pain and develop ways of helping to treat it (Turk et al., 1983). It proposed 
that for each individual there were pre-disposing, precipitating and maintaining 
biological and psychosocial factors that interacted to establish and maintain chronic 
pain and disability. It posited a link between affect like fear, distress and the somato- 
sensory cortex and established a link between pain experience and the physiological 
processing of pain (Turk and Rudy, 1988). The bio-psycho-social model outlined by 
Waddell (1987) and Turk, Meichenbaum and Genest (1983) incorporated 
psychological, social and cultural factors and encompassed both the complexity of 
chronic pain and its fluid relation to distress and disability. It provided a vehicle for 
exploring further how the processes that influenced the pain-gate and the chronic pain 
experience might operate. 
Chronic benign lower back pain is a major health problem and single largest cause of 
time lost at work in western society. It produces a demand on the medical health 
services which cannot be satisfied as 85% of cases are not amenable to a neat medical 
diagnosis, 60% of low back pain cases would not benefit from the attention of a 
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medical consultant and only 2-3% would qualify for surgery (Clabber Moffat et al., 
1995; Waddell 1987). 
It's incidence has been described as having reached `epidemic' proportions in western 
societies and as it is predominantly a mid-life, not a late-life condition it affects 
people during their most economically active years. It is the single largest cause of 
disability in the UK and represents a major source of morbidity and distress (Rosen, 
1994). Maniadakis and Gray (2000) estimated that the direct economic cost in the 
United Kingdom in 1998 in terms of health care costs, informal care and loss of 
production was £1632 million. For those experiencing back pain the aggregate yearly 
cost to the U. S. economy was in the region of $80 billion (Bonica, 1990). 
The simple epidemiological statistics that establish the prevalence of chronic low 
back pain and its status as a public health problem are compelling. In any one year 
60% of the working population will have an episode of some kind of back pain. 
Fortunately 95 % will resolve within 6 weeks, leaving 5% at risk of developing a 
chronic problem. At some stage of our lives 80% of the population will endure back 
pain (Waddell, 1987). It could therefore be considered statistically to be a `normal' 
part of life. Although not all those who suffer pain seek help for it (Smith et al., 
1996) for those people who develop a chronic pain problem it can leave them, their 
families and associates feeling significantly distressed and disabled. 
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The Impact of Chronic Pain: Affective and Cognitive. 
To the sufferer chronic benign low back pain can a be significant problem. Bonica 
(1974) described chronic pain as exclusively `malefic' as despite the ability of people 
to manage it constructively, it was inherently and powerfully destructive and had no 
redeeming features. Chronic pain serves no protective function, disrupts daily 
activities and functioning, interferes with sleep and promotes distress in its sufferers, 
their carers and family and the professionals who set out to help them (Von Korff, Le 
Resche and Dworkin, 1993; Gatchell 1996). Chronic pain appears to have the 
potential to disable most functioning but the mediating processes involved allow for a 
considerable degree of heterogeneity and variability in that regard and are not well 
understood. 
Concomitant to chronic pain sufferers also report many other difficulties (IASP Task 
force on Taxonomy, 1994) as they respond to the demands of their pain. People with 
chronic pain often present with fatigue, immobility and disability and sleep problems, 
social isolation and family relationship problems can also emerge and the relationship 
with social and medical services can deteriorate as the sufferer continues to seek help 
but most often receives failed medical treatments that compound their situation 
(Gatchell and Turk, 1996,1999; Hanson and Gerber, 1990; Main and Spainswick, 
2000). 
Chronic pain is related to emotional problems as the sufferer struggles to manage their 
situation (Jensen et al., 1991; Robinson and Riley, 1999). It can be associated with 
high levels of pain-related fear and disability (McCraken and Gross, 1993), other 
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more social and interpersonal anxieties (Asmundsen et al., 1996), self-criticism and 
depression (Haythornthwaite et al., 1991), anger (Fernandez and Turk, 1995) and 
frustration (Wade et al., 1990). Chronic pain is associated strongly with negative 
emotions (Robinson and Riley, 1999) and the destructive effect of the fear and anxiety 
related to chronic benign low back pain can be significantly disabling. Emotions that 
have been associated with chronic benign low back pain include anxiety, fear, anger, 
guilt and frustration (Craig, 1994; Gaskin, et al., 1992; Kuch et al., 1993; Okifuji et 
al., 1999). Depression has been associated strongly with chronic pain and has been 
related to decreased pain tolerance (Romano and Turner, 1985) and self-criticism but 
the evidence suggests that although chronic pain can cause depression, the reverse is 
not true and depression is not a causal factor or precipitant for chronic benign low 
back pain (Skevington, 1995; Gamsa, 1994). Turk and Flor (1999) in a review of the 
research suggested that 40-50% of chronic pain patients suffered clinical levels of 
depression. Whilst from a clinical perspective, accommodating to loss and coping 
with depression was considered by Hanson and Gerber (1990) to be the major task 
presented to some-one having to endure chronic pain. 
With regard to anxiety, authors such as Vlaeyen and Linton (2000) and Crombez et al. 
(1999,1998) have argued that the role of fear in chronic pain was critical. The fear 
itself could be such that it promoted a phobic response to specific movements that 
caused more disability than the pain sensation itself. Such a high level of arousal was 
also considered by Melzack (1990,1999) to be detrimental to both functioning and 
general health. In his work on the neuromatrix he highlighted its close relationship 
and sensitivity to prolonged stress. The two interacted in a synergistic fashion that 
perpetuated both and caused the related homeostatic mechanisms to dysfunction. In 
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the long run this led to a heightened experience of pain, hyper-arousal and the 
breakdown of muscle, bone and neural tissue. 
Anger and its related hostility and aggression has been associated closely with chronic 
pain and was described by Fernandez and Turk (1995) as `one of the most salient 
emotional correlates of pain' (p165). Anger is a common emotion experienced by 
chronic pain sufferers (Okifuji et al., 1999) and has been associated with increased 
pain intensity as well as depression and other pain behaviours. Although cognitive 
mediation was a factor in the experience and expression of anger, Berkowitz (1990, 
1993) suggested that the noxious nature of pain and its intrinsic unpleasantness meant 
that the anger response was to some extent sub-cortical and not mediated by any 
cognitive processing. Berkowitz conceived of anger as integral to pain rather than 
-just reactive to it. 
The denial of anger, or self-blame was considered by Fernandez and Turk to be 
destructive and was implicated by them in increased pain and distress. Along with the 
inhibited expression of anger it has been shown to be a variable in poor physical 
health in general (Pennebaker, 1989,1992). Pain sensation alone is not the sole 
source of anger for the sufferer and Fernandez and Turk listed many reasons for a 
chronic benign low back pain sufferer to become angry and frustrated in response to 
the personal and social implications of their situation. 
All pain, acute and chronic has been shown to disable cognitive functioning. This can 
result in difficulties with concentration, attention, short term memory as well as 
problem solving and other cognitive tasks (Kewman et al., 1991; Smith et al., 1994; 
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Schnurr and McDonald, 1995). Sufferers also struggle to understand their chronic 
pain and the reason for its presence and this mysteriousness, incongruity and resultant 
confusion can compound the distress and cognitive problems that arise (Eccleston et 
al., 1997; Morley and Wilkinson, 1995; Williams and Thorns, 1989). 
The role of attention and anxiety in chronic pain has grown in prominence over recent 
years, in particular the implications of the capacity for pain to interrupt and capture 
attention, the process by which we select the information required for action 
(Eccleston and Crombez, 1999). Eccleston and Crombez (1999) defined the inherent 
characteristics of pain that enabled it to do this; namely its intensity, novelty, 
unpredictability, association with threat and the related fear and catastrophising that 
promote hypervigilance. 
Attention, tension and anxiety are also thought to influence the experience of pain by 
both increasing the levels of somatic tension and mediating the perception of pain. 
Arntz et al. (1994) proposed two psychological processes in the relationship between 
attention, anxiety and pain. An attributional one in which the pain-relevance of the 
anxiety was the essential factor and an attentional one, whereby the focus of attention 
was more critical. Pain-relevant anxiety was assumed to increase and mediate pain if 
the arousal experienced due to the anxiety was itself attributed to the source of the 
painful sensation and integrated into the pain experience. With attention the 
important factor was the degree to which the inherent nature of pain enabled it to 
command the sufferers attention, disable their functioning and cause secondary 
problems such as rumination, pain pre-occupation, emotional distress and more pain. 
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As anxiety is also a factor in focusing attention through the priming of the attentional 
processes it is likely that the two processes inter-relate. Pain-related fear can also 
interfere with cognitive functioning and cause the sufferer to become hypervigilant to 
threatening stimuli and less able to divert their attention from pain-related information 
( Asmundsen et al., 1997; Crombez et al, 1998) or apply more adaptive coping 
strategies (McCracken and Gross, 1993). 
Eccleston (1995a, 1995b) argued strongly for the need to direct research toward the 
relationship between central attention structures, anxiety and chronic pain. This was 
prompted by research that showed the efficacy of distraction techniques and cognitive 
strategies for managing chronic pain to be equivocal (Eccleston, 1994; Skevington, 
1995). 
Eccleston's research focused on the fundamental nature of the relationship between 
pain and attention. He argued that pain, through its noxious and fluctuating nature, 
was able to access our consciousness very successfully. It could both interfere with 
our cognitive processing and secure the lions share of the finite resources that were 
available for all cognitive functioning. Eccleston concluded that as this was the case 
any attempts to divert attention away from chronic pain were futile in the long term 
and that to be constructive attention should be directed toward the pain. This would 
then facilitate a more adaptive attribution of the pain experience into something less 
fearful and less painful. 
The evidence appears to show that affective distress is an important factor in the 
experience of chronic benign low back pain and that it can operate within it in a range 
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of ways, although the causal or maintenance mechanisms are not well understood. 
Longitudinal studies have indicated that affective distress is more likely to result from 
chronic pain than precipitate it (Gamsa, 1990; Radanov et al., 1996). In addition 
psychological disturbance has been found to be as great in patients with an organic 
basis to their pain as in those with no organic diagnosis (Benjamin et al., 1994) and 
pain sufferers pursuing litigation do not report significantly higher pain or distress 
than those who do not (Skevington, 1995). Both of these cases undermine the 
argument for purely psychogenic pain. 
Psychological Processes and Theories of Chronic Pain: The maintenance of 
Chronic Pain and Chronic Pain Syndrome 
Gatchell and Turk (1999) in the preface to their book `Psychosocial Factors in Pain' 
(p. xiii) defined four important points in the recent development of the study of pain, 
each one of which involved a significant step forward in the role of psychological 
factors and theories. In brief the four points were: 
1. Melzack and Wall (1965), formulation of the gate-control theory of pain 
which emphasised the role of central nervous system structures in pain and the 
primacy of cognitive and affective factors in the experience of pain. 
2. The work of Miller (1969) and Basmajian (1963) which demonstrated that 
psychological factors could influence physiological activity in the muscular 
and vascular systems implicated in pain. 
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3. Fordyce's (1976) study of the role of learning and conditioning factors in 
communication and pain behaviour. 
4. The work of Turk, Meichenbaum and Genest (1983) to integrate the above 
findings into a cognitive-behavioural model of chronic pain and its treatment. 
Chronic benign low back pain presents a different profile of symptoms and signs to 
the sufferer than that of acute pain. Although it may be associated with some form of 
injury or accident at first once any related tissue damage has healed after three to six 
months the symptoms are often hard for the sufferer to understand as they are 
generally unpredictable, vague, ill-localised and lack any relationship with time or 
physical activity that could be predicted from a simple or `common-sense' knowledge 
of anatomy and physiology. 
Mainstream social-cognition psychological theories of chronic benign low back pain 
have focused on either the contribution of dysfunctional beliefs and behaviours 
associated with it, or the coping or adaptation responses to it. Most research in 
chronic pain is applied and directed at either how to modify particular maladaptive 
behaviours or beliefs, or toward determining the active contribution of particular 
phenomena with the aim of achieving better therapeutic interventions and outcomes. 
This situation reflects the imperatives and clinical demands of working with patients 
who suffer with chronic pain, distress and disability but it could be argued that such 
an applied focus has skewed research away from the study of pain itself as a discrete 
phenomenon and that this has constrained our understanding. 
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The main psychological approaches will be reviewed below. The categorical 
distinctions, `Behavioural' and `Cognitive', are not meant to portray them as discrete 
or opposing theories but act as a simple device to aid their description. Each approach 
is also not homogenous and encompasses a variety of different perspectives which, 
when combined, represents the elements that have been integrated into the 
mainstream cognitive-behavioural approach. 
Behavioural Theories. 
Behavioural approaches established the difference between pain sensation and pain 
behaviour and focused on the relationship between them and the sufferer's external 
environment. They represented the first formal approach to pain management and 
targeted behaviour and suffering as opposed to just pain sensation. Chronic pain was 
viewed broadly in two ways. 
Firstly, that it could arise and be maintained as the result of secondary hypertension 
that is induced by a fear of pain and can cause somatic tension, muscle spasm, 
ischaemia (restricted blood supply) and an exaggerated pain perception (Flor, et al., 
1985; Bortz, 1984). 
This respondent model postulates that the avoidance of movement that is induced by 
pain causes secondary problems as it leads to lower levels of activity, the disuse and 
deconditioning of the musculo-skeletal system and yet further increases in the levels 
of somatic tension and pain sensation over time. This situation generalises as it 
persists and more and more situations elicit pain and immobility as the pain-tension 
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cycle is intensified yet further. 
Secondly, that pain behaviour and as a consequence pain is maintained by a form of 
secondary gain for the sufferer. This occurs when external reinforcement 
contingencies, including the behaviour of the sufferer's family or significant others 
prompts the development and maintenance of the maladaptive pain behaviour and 
chronic disability (Fordyce, 1976; Romano et al., 1992). In particular the 
solicitousness and attending behaviour of significant others toward the pain sufferer 
was felt to be a key factor in the maintenance of their pain behaviour and pain 
sensation (Flor, Kerns, and Turk, 1987). 
This operant model, developed by Fordyce (1976), distinguished between the 
individual's private pain experience and their quantifiable pain behaviours. The latter 
being amenable to modification. The theory proposed that during the acute pain 
phase (the first three months) the pain behaviour would come under the control of 
external contingencies of reinforcement which prompted the development and 
maintenance of a chronic problem. 
Philips and Grant (1991a, 1991b, 1991c) found evidence to argue that problematic 
chronic pain behaviours did not emerge as a new kind of behaviour but were the result 
of the persistence of acute pain behaviour over time, `there was no evidence of 
chronic pain evolving and growing, but rather of a persistence of the acute 
presentation' (p435) (Philips and Grant, 1991b). This indicated to them that the 
behaviour represented a failure to accept that the pain was no longer acute, that no 
further medical treatment was possible and that a new way of conceiving and relating 
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to the pain was necessary. The pain behaviour had now become inappropriate and 
unhelpful as it was directed toward achieving a cure and solving an acute problem, 
rather than managing and adapting to the pain as a chronic phenomenon. 
The behavioural approach suffers from appearing to be too uni-dimensional. It can be 
criticised for not taking account of the cognitive or affective factors involved for the 
sufferer and neglecting the perspective of the other individuals in the sufferer's 
immediate social network. Not allowing for the internal states of the sufferer or their 
family. Rowat et al. (1994) reviewed chronic pain in the context of the wider family 
network and showed how other family members also struggled to manage the chronic 
pain and how its impact on their collective lives influenced the sufferers pain. This 
exposed how the concept of chronic pain and pain behaviour as the result of 
secondary gain or attention seeking related to one discrete individual was too 
simplistic to explain the chronic pain experience. 
Behaviourists would argue in their defence that they have never advocated such 
simplicity and have been misrepresented, that the focus of the theories they advocate 
has always been on the subtle and dynamic interaction between the person and their 
environment and that clinical interventions have abused the method in the past by 
aiming only to extinguish pain behaviour crudely, rather than understanding its 
maintenance. Behaviourism is interested in meaning, particularly the impact of threat 
and fear in this respect and so does not ignore or dismiss the emotional experience of 
the patient in a discompassionate manner. Nevertheless it remains a reductive 
approach that treats people as passive and inert respondents to the environment. It 
does not take account of their active `internal' or private processes that contribute to 
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the particular personal construction of meaning that explains why similar 
environmental events can produce both a wide range of responses in different people 
and different responses in the same individual at different times. 
Cognitive Theories. 
Cognitive theorists focused on the individual's private appraisal of their pain and how 
they made sense of their experience. It represented a shift away from attending to 
observable behaviour toward an interest in the mind of the person involved. As a 
consequence cognitive theories placed an emphasis on the importance of the 
individuals beliefs, attributions, self-efficacy, expectations and acceptance, attention, 
control and coping strategies in the experience of chronic pain (Weisenberg, 1994; 
Jensen et al., 1991). The imperative to help people in chronic pain has focused 
research more on the cognitive aspect of the management of chronic pain and defining 
processes that exacerbate the experience and promote chronic pain syndrome. 
The cognitive approach has shown that people develop a set of dearly-held beliefs 
about their illnesses and that the nature of those beliefs and the `common-sense' 
models of illness that they construct out of them have implications for their chronic 
pain experience, pain behaviour and treatment (Nerenz and Leventhal, 1983; Lau and 
Hartman, 1983; Leventhal et al., 1980). 
It is the dysfunctional nature of certain beliefs and the impact of unhelpful ways of 
thinking (in the form of coping responses) that are thought to be most important in the 
maintenance and genesis of chronic pain from a cognitive point of view. Maladaptive 
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evaluations of the pain experience have been associated with an increase in 
uncertainty, hopelessness, low self-efficacy and a lack of control (Jensen et al., 1991; 
Turk and Flor, 1999) which, it is argued, promotes further distress and disability and 
a subsequent increase in pain sensation. This maintains the pain as a chronic 
phenomenon through the direct influence on the pain-gate system and by denying the 
sufferer access to more therapeutic behaviours or ways of thinking. 
The nature of the beliefs related to the onset of the chronic pain have also been shown 
to have an effect on morbidity in chronic pain, although it is not clear quite how this 
works. They generally fall within one of two broad categories where the sufferer 
considers their pain is due to a discrete event or not (non-event). Specific events 
include accidents, illness or surgery that the sufferer feels has led to pain that persists 
whilst non-event accounts for those situations where the chronic pain has emerged 
gradually over time for no apparent reason that the sufferer can discern. Adjustment 
appears to be worse for patients who belief their chronic pain arose as a result of a 
specific event (Toomey et al., 1997; Turk and Okifuji, 1996; Turk et al., 1996) 
however the results were not consistent and no causal mechanism has been proven 
although the role of blame and its attribution may be important (DeGood and Kiernan, 
1996; Turk et al., 1996). 
An individual's cognitions about an event and their ability to cope with it are 
hypothesized to affect functioning and behaviour in two ways, through a direct impact 
on mood and an indirect one through the influence of the selection of coping 
strategies. Lefebvre (1981) found that the cognitive distortions of chronic low back 
pain patients were similar to those of clinically depressed patients whilst 
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catastrophisation, frustration, pessimism, self-criticism/blame and pain pre-occupation 
have each been associated with poor coping, distress and high levels of pain in the 
chronic benign low back pain sufferer (Turk & Flor, 1984; Turk and Rudy 1992; 
Keefe et al., 1992; Holzman & Turk, 1986; Härkäpää et al., 1996; Williams et al. 
1994). 
Chronic Benign Low Back Pain: Fear-avoidance beliefs 
The single most important dysfunctional belief in musculo-skeletal chronic pain is 
related to the `fear-avoidance' of the pain. This belief is rooted in the incorrect 
assumption that the sensation of chronic pain signals the presence of an on-going 
disease process and organic damage that dictates the need to rest or restrict mobility 
(Slade et al., 1983; Riley et al., 1988). People with significant fear-avoidance see 
disability as a necessary part of chronic pain and activity as dangerous. The 
dominance of fear in this misinterpretation promotes the avoidance of movement and 
all the secondary problems this generates related to disuse, deconditioning and the 
maintenance and exacerbation of fear and somatic tension (Vlaeyen and Linton, 
(2000). Prolonged rest is contra-indicted in chronic pain and fear-avoidance has been 
shown to be predictive of the development of a chronic pain career (Waddell et al., 
1993). The fear of the implications of spinal pain and the associated unwillingness to 
remain functionally active was at one point as much a result of misinformation 
concerning the nature of the underlying pathology causing the pain, as an aversion to 
the pain itself. Sources of misinformation were numerous but health professionals 
were not innocent in this instance. Despite the fact that no more than two days of bed 
rest is recommended for episodes of acute low back pain Deyo et al. (1986) patients 
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were until recently recommended to rest until they got better and told to avoid any 
physical activity that produced pain. 
The research on pain beliefs has highlighted the association of certain dysfunctional 
beliefs with greater pain sensation, disability distress but has been unable to make 
more than correlational conclusions. More needs to be known to understand and 
explain the processes that are involved and the inherent variability over time that so 
typifies the presentation of chronic pain. The work to date has tended to examine 
beliefs by treating them as fixed, stable and inert variables in an experiment. As a 
result it has not been possible to make any statements about how they evolved or were 
formed and has not been able to address or accommodate them as dynamic or fluid 
phenomena. 
The Concept of Coping. 
Contemporary mainstream approaches to the study of chronic pain tends to adopt an 
integrated cognitive-behavioural approach that acknowledges the importance of both 
the individual's beliefs and appraisal of a situation and their experience of particular 
reinforcement contingencies. They are believed to inter-relate in a manner which 
determines the person's behaviour and can be understood and manipulated through 
the rational functional analysis of the behavioural and cognitive antecendents and 
consequences related to particular events such as pain or pain behaviour. 
Research into coping strategies has attempted to identify the various ways, both 
helpful and dysfunctional, that sufferers employed to manage their pain. In brief, 
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passive approaches that reflected a sense of powerlessness and uncertainty such as 
`hoping for a cure', `resting' and `catastrophising' have been found to be unhelpful 
prompting higher levels of reported pain sensation, distress and disability whilst more 
active strategies such as `coping self-statements', `positive social comparison', 
`regular exercise' and `seeking social support' have been shown to be more helpful 
(Jensen et al., 1991; Boothby et al., 1999). Certain strategies such as `Ignoring pain', 
`reinterpreting pain sensation' and `distraction' have been shown to play only a minor 
or equivocal role in good adjustment (Boothby et al., 1999). Reviews of the research 
into coping strategies to date suggest that the relationship between each particular 
strategy, pain and functioning is not understood at all clearly and much more study is 
required. 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) defined coping responses as `constantly changing 
cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage specific external and/or internal demands 
that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person' (p. 141). Much 
of the literature on coping views pain as a source of adversity that places a demand on 
the person that might exceed their resources. Pain is seen as the stressor and coping 
the response to it. The research has tended to focus on the reaction to the presence of 
the sensation of pain rather than any of its other emotional, behavioural or social 
elements. 
Keefe et al. (1992) argued that it was difficult to determine whether it was pain or the 
lifestyle changes that were the most salient source of stress for pain sufferers. Turner 
et al. (1987) asked pain sufferers to indicate the major sources of stress in their life 
but only analysed the data on those patients identifying pain as the main stressor and 
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ignored the rest of the population. It is conceivable that people's coping responses 
have different effects in different contexts. 
The review by Jensen et al. (1991) presented a mixed picture of the relationship 
between coping strategy and functioning although there were methodological 
problems with the grouping of studies. The review failed to distinguish between 
patient populations in its analysis, grouping studies using malignant pain (where a 
disease process was present) and benign chronic pain together. Chronic pain is not an 
homogenous condition and it cannot be assumed that each pain syndrome has the 
same set of biopsychosocial and contextual factors and processes at play. This can 
also be the case within particular single conditions. In chronic benign low back pain 
the incidence of catastrophizing and other `maladaptive' pain strategies was higher in 
patients whose diagnosis was incongruent with a medical explanation and whose pain 
was more poorly localised (Hadjistavropoulus & Craig, 1994). 
Boothby et al. (1999), Jensen et al. (1994), Dozois et al. (1996) Turner et al. (2000) 
each reviewed particular coping responses to chronic pain. Their findings for certain 
particular strategies are reviewed in more depth below although the overall picture 
with regard to their utility is not clear. The research has tended to focus on clinical 
populations that by their nature are typified by high distress and disability. The 
conclusions therefore have tended to emphasise the presence and problems of 
adopting passive responses to chronic pain and the limited efficacy and resource 
problems of employing more active strategies. It is not yet possible to divine the role 
of coping strategies as a discrete phenomenon in the maintenance or management of 
chronic benign low back pain but the research to date highlights the complexity of this 
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aspect of the experience of chronic pain. Those strategies which have received the 
most attention to date are explained and reviewed in more detail below. 
Catastrophising involves the use of exaggerated negative cognitions and attributions 
in relation to pain. It is the one strategy which has been related most consistently to 
poor adjustment and functioning in chronic benign patients (Boothby et al., 1999), 
although how the relationship works is poorly understood. Cross-sectional studies 
have shown catastrophizing to be associated with high levels of psychological distress 
(Harkapaa, 1991; Jensen et al., 1992) and pain intensity (Harkapaa, 1991). In 
agreement with the cross-sectional studies the longitudinal study by Jensen et al. 
(1994) showed that decreases in catastrophizing from pre to 3 month-post intervention 
were correlated with decreases in depression. In the more recent study by Turner et 
al. (2000) catastrophizing again predicted depression even when age, gender, pain 
intensity, beliefs and other coping strategies were controlled for. 
Catastrophizing seemed to be unrelated to disability (Turner et al., 2000). Decreases 
in catastrophizing over 4-7 months were unrelated to changes in disability over the 
same time period (Jensen et al., 1994). An earlier cross-sectional study by Jensen et 
al. (1992) also found no relationship between catastrophizing and disability when pain 
intensity and duration were controlled. 
Cross sectional studies vary but on the whole have shown ignoring pain to have little 
relation to disability and distress in patients with benign chronic pain (Robinson, 
1997; Jensen et al., 1992,1994). Post treatment physical and psychological 
functioning were also unrelated to pre-treatment scores on ignoring pain (Dozois et 
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al., 1996). One exception is Turner et al. (2000) who found ignoring pain to be 
significantly related to both physical and psychological functioning. The evidence is 
equivocal and worthy of further research. 
Neither the four reviews nor other cross-sectional studies found a relationship 
between diverting attention away from pain and disability (Jensen et al., 1992) or 
psychological distress (Jensen et al., 1992; Robinson, 1997; Jensen et al., 1994; 
Dozois et al., 1996; Turner et al., 2000). On the whole the relationship was 
inconsistent and suggested that such distraction was similar to `ignoring pain' and not 
something that appeared to be effective at managing pain. The problems related to 
sustaining distraction in the face of chronic pain and its ability to capture attention 
were reviewed earlier and will be looked at again in more detail in chapter seven, 
study two. 
Employing positive coping self-statements is one of the rarer and more active 
strategies for coping with chronic pain. In this case the sufferer repeats to themselves 
consciously phrases that reinforce and describe a sense of optimism, control and self- 
esteem in an attempt to mitigate the impact of the chronic pain. Again research 
findings are mixed. Robinson et al. (1997) found more frequent use of coping self- 
statements to be correlated with higher levels of general activity. However Jensen et 
al. (1992) and Robinson et al. (1997) found no relationship between coping self- 
statements and disability or psychological distress. Jensen et al's (1994) longitudinal 
study also failed to find a significant relationship as did Dozois et al. (1996). Turner 
et al. (2000) found more frequent use of coping self-statements to be related to less 
depression. With the exception of Turner et al. (2000) the use of self-coping 
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statements appeared to be unrelated to better functioning. 
Praying and hoping are not intended to mean the same thing but refer to a more 
passive and inert approach to managing pain. Of all the strategies this is one where 
the definition is the least well defined as little distinction is made between praying as 
an active religious or spiritual endeavour or as a more passive secular activity. It has 
been associated with distress and poorer adjustment in chronic pain (Boothby et al., 
1999) but again the picture is uncertain and perhaps reflects the fuzziness of the 
concept. 
The mixed picture given by reviews of coping strategies indicates that the concept 
could be useful but makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions beyond confirming 
the maladaptiveness of catastrophising. It suggests that further research is required 
and highlights how little is known about the processes involved. The strategies as 
they are currently defined may not relate to the single phenomenon of pain in any 
consistent or meaningful way. They may say more if reviewed in the wider context of 
the personal and social situation the person with pain finds themselves in and the 
resources and demands that are placed upon. Equally, it may be more productive to 
control more for the intensity of the pain sensation, broad pain type and chronicity in 
more detail. In a study by Jensen and Karoly (1991) `ignoring pain' and `coping self 
statements' were found to be related to better psychological functioning and they also 
found `diverting attention', `ignoring pain' and `coping self statements' to be related 
to increased activity levels. However this was only the case for patients with low 
levels of pain severity, identifying pain severity as a moderator of the relationship 
between coping and adjustment. As with the case for the study of beliefs the research 
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has tended to treat coping strategies as inert and monolithic variables and not as more 
dynamic or flexible concepts. It is possible that pain sufferers will not adopt one 
discrete strategy and apply it in a stable and uniform manner at all times but will 
utilise a whole range of them at different times and in varying degrees, according to 
different circumstances. 
Other Theories of Chronic Pain. 
Each psychological approach and theory like cognitive-behaviourism has addressed 
the problem of chronic pain, its genesis and maintenance at some time in an attempt to 
understand and explain its presence. Two alternative clinical approaches, Psycho- 
analytic and Systemic, are reviewed below. Each approach has a strong clinical 
tradition although not one grounded in the mainstream, social-cognition approach to 
research. They are referred to here, albeit briefly, to highlight the breadth of interest 
there has been in chronic pain and the importance of personal and social meaning that 
is shared by each approach. 
Psycho-analytic approaches have described chronic pain as either, a conversion 
neurosis, a form of masked depression, or a hypochondriacal reaction and are based 
on the psycho-analytic view (Symington, 1986) that it results from a compromise 
between the fulfilment of a `forbidden wish' and its punishment. More recent 
approaches addressed the metaphorical nature of the pain site and saw it as the 
somatization or sublimation of powerful personal emotional impulses and intra- 
psychic conflicts. The rigour of psycho-analytic research has never satisfied scientific 
criteria and their findings are generally considered to be interesting but not testable. 
42 
The evidence of Benjamin et al. (1988) that psychological disturbance has been found 
to be as great in patients with an organic basis to their pain as in those with no organic 
diagnosis also undermines the argument for a purely psychogenic pain. 
Such an approach could also be criticised for being too uni-dimensional and not 
relating to pain as a multi-dimensional bio-psycho-social phenomenon. The 
traditional psycho-analytic approach seeks to explain the differences in reported pain 
according to the personality of the patient or the presence of a disorder. Patients are 
subsequently treated in a dichotomous fashion and their pain classified as either 
`organic' or `functional'. If the pain is organic it is considered `real' and if not, it is 
defined by exclusion to be `psychogenic' and explained as a somatoform disorder. 
This makes many assumptions: 
(i) That pain measurement is reliable 
(ii) That current diagnostic methods can detect all possible medical pathology. 
(iii) That there are no differences between people other than psychopathological 
ones. 
(iv) That pain cannot cause emotional problems, but is always the symptom of one. 
These are all crude assumptions based on a reductionist and biomedical model that do 
not take account of the multi-dimensional nature of pain. Exclusively behaviourist or 
cognitive approaches, or an integrated cognitive-behavioural one would be equally at 
fault should they neglect the fact that pain existed and operated within a 
biopsychosocial context. 
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Family systems therapists have a clinical tradition of working with people in physical 
illness (Altschuler, 1997) and the importance of the family in chronic pain sufferer is 
important (Kerns and Payne, 1996; Kerns, 1999). Theorists believe that the emotional 
strain linked to pain and illness is related to the communicative nature of pain and that 
the symptoms of the patient are maintained if they fulfill the collective emotional 
needs of the family as a unit or social system (Roy, 1986; Patterson and Garwick, 
1994). A rigidity in family interactions was considered to lead to the onset of a 
psychosomatic illness and the immediate precipitation of the symptoms were often 
caused by a threat to the family homeostasis whilst the maintenance of the symptom 
was explained by the new stability the symptom provided to the family system (Roy, 
1986; Nicassio and Radejevic, 1993). 
The implications of systems theory were supported by Smith and Friedman (1999) 
who looked at how the chronic benign low back pain patients perceived their pain 
within the context of their family relationships and suggested that the pain acted as a 
mechanism to regulate the distance and closeness of the sufferer to their family 
members. 
As with the psycho-analytic studies more research related to a systems approach to 
chronic pain would be helpful, but the conclusions offer interesting avenues to 
explore and promote the active consideration of the symbolic, social and 
psychological factors over the physical ones in the genesis and maintenance of 
chronic pain. 
The evidence suggests that it is unlikely that any one prescriptive psychological 
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theory that neglects to see pain in its bio-psycho-social context will be able to explain 
the multi-dimensional puzzle of chronic pain successfully and will only repeat the 
failures of the medical model. That is not to say that for specific patients the two 
approaches above have not been very helpful. 
Chronic Pain Management - Pain Management Programmes. 
An argument in support of the primacy of psychological factors in chronic pain is the 
efficacy and utility of chronic pain management programmes. These are 
psychological interventions designed to help people better manage their pain and 
reduce the disability and distress concommitant with it. 
Living with chronic pain involves managing more than just the sensation and 
unpleasantness of pain but also its personal and social impact, including the changes, 
losses and uncertainty it brings for both the sufferer and their families and carers 
(Hanson and Gerber, 1990; Main and Spainswick 2000). 
The services for people with chronic pain are grounded in the bio-psycho-social 
model and many studies have been able to show their utility and efficacy (Flor et al., 
1992; Morley et al., 1999). These services are in demand as chronic pain is a 
significant source of disability and morbidity amongst the working population and has 
been described as a public health problem of epidemic proportions (Rosen, 1994). 
Pain management programmes vary according to their composition and approach but 
most if not all are based on the gate-control theory of pain (Melzack and Wall, 1988). 
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They attend explicitly to the psychosocial processes involved in the mediation of 
chronic pain and aim to enhance the individual's ability to manage and cope with their 
chronic benign low back pain. 
Each of the psychological theories reviewed above have contributed to the 
development of helpful psychological interventions for chronic pain. Although 
services differ locally in their approaches they each share certain common features, 
(Turk and Holzman, 1983; Hanson and Gerber, 1990; Gatchell and Turk, 1999) which 
are: 
(i) Reconceptualisation. Providing a rationale of the patients' pain in a way that 
makes it understandable to them and amenable to modification.. 
(ii) A message of hope and optimism to combat demoralization. 
(iii) The individualisation of treatment to suit the patient's needs and take explicit 
account of their psycho-social situation. 
(iv) Active patient participation and responsibility in the quest for improvement. 
(v) The acquisition of pain management skills. 
(vi) The promotion of self-efficacy. 
(vii) The attribution of change to the self. 
Each of these common elements and objectives are shared with other chronic illness 
rehabilitation programmes (Bennett, 2000) and some psychotherapies (Dryden, 1996). 
They highlight the benefit of focusing on the personal and psychosocial resources of 
the individual sufferer in chronic illness, independent of their medical situation. 
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Pain Management Programmes (PMP) are the most popular group psychological 
interventions and take a palliative approach to chronic pain. They are not concerned 
primarily with ridding a person of pain but are focused on helping people deal with, 
cope and ultimately manage the effects of having chronic pain. People referred to a 
PMP have generally experienced a significant decline in their social, recreational, 
vocational and domestic activities and are often experiencing psychological distress 
(Main and Spainswick, 2000; Gatchell and Turk, 1996; Hanson and Gerber, 1991). 
Chronic pain is a broad term that encompasses many different types of pain of which 
chronic benign low back pain is one of the largest. Similarly, patients who display 
and endure chronic pain syndrome, that is pain with disabling distress are also not an 
homogenous group. The previous section on coping strategies highlighted the 
extensive and complex variety of individual responses to chronic pain and how each 
one, although described as a strategy, did not appear to serve a single function but was 
perhaps better described as a multi-dimensional reflection of that persons appraisal of 
their situation. Turk and Rudy (1988) surveyed a clinical population of chronic 
benign pain sufferers and found evidence of their diversity and the variation in their 
clinical need. They distinguished between three distinct profiles of patients which 
were; `Dysfunctional' (DYS), `Interpersonally Distressed' (ID) and `Adaptive 
Copers' (AC). DYS patients reported high levels of psychological distress, inactivity 
and felt a lack of control whilst ID patients felt they had little social support and that 
their pain was dismissed by important others. In contrast AC patients reported less 
pain and distress and functioned at a higher level of mobility. These findings were 
reinforced by Mikail et al. (1993) and were used to show how an enhanced 
therapeutic effect could be achieved by tailoring interventions to the more specific 
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and personal needs of chronic pain patients (Turk and Okifuji, 1998; Turk et al., 
1998). 
A pain management programme format varies from centre to centre. There are both 
inpatient and outpatient programmes and the amount of patient contact time is 
dependent on the resources available. Due to the multifaceted nature of chronic pain 
the team running a PMP is typically multidisciplinary consisting of a nurse, doctor, 
physiotherapist, occupational therapist and a clinical psychologist. 
The psychological therapeutic approach of a pain management programme is based 
mainly on cognitive-behavioural theory. Although clinical psychologists are divided 
in the emphasis they place on either the cognitive or behavioural components in 
therapy it is difficult to differentiate between them in practise. Implicit in cognitive- 
behavioural therapy (CBT) is an emphasis on helping patients to look after 
themselves. Bradley (1996) highlighted the four main objectives of CBT when 
applied to chronic pain patients, which were: 
To help patients to alter their beliefs that their symptoms are unmanageable 
and teach them to become resourceful problem solvers. 
To help patients to monitor their thoughts, emotions and behaviours so they 
may realize the relationships between these and environmental events, pain, 
emotions and psychosocial difficulties. 
To help patients to practice behaviours at certain times to cope effectively with 
pain, emotions and psychosocial difficulties. 
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To help patients to learn and maintain adaptive ways of thinking, feeling and 
responding that can be used to cope with problems that may arise after the 
termination of the PMP. 
There have been a number of meta-analyses into the efficacy of PMPs. Morley et at. 
(1999) conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis of the randomised control 
trials that had examined the efficacy of PMPs. They found strong evidence for the 
efficacy of cognitive-behavioural treatments in restoring function, mood and reducing 
pain and disability. Their analysis also found PMP multidisciplinary approaches to be 
significantly better at achieving positive changes in pain experience, cognitive coping 
and appraisals and reducing pain behaviours compared to uni-modal treatment 
approaches. Studies comparing PMPs to waiting list controls showed the same 
significant differences, as well as significant improvements in mood, affect, activity 
levels and social role functioning. 
Morley et at. (1999) were critical of the research they reviewed and noted that most 
empirical studies had an over-reliance on self-report measures and not enough direct 
observational reports. They felt there was a poor representation in the data of 
measures of health service use, drug intake, uptake of additional treatment and change 
in work and occupational status. 
Due to the nature of a meta-analysis many outcome measures have to be subjectively 
classified into higher-order constructs to aid the making of generic conclusions. In 
addition to this the variability between different programmes and the difficulty in 
standardising the application of the wide variety of cognitive-behavioural therapies 
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can prevent important effects of a the cognitive-behavioural approach to chronic pain 
being identified. It can be argued that such a statistical analysis only gives a view of 
the general efficacy of the most common components of pain management 
programmes and that little comment on the therapeutic processes involved is possible. 
The majority of studies used in the Morley et al. (1999) meta-analysis were designed 
to compare pre and post adjustment measures to determine contemporaneous efficacy 
and little long term follow-up data was taken. Other longitudinal designs have 
however shown long term improvements. One randomised control study followed up 
an outpatient multi-modal CBT programme over 18 months and found the CBT group 
to be significantly better than the controls on measures of pain intensity, behaviour 
change pain coping ability at work (Jensen & Bodin, 1998). A much earlier study by 
Guck et al. (1985) compared post-treatment patients with controls from one to five 
years after treatment and found patients reported less pain and depression and an 
overall increase in quality of life above that of the controls. 
Psychologically based pain management programmes, although the treatment of 
choice and proven to be effective remain only partially understood. Many medical, 
personal, social and cultural factors are beyond the influence of such interventions 
and they should not be considered to have failed if they have not produced significant 
change at every level. However, the mechanisms underlying treatment success have 
yet to be determined and it is still not clear what works for whom (Tait, 1999). The 
limits of our knowledge are exposed by the difficulties we have in explaining 
outcomes and predicting the individual variability of patients' progress through pain 
management interventions. Turk and Rudy (1991) asserted this view in their 
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conclusion that it was unclear exactly what people with pain have to do to feel better 
and that as a consequence compliance, adherence to treatment and attrition from 
programmes remained a problem. Turk and Flor (1984) and Jensen et al. (1991) when 
reviewing treatment approaches each concluded that the development of research into 
the contextual and processual factors in chronic pain was required to improve services 
in this regard. 
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Chapter Three. 
Qualitative Research and Chronic Pain. 
Introduction. 
Psychological research has yet to address completely the dynamic complexity of chronic benign 
low back pain and it could be argued that this is due in part to the limits of the approaches that 
have been employed to date. Despite the evidence of an acknowledgement of the significance 
of the meaning and phenomenology of chronic pain outlined earlier, psychological research and 
treatment has only recently begun to adopt qualitative methodologies to examine it. Little 
attention beyond the anecdotal accounts of clinicians has been given to the lived experience of 
people with back pain (Carter, 1999) and this was exposed in the literature review undertaken by 
Walker et al. (1999) who could not identify any published studies using qualitative methods in 
any of the journals directed solely to the study of pain. 
The research to date has shown much of the multi-dimensional nature and complexity of pain 
and provided us with a wealth of data about it and the argument for applying qualitative methods 
does not imply the rejection or dismissal of the findings of quantitative research. Shaw (2001) 
emphasised this point when making the case for the application of Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) in health psychology: 
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without the invaluable knowledge provided by these traditional studies health psychology 
and more fundamentally, health practice, would not bare the high levels of sophistication 
it does today. (p48). 
Much remains that defies our understanding of chronic benign low back pain and a 
phenomenological approach could be utilised to explore more fully the confusion that is left. 
There is a need for a different approach, not to replace empiricism, but to complement it: 
phenomenological perspective in psychology offers the possibility of reconsidering many 
established psychological issues and concerns in ways which are original and 
illuminating. (preface ix) Spinelli (1989) 
Although few qualitative studies of the personal experience of pain have been published there are 
examples of quantitative endeavours to attend to the symbolic nature of pain and the use of 
language. Melzack and Torgerson (1971) in their preliminary work for the McGill Pain 
Questionnaire were keen to develop new approaches to the problem of assessing pain and wanted 
to use words instead of numbers to describe its many forms. This was an attempt to view pain as 
more than just a sensory phenomenon and explore the wealth of language that was available to 
describe it. Their ambitions were limited at the time but they hoped to explore the many 
different ways that pain could be described in an empirical way,. Words used to define pain 
were brought together and categorised and an attempt was then made to scale them on a common 
numeric intensity dimension. Unfortunately this maintained the primacy of a quantified view of 
pain intensity in research and clinical work by taking a rich source of qualitative data and 
reducing it to a single dimension and a number. The study did, however lend strong support to 
the notion that pain represents a wide variety of experiences that can be captured, expressed and 
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accounted for in the sufferer's use of language. They were able to show that the words that were 
used revealed something about the nature of pain and showed it to be something that involved 
previous experience, attribution and meaning. They went on to suggest that a detailed analysis 
of the quality and structure of the pain experience was required, but this has yet to happen in the 
way they intended. Their experience revealed how the nature of pain will resist any attempts to 
reduce it to a simple uni-dimensional phenomenon and that the language used to describe pain 
does not contain enough shared or consistent meaning to work successfully as a diagnostic 
medical tool. 
Rationale for the adoption of a Qualitative Approach in the study of Chronic Benign Low 
Back Pain. 
The qualitative approach and the methods employed within it are reviewed extensively in the 
next chapter (the Qualitative Approach). Prior to this in the section below a rationale is given for 
adopting it in this thesis. 
Getting at the Meaning of Chronic Pain. 
A range of explanatory theories have been developed for chronic pain and these have been 
criticised for being too reductive (Novy et al., 1995). Novy et al. indicated the need for more 
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complex theories that could integrate the many multi-dimensional aspects of pain whilst Aldrich 
et al. (2000) also argued that such theories needed to recognise these elements as dynamic 
phenomenona and not static or concrete. Qualitative methods have been shown to be useful in 
the study of fluid and rapidly changing phenomena that are not easily measurable. 
The inability to quantify pain or its related cognitions and emotions in a reliable and valid way 
remains a key research problem and one which supports the argument for developing alternative 
ways of studying pain. This argument is not just based on a critique of the limits of the research 
that has been done to date, but has emerged out of the conclusions formed from that research and 
their recommendations for further study (e. g. Price, 1999; Pincus and Morley 2001). A more 
'idiographic approach to the study of pain is recommended and in particular one that privileged 
the description and interpretation of the personal meanings of chronic pain and articulated the 
processes by which those whom suffer it constructed and made sense of their experience. 
Two examples of the problems of quantifying the chronic pain phenomena are `straight leg 
raising' and the `visual analogue scale' (VAS). Both are accepted widely as quantified measures 
of pain sensation and disability but claims that they capture the pain experience in an objective or 
valid manner are problematic. Medical and sensory conceptualisations of pain have led to the 
use of measures such as `straight leg raising' (the degree to which some-one can raise their leg 
from the horizontal) to determine the nature and extent of pain sensation, organic pathology and 
disability. The interpretations of these findings however rely on the clinical judgement of the 
clinician and are poorly standardised (Jensen et al., 1991). They also do not allow for the social 
demand characteristics of the situation, for example, some one in chronic pain could raise their 
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leg to its mechanical limit once, as long as they were prepared to endure severe pain as a result. 
That pain would most likely not be contingent on the leg raise but would emerge the next day. 
Consequently, the degree to which a person with chronic pain can raise their leg is not a measure 
of their pain but could also be a function of what they hoped to do the next day, or what they 
wanted the person assessing them to think of them. 
A more psychological measure is the visual analogue scale (VAS) to measure pain severity and 
intensity. Despite its development as a standardised and objective pain measure it also remains 
very subjective. Sufferers are asked to indicate the severity of their pain by placing a mark on a 
100 millimetre line where one end signifies `no pain' and the other the `the worst pain 
imaginable'. This is based on the assumption that pain can be evaluated along one dimension 
and that `the worst pain imaginable' remained constant for the individual. This does not allow 
for the possibility that the person's experience could cause their imagination to change over time 
and so alter their report of pain. 
As some-one's pain can only be inferred from their behaviour and self-report its quantitative 
study will always be problematic. Quantifying pain and aspiring for an objective and stable 
measure limits the extent to which it can be viewed as a dynamic or fluid phenomenon that can 
be different according to context and contain within it paradoxical or contrasting elements. The 
evidence suggests that pain is more than just an acute primitive warning signal and its complex 
presentation demands further study. 
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Quantitative empirical research to date has clarified and classified the psychological nature of 
chronic benign low back pain (Skevington, 1995). However, although in each case the 
researchers have identified important constructs, beliefs and behaviours that are characteristic of 
and associated with chronic pain, they have been unable to address completely how or why such 
behaviours and beliefs were formed, maintained or interacted. Further research is recommended 
by a number of authors to gain a greater awareness of the personal meaning of pain to the 
sufferer and the processes involved in the development of chronic pain (Craig, 1984; Holzman & 
Turk, 1986; Jensen et al., 1994; Jamison et al., 1994; Flor & Turk, 1984; Gatchel and Turk, 
1999). Leventhal (1993) considered that the nature of personal meaning needed to be given a 
central focus in the study of pain because: 
It has long been clear that the meaning given a somatic (pain) experience will play 
a crucial role in the activation of the emotional-motivational component of the 
pain system. (p142) 
Craig (1984) after acknowledging the extensive expansion of research on the pain phenomenon 
argued that the developments in our knowledge highlighted the need to gain a greater awareness 
of both the meaning of the pain to the sufferer and the relationship between a subjective 
experience and its overt expression. Craig felt that these phenomenon could best be understood 
as a product of the sufferer's personal background which lends further support to the value of 
adopting an idiographic approach to research. 
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Anecdotal Studies 
There is a small literature of anecdotal studies about the experience of chronic pain written by 
experienced clinicians. These did not follow a systematic method but attended to the meaning of 
the personal experience of their patients. They are reviewed below. 
Hubner (1984) in his clinical observations, placed pain at the heart of the individual's experience 
of their lives: 
Pain had posed the ultimate question of meaning; that is, dominated by pain, and 
distracted by nothing, what did these patients live for? What gave their lives 
meaning? (p446) 
Hubner considered that pain challenged the sufferers' meanings about their life and in so doing 
isolated them from those around them. To be in pain involved `being separated, being alone. At 
no time are we more alone than when we are in the grip of pain' (p447). Bakan (1968) took a 
similar view and addressed the puzzle of pain by considering it, as did Frankl (1959), as an 
essential human experience which was indivisible from life and not simply a diagnostic tool of 
medical science but something which had the destructive potential to challenge the meaning of 
life. 
In LeShan's (1964) work with patients in severe pain of long duration their pain was described as 
`utter senselessness' and `meaningless' but LeShan saw that individuals always tried to give it 
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meaning. He compared chronic pain with a nightmare as, (i) terrible things were done and worse 
threatened, (ii) all control appeared to be external, (iii) there was no time limit set. LeShan and 
Frankl both emphasised that as humans we have a need to find a reason or cause for suffering, a 
`will-to-meaning', and that the lack of a perceived meaning in chronic pain or of a culturally 
understood context made it harder for the individual to cope with. According to LeShan chronic 
pain did not warn or tell us what to do, it did not help us to act and may be so severe as to disrupt 
useful activities and habits. He concluded that as we cannot act against chronic pain, but can 
only bear it, the only adequate expression of this kind of pain was a scream. 
The above writings reinforce the concept of pain as a destructive force and described the 
potential of chronic pain to produce a form of existential frustration in the individual, a noögenic 
neurosis as Frankl put it where the sufferer felt not just pain but also experienced no other 
positive value in their life. This conforms with Levi (1987) who's personal account of suffering 
led him to believe that when enduring abuse and hardship it was the retention of an individual 
sense of purpose in living that promoted survival in adversity rather than a robust constitution. 
During the last 30 years the field of pain control and research has grown at an ever increasing 
rate and pain phenomena are now considered an integral part of psychological theory, 
experimentation and clinical practice. Despite this progress however our understanding of 
chronic pain remains plagued by differences in focus and is typified more by debate than 
consensus. Psychological research into pain has been criticised for a lack of rigour and the 
neglect of single case design (Jensen et al., 1991; Morley et al., 1999) and the manner in which it 
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struggles to answer the contextual and phenomenological questions that have been specified as 
important in helping take pain research forward. 
Much mainstream psychological research has focused on pain management rather than pain and 
represents an attempt to quantify and measure the experience in order to determine the efficacy 
of pain control procedures or the relative contribution of certain discrete factors. Large group 
studies and statistical analyses have not enabled the individual and personal parameters of the 
participants to be defined and denies the researcher the opportunity to study themes related to the 
idiosyncratic process of suffering chronic pain. 
The extant psychological research suggests that the phenomenology and meaning of pain cannot 
be ignored and a qualitative approach has been shown to be useful to develop our understanding 
further. Price (1999) also argued that, as the ontology of pain was subjective, there was a need 
for new and different forms of study that could address it as such and recommended the 
application of a phenomenological approach to develop our understanding and knowledge: 
A deeper understanding of pain and pain modulation requires that both scientists and 
healthcare providers directly address the meanings of pain (p210) 
Chapman et al. (1999) felt that to develop our understanding of pain further the bio-psycho- 
social model itself required further development as it did not explain adequately the process of 
how the person's psychosocial experience affected their brain and body. They proposed that a 
constructivist perspective would help in this regard. One which acknowledged processes of 
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consciousness and meaning and assumed that the brain responded to an internal representation of 
reality, one of pain as a phenomenon, rather than to an objective or external reality. 
Chapman et al. identified some key features of human consciousness which they felt were 
important in the construction of a personal representation of chronic pain (or any other similar 
phenomenon) for the sufferer. These were; `coherence', which tended toward the formation of a 
personal meaning situated in space and time; a `sense of self, described as an epiphenomenon of 
the brain's tendency toward that coherence which allows for a point of view or perspective to be 
established and maintained in a stable fashion over time; and `purposiveness' which inclines 
toward survival and adaptation and mediates the allocation of finite resources. 
The constructivist view expands on the idea of the importance of cognitive schemata (Dar and 
Leventhal, 1993; Pincus and Morley 2001) or `common sense' models in the experience of pain 
(Leventhal, 1993) and according to Chapman et al. provides for a pathway from the peripheral 
and biomedical processes of transduction and nociception through to the final and psychological 
experience of pain. 
The review in chapter two of the definitions, theories and psychological aspects of chronic 
benign low back pain showed it to be a multi-dimensional phenomenon and established the 
importance of the psycho-social elements within it. Its `unpleasantness' was evident in the 
extensive negative affect, cognitive distortion and behavioural dysfunction and disability that 
was associated with it. Merskey (1984) stated that the management of pain should be based on a 
clear concept of the nature of pain and that the challenge was to understand the relationship 
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between pain sensation, distress and disability which was neither directly linear nor causal but 
personal and psycho-social 
Pain is now both defined and recognised as a subjective experience and this has had important 
implications in its research, enabling a focus to be directed toward phenomenological and 
contextual influences (Anand and Craig, 1996; Encandela, 1993; Price, 1999). Despite such 
recommendations the number of published empirical studies on the personal meaning of pain is 
limited and research is most often to be found within the medical sociology literature (e. g. 
Kotarba 1983; Baszanger, 1992; Bury, 1988; Bendelow & Williams, 1995). Carter (1999) 
concluded that little attention has yet been given in the study of pain to the lived experience of 
people with back pain. 
The review of the body of qualitative research on chronic pain that follows later in this chapter 
shows that the application of this approach is at an early stage. There is little on chronic benign 
pain as opposed to chronic malignant pain or chronic illness and even less that adopts a more 
explicit idiographic approach looking at the individual's private experience of the chronic benign 
low back pain itself. Much of the work adopts a sociological perspective that highlights the 
social consequences of having pain and the difficulties that are created within the sufferer's 
family system, or in their relationship with the health and social services. 
The qualitative psychological studies to date, however few in number, have shown that there is a 
significant advantage to employing a qualitative methodology and gaining access to an area of 
the individual's experience that could not otherwise be secured. The conclusions of qualitative 
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study are, by their nature, tentative and help to discern the themes around which the participants 
order and build an understanding of their experience. 
Qualitative research into physical health has been criticised from within for according the socio- 
linguistic dimension too much privilege such that the material or physical dimension of the 
experience of illness, the body, has been overlooked or rendered invisible (Yardley, 1997a). In 
health psychology this takes the form of focusing too much on the discursive nature of 
experience such that the material or external aspects are neglected and a reductive, dualistic 
mind-body approach that excludes the body and only attends to the mind is reinforced. The 
findings and conclusions that emerge from such an approach to research is then at risk of 
becoming disembodied from the participants' experience and guilty of being equally as 
unrepresentative and limited in its scope as a quantitative study (Kelly and Field, 1996). The 
relationship between discourse and physicality is an ongoing source of debate and has led to the 
development of material-discursive approaches that acknowledge the physical reality of the body 
and attempt to encapsulate theories which embody the participant's experience and do not 
relegate the body to a minor or passive role (Yardley, 1997a; Murray and Chamberlain, 1999). 
This notion, which has been termed `embodiment' is an attempt to maintain the idea that we 
experience things from the perspective of an integrated and `lived body' (Bendelow and 
Williams, 1995; Frank, 1990) and as such are more than simply a psyche reacting to and separate 
from a body. To not adopt this view would represent a replication of the biomedical and dualist 
perspective that discursive approaches set out to challenge. A more integrated and `embodied' 
approach recognises that the physical aspect of experience is equally as responsive to contextual 
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and discursive processes and an important focus of study. In this way the contribution of more 
physical phenomena such as dizziness, fatigue, pain, nausea, heat, weight gain or anxiety can be 
recognised and included within any emergent theory 
Phenomenology, with its primary focus on the personal experience of the participant provides a 
useful means of achieving such an approach and recent writings have aimed to develop a 
phenomenological approach to the body and illness which conceptualise it as an embodied, 
multi-dimensional phenomenon (Murray and Chamberlain, 1999; Yardley, 1997; Borkan et al., 
1995). 
This Research Project: using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to examine 
the personal experience of chronic benign low back pain. 
This doctorate represents my contribution to the development of our understanding of chronic 
benign low back pain and the request that is repeated often in the literature to attend to an aspect 
of the personal experience of chronic pain in a manner that is firmly psychological in orientation 
and emphasis. 
The particular approach that has been adopted, interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 
and its theoretical basis are described in detail in the next two chapters. 
The research to date about the psychology of chronic benign low back pain is compelling and 
shows it to be an important and fascinating area of study. In particular it shows that there is a 
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pressing need to continue to study it from a qualitative perspective and look at its `lived' 
experience and personal meaning. 
Qualitative research methods are concerned with achieving a descriptive or conceptual account 
of the data rather than constructing general laws of behaviour and can help to build theory in 
areas which are difficult to research in more quantitative ways. They can be particularly helpful 
in making sense of a mass of abstract information or in areas typified by fluidity or change. 
The commitment of IPA to an idiographic case-study approach can complement both the 
extensive quantitative research that has been published to date and add to the very limited body 
of qualitative research that shows a need for more phenomenological study. The value of IPA is 
it is data-driven, it employs a method that maintains a closeness to the data and as a consequence 
is governed very much by the accounts given by the participants. Its flexibility enables the 
researcher to investigate the personal experience of the participant within a cultural context and 
make connections between the two, attending to both what is unique and what is shared within 
the participant's accounts (Shaw, 2001). 
A considerable number of health psychology studies have now been published using IPA and 
although it's use is not exclusive to health psychology it has been proven to be particularly useful 
in this field. The phenomenon under study in health psychology; peoples bodies and the 
experiences they have of them are ideal subjects for study using IPA as they are recognised to be 
complex, subjective and dynamic and influenced by contextual factors that are not easily 
measurable. It is useful for exploring the relationship between subjective perceptual processes 
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and disease and there is already a growing literature on the use of IPA in a variety of areas in 
health psychology, including: genetics (Michie et al, 1999; Smith et al., 2000), sexual health 
(Flowers etal., 1997; Flowers et al., 1998), palliative care (Jarrett et al., 1999), and pregnancy 
(Smith, 1999a; Smith, 1999b). 
The existence of real, material entities such as bodies and disease provides an ideal context for 
this kind of qualitative research. Smith et al. (1999) summed this up by saying: 
Why is IPA relevant to health psychology? It can be argued that health psychology is 
generally premised on the belief that people think about their bodies and that their talk 
about these bodies in some way relates to those thoughts. (p219) 
Accessing the personal meanings inherent in the participants' experiences is central to this form 
of study. The aim is to try to understand and illuminate their content and complexity rather than 
determine any measure of their frequency. As mentioned in the next chapter on qualitative 
research, these meanings are rarely transparent and emerge via the interpretative process which 
involves the investigator in a sustained engagement with the data. That is the approach within 
each of the studies in this thesis and the data are the verbatim transcripts of semi-structured 
interviews given by the study participants. 
This doctorate will attempt to add to our understanding of chronic benign low back pain by going 
some way to addressing a gap in the extant research which indicates an urgent need for more 
psychological idiographic qualitative studies to complement the body of quantitative and 
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sociological work that has been done to date. Chronic benign low back pain represents perhaps 
one of the best subjects for this kind of research as the evidence suggests it involves the ever- 
changing interplay of physical, psychological and social elements. 
Empirical Qualitative Studies in Chronic Pain. 
Studies directed explicitly at exploring the personal meaning of chronic pain are rare in the 
psychology literature and until recently tended to represent the anecdotal observations of 
experienced clinicians, rather than the application of a particular empirical method (reviewed in 
chapter two). Of the qualitative study on chronic pain that there is, the majority has been 
undertaken within medical sociology and has either focused exclusively on determining the 
social meanings related to the phenomenon under study or looked more broadly at chronic illness 
in general. 
The impact of a chronic disabling condition such as pain on the individual was described by 
Bury (1982) as a `biographical disruption'. Chronic pain and illness was shown to call into 
question the sufferer's past and future and required them both to rethink each one and renegotiate 
each of their relationships. Williams (1984) also argued along similar lines that chronic illness 
had the potential to cause the sufferer to rethink their situation extensively and engage in a 
`narrative reconstruction' of their lives. In the absence of other facts, the individual drew upon 
their lay beliefs to construct an account of the onset of their illness and often this entailed that 
they reconfigured their biography, past and present. It was essential for the sufferer to construct 
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an account of their situation and they used whatever beliefs, models or `facts' that were available 
to them to serve this process. 
Strauss (1984) looked at chronic illness generally and introduced the notion of the `illness 
trajectory' to describe the total amount of work undertaken by the sufferer over time to manage 
their illness. Themes such as uncertainty, intrusion and social isolation were considered by 
Strauss to be important in defining the individual's particular trajectory which itself was then felt 
to have consequences for their social roles and identity, how they defined themselves and were 
defined by others. Corbin and Strauss (1987) later wrote about the active way in which people 
with chronic conditions endured a process of identity reconstruction as their situation changed 
and deteriorated and they endeavoured to maintain a continuity with the life they knew prior to 
their illness. 
Charmaz (1983,1995b, 1999) emphasised the degree of loss associated with chronic illness and 
how this forced the sufferer to adapt constantly. Charmaz speculated at how the experience of 
chronic illness disrupted the sufferers social identity and forced them to redefine their place 
within their social and cultural network. This process of definition took place in the context of 
social discreditation and produced a sense of alienation in the sufferer as they became dislocated 
from their previous and preferred social identities. Their identities were not conscious and had 
been taken for granted by them up to that point, only emerging into consciousness as a result of 
their loss. Other studies also highlighted the deleterious impact of illnesses that had chronic 
consequences on the sufferer's self-concept and the problematic contrast between their private 
sense of self and their public social identity (Yoshida, 1993; Kelly, 1992). 
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An explicitly qualitative approach to chronic benign pain was undertaken by Baszanger (1992) 
and took as its focus two different pain centres with contrasting philosophies although the same 
theoretical base in the gate-control theory of pain. Baszanger focused on the context and setting 
of a pain clinic, described its characteristics and examined how physicians specialising in chronic 
pain worked at `deciphering' pain to themselves and for the patient. The study was not an 
analysis of the sufferer's experience of pain but that of the professionals who set out to treat 
them. 
Baszanger found that there was no consensus regarding chronic pain that could be used to 
characterise a patient's pain situation or organise relations between professional and lay persons. 
This difficulty, `the problematic factuality of pain and doctrinal debate' (p212) affected 
physicians' everyday practices and their relations with patients. By using two pain centres with 
opposite conceptions and practices Baszanger showed the differing ways in which the physicians 
determined the patient's pain, formulated advice to them and how this involved them in specific 
systems of relations with patients. This enabled her to draw attention to the use of operational 
knowledge and the physicians' arrangements of the facts that amounted to the resources they 
used for organising interventions. She revealed how operational knowledge was central to the 
medical work that brought doctors and patients together. 
A researcher who focused on the social meanings attached to chronic benign low back pain 
specifically was Kotarba (1983), who underscored how difficult it was for chronic benign low 
back pain sufferers to function securely within their social settings, free of punitive labels. 
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Finding an acceptable role or public identity was shown to be difficult and their self-concept 
suffered as a consequence. Kotarba, like Williams (1984) highlighted how chronic benign low 
back pain patients did not resign themselves passively to having pain but engaged in a continual 
sense-making process and showed how they reached out to others in their social world to 
establish and determine the meanings of their pain. He focused on the loss of self-esteem that 
could occur when having pain threatened the competent fulfillment of particular social roles, 
such as the `good patient', `good parent' or `good worker'. The lack of any positive social 
meanings for chronic benign low back pain was a key part of Kotarba's thesis: 
the common reaction among patients is to interpret the term `chronic benign low back 
pain patient' as a negative evaluation of self. They see themselves as somehow being blamed for their misery or as having a weak character for not remaining stoic. (p76) 
Kotarba highlighted how the experience of chronic pain challenged the individual's definition of 
themselves and their social worth through the absence and loss of any positive social identities 
and roles. They showed how sufferers had to defend themselves against the acquisition of 
negative social labels and struggled to fulfil other more positive ones competently. Chronic pain 
often meant it was difficult even to be a `good patient'. 
Hellstrom (2001) and Charmaz (1991,1994,1999) highlighted the importance of the dimension 
of time in relation to the individual's experience of their self-concept during a chronic illness.. 
Hellstrom (2001) adopted a phenomenological method and looked specifically at the problematic 
relationship between chronic benign low back pain and the self. She emphasised a key task in 
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chronic benign low back pain of maintaining the consistency of the self and focused on how this 
unfolded problematically over time. To Helstrom, the self was something that was both stable 
and malleable and could, as a result of chronic benign low back pain, develop into many 
different and sometimes unhelpful selves. The participants in Helstrom's phenomenological 
study described their self-concept in a number of ways. As a nostalgia for a past self, 
highlighting a significant sense of loss; as a notion of a `projected self where they felt defined 
by others and vulnerable to denigratory labels; and as an `entrapped self where they felt isolated 
in the present, unable to communicate with others or progress and stuck in what Helstrom termed 
a `viscous' present where events could not be controlled or predicted. The task of maintaining a 
consistent self-concept in the face of chronic benign low back pain was highlighted and Helstrom 
argued how when this led to the development of an unrealistic or `spurious' self, like the 
`fictional self described by Charmaz, it could compound the problem and prevent the individual 
concerned adapting constructively to their situation. 
Walker et al (1999) also took a phenomenological approach to the study of chronic pain and a 
prominent theme to emerge was one they termed `in the system' to describe where patients felt 
trapped and powerless within the medical, social security and legal systems. In their study 
personal accounts were collected from chronic back pain sufferers who sought help from a pain 
clinic and analysed using a phenomenological method. Five themes emerged which were 
identified as; `The pain takes over', `Sense of loss', `They don't understand', `Coming to terms' 
and `In the system'. Unfortunately they chose to focus on only one theme, `In the system'. They 
did not expand on the other four in any detail except to say in summary that the participants told 
how their daily lives had been changed irrevocably due to their pain and that it lead to a profound 
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sense of loss that pervaded all aspects of their life. The participants felt misunderstood and 
stigmatised by their pain and this made it difficult to come to terms with their current situation, 
they felt pessimistic and could see no positive future for themselves. 
The theme `In the system' represented the main focus of the Walker et al. study and described in 
detail how those with back pain felt both passive and powerless. The authors argued that they 
were rendered this way to a great extent through becoming entrapped by the very systems which 
were designed to help and protect those who were ill, injured or disabled. The participants' 
experience of both the medical and the welfare systems acted to compound their distress and 
disability through exacerbating their confusion, limiting their sense of control and discretion and 
engendering a feeling of stigma. They concluded that this reinforced the relevance of situational 
explanations for the development of the negative attitudes and perceptions that were often held 
and reported by chronic pain patients. The social meanings related to chronic pain that emerged 
in the study confirmed Kotarba's (1983) findings and emphasised the difficulties chronic pain 
patients had of living with their condition within a social context that conferred it no positive or 
even neutral value. 
The Walker et al. study represented the first exclusively qualitative study to be published in a 
pain journal. It highlighted the importance of situational processes over individual or intra- 
personal factors and explored how the physical, personal and the social elements interacted in the 
experience of chronic pain. Their focus on the one theme `in the system' however tended to 
emphasise and privilege the situational and social factors over the personal and physical 
experience. This echoes the assumption within phenomenology that human experience is too 
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complex for any one study to capture (Giorgi 1985) and highlights the potential for more 
research in this area 
Summary of the Literature 
Pain is an everyday experience that functions to promote protective behaviour aimed at the 
escape or avoidance of physical harm. Viewed in this way it has a strong survival function. 
However, chronic benign pain also has two rather unfortunate and dominant characteristics: first, 
it is an interruptive and unpleasant experience; and second, it can persist long after its survival 
value (or diagnostic utility) is spent. It cannot be measured directly but can only be inferred 
from the sufferer's self-report and behaviour. 
Chronic benign low back pain has the potential to disable cognitive functioning and can be 
associated with high levels of negative affect and disability. It has been described as 
`physiologically offensive' (Fernandez and Turk, 1995) and `malefic' (Bonics, 1974) and in 
particular the inherent characteristics of pain: its intensity, novelty, unpredictability and 
association with fear can promote hypervigilance in the sufferer and makes chronic benign low 
back pain particularly good at capturing our attention and securing a place within our 
consciousness (Eccleston and Crombez, 1999). 
Counter to the notion of pain as a private event it can usefully be understood as a cultural, social, 
and symbolic event. The advent of the gate-control theory (Melzack and Wall, 1965) and the 
biopsychosocial model (Turk et al., 1983) established a connection between psychological 
73 
factors and the ultimate experience of pain that helped to some degree to explain the dynamic 
and idiosyncratic relationship between pain sensation, tissue damage, distress and disability. 
Cognitive-behavioural theories consider that the suffering, maintenance and causes of chronic 
pain are the result of maladaptive behaviours, reinforcement contingencies, cognitions and a 
deficiency of coping skills. In particular, chronic benign low back pain has been related to: 
Secondary hypertension and ischaemia due to excessive guarding and bracing of the pain 
related parts of the body. 
The avoidance of movement due to secondary gain and social reinforcement that 
promotes immobility, disability and the deconditioning of the body. 
A phobic level of fear-avoidance of movement driven by the incorrect belief that the pain 
it caused signalled further tissue damage and peripheral pathology (as would be the case 
perhaps in acute pain). 
Cognitive distortions such as catastrophisation which prompt further distress, 
hypervigilance to pain and disability and an inability to adopt any useful coping strategies 
that might promote better adjustment or acceptance. 
Qualitatitive studies of chronic pain are very limited in number and have highlighted the 
difficulties related to the process of loss, of preserving a valued social identity, maintaining a 
coherent sense of self and the problems of relating productively to medical health services. 
The focus of much psychological research has most often been on chronic pain management 
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rather than the pain itself and there is a need for more progress in understanding key aspects of 
the experience of pain such as the pathway or link between psychosocial factors and the pain- 
gate, the active therapeutic ingredients of change and rehabilitation and the manner in which 
chronic pain unfolds and emerges over time following the first acute phase. 
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Chapter Four. 
The Qualitative Approach. 
Introduction. 
This chapter reviews the qualitative approach to research within psychology, gives examples of 
some of the main approaches (although not all as this area is characterised by the variety and 
diversity of the methods that are employed) and argues the case for the utility of qualitative 
research. 
In appearance the qualitative approach is markedly different to the quantitative one although on 
closer inspection they have more in common than might appear from the contrast in their 
underlying philosophies and methods. The presence of a degree of overlap and shared ground 
argues against defining the two approaches in opposition to each other. However, advocates of 
the qualitative approach are critical of the exclusive application of quantitative work within 
psychology. To a certain extent qualitative research emerged out of a dissatisfaction with the 
epistemology and methodologies that characterised the majority of research in mainstream 
academic psychology (Smith et at., 1995a; Yardley, 1997b). From an historical perspective 
psychological research has developed extensively over the last fifty years and as a result has 
moved from controlled laboratory experiments that focused on the manipulation of observable 
behaviours, to the study of more private, covert and intra-psychic phenomenon. This shift 
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represented the development of an interest in the activity of the mind of the person under study. 
Despite this development the ontological and epistemological approach that has been employed 
has most often remained the same, namely the logical positivism and empiricism of the natural 
sciences. 
The qualitative approach is not easy to define in a concise manner. It did not emerge as a single 
or unified movement and the inherent variety, diversity and fierce debate within it defies any 
attempts at achieving a neat summary. The various qualitative approaches that have been applied 
come from different backgrounds and some are more advanced than others in their development. 
A broad consensus regarding the themes that typify the qualitative approach is possible however 
and these include an explicit commitment to; accessing the construction of personal and social 
meaning for the individual, an interest in subjectivity, using interpretation and description rather 
than measurement and statistical analysis, the importance of context and an holistic not atomistic 
approach, examining the process of the phenomena as well as its outcome and viewing the 
imposition of pre-ordained theoretical frameworks and assumptions as problematic as they 
constrained the researcher and may have a poor fit with the subjects perspectives. A priori 
assumptions are considered unacceptable as they interfere with the researcher's main objective 
which is to attend to the subject's personal perspective. 
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Qualitative and Quantitative Psychology. 
Psychology by tradition is a quantitative and positivist discipline although in recent years there has 
been a development in the use of new and alternative approaches that have adopted a more 
constructivist, contextual or discursive epistemology (Smith et al., 1995a, 1995b; Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994). 
Over the last decade the interest in qualitative approaches in psychology has increased 
dramatically and this has prompted the emergence of a number of publications dedicated to the 
approach both within psychology in general (Smith et at, 1995b) and in the area of health 
psychology specifically (Yardley, 1997; Murray and Chamberlain, 1999; Morse and Johnson, 
1991). This represents a significant development in a discipline that has been dominated by 
quantitative study and a dedication to an epistemology and methodology inspired by the natural 
sciences (i. e. Physics). Smith et at. (1995a) asserted that this development was necessary and 
perhaps inevitable in order for the discipline to develop and progress in the study of covert, multi- 
dimensional and dynamic phenomena that require attention to be focused on personal meaning 
and the mind. 
The differences in the two approaches is grounded in their view of several key aspects including; 
the status of an `external reality', objectivity as opposed to subjectivity as the goal of 
measurement and study, how knowledge can be developed and accessed and ultimately, what 
constitutes human nature and a credible or legitimate scientific approach. A simple semantic 
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distinction might be that qualitative work sets out to articulate the nature of the constituent 
properties of an entity whilst quantitative work attempts to determine how much of the entity 
there is, what its dimensions are and how the component parts relate to each other in a logical or 
law-like manner as if they were acting in the same way as a physical particle. Typically a 
quantitative approach transforms a phenomena into a static numerical value in order to analyse it, 
whilst a qualitative study would focus on acts of speech and language or behaviour and attempt to 
describe or interpret the personal meanings within it. Qualitative work has an avowed 
commitment to language and the ways in which people use it. People are seen to engage in the 
active process of making sense of their world and there is a presumption that we build a 
representation of it to use as reference and guide action. Quantitative researchers also accept the 
notion and importance of an internal representation or schema that influences our experience, but 
study it in a different way, most often by treating individuals as interchangeable variables or 
subjects within the context of a controlled experiment. 
The qualitative approach aims to achieve a detailed and textural interpretation or description of 
the phenomenon rather than the quantitative measurement of the relationship between 
hypothesised variables. The orthodox notion of psychological variables is abandoned in favour of 
seeing them as dynamic constructions located and embedded within an embodied social and 
biographical context. Meaning and interpretation are privileged over measurement and statistical 
analysis and explicit attention is given to the social context of the research study itself (Smith et 
al., 1995b; Murray and Chamberlain, 1999; Yardley, 1997). 
79 
Debates between the two approaches are diverse and range from the more conciliatory and 
utilitarian arguments that attempt to define which approach might suit which question (Bryman, 
1988) through to challenging the status of psychology as a science in the traditional prescriptive 
sense and adopting a separatist distinction that separates qualitative work from psychology as a 
science. 
To portray the two approaches in opposition would be problematic as some representatives of 
each would claim to occupy part of the middle ground that exists between them. In particular 
advocates of both approaches would argue that the pursuit of meaning was their goal and 
quantitative researchers would also assert that the interpretation of results to build a theory was 
an important part of their work. The approaches are also not mutually exclusive or incompatible 
and could be employed within the same study to good effect. Yardley (2001) argued that as the 
value of both approaches was now recognised more and more, there was a need to find an 
integrative theoretical framework that enabled the discipline to progress in a pragmatic way, 
rather than maintain a separatist or adversarial debate where each party caricatured and 
misrepresented the other. 
If carried out in their most recognisable forms the two approaches would be distinguished from 
each other easily and the experience of the researcher and the participants would be very different. 
The distinction is clear in the priorities of the different approaches, either toward securing reliable 
and valid measurement in an attempt to determine a universal and objective `reality', or the 
interpretation or description of the individual's subjective sense-making and construction of 
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personal and social meaning through a focus on their use of language and communication. 
Murray and Chamberlain (1999) argued that the emergence of qualitative approaches represented 
a radical alternative to the mainstream positivist tradition: 
Instead of seeking accurate measurement of hypothetically related variables and assessing 
their relationship statistically, these alternative approaches seek complex interpretations of 
specifically socially and historically located phenomenon. (p7) 
Giorgi (1995) considered that the contrast in the two approaches within the one discipline was so 
profound as to place psychology at a critical point in its development. It either adhered strictly to 
the version of science established by the natural sciences or admitted that it was not a science 
according to that definition and adopted another scholarly label. Many qualitative researchers 
argue for adopting an expanded idea of science such that their findings can be afforded the status 
of knowledge (Smith et al, 1995a; Stevenson and Cooper, 1997; Smith, 1996a). 
The quantitative approach in psychology privileges the collection and statistical analysis of 
numerical data in order to determine a `true', reliable, valid and objective set of outcomes and 
conclusions about the object under study. It aims to do this through the logical process of 
statistical analysis, deduction and reasoning. The discrete elements that are believed to constitute 
the phenomenon are identified and relationship between them is determined by treating them as 
independent and dependent variables within an experiment. In this way a detached and neutral 
researcher is able to determine and expose the fundamental laws and patterns that govern how the 
constituents interact. It assumes there is a stable `reality' that is independent of the observer or 
the participant and measurable in an objective way through controlled observations. 
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The quantitative approach within experimental psychology was appropriated from the natural 
sciences of the nineteenth century, physics being the prime example. It draws upon the 
empiricism, positivism and hypothetico-deductive reasoning that are the mainstays of that 
scientific approach and treats individuals as a physicist would treat a natural material or particle. 
It was the dominant philosophy of science at the time that psychology was emerging as a 
discipline and it has been argued that its adoption reflected the need of psychologists at the time 
to both see themselves and be seen by others as legitimate scientists (Murray and Chamberlain, 
1999). This approach informed the early psychological studies which focused on observable 
behaviours that lent themselves easily to experimentation. As the focus changed over time and 
moved on to an interest in cognition and the workings of the mind the same experimental and 
epistemological principles were adhered to (Smith et al, 1995a). It is assumed within a positivist 
paradigm that empirical and quantitative methods, if applied appropriately, give the researcher 
access to an objective reality that can be measured and identified (Charmaz, 1995a): 
sophisticated quantitative methods gained dominance and beliefs in scientific logic, 
objectivity and truth supported and legitimised reducing qualities of human experience to 
quantifiable variables. (p29) 
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Critique of the Quantitative Approach. 
The quantitative approach is criticised as reductive and limiting by qualitative researchers who 
contend that it does not fit well with the inherent nature of human behaviour and experience, 
ignores the context of the subject under study and cannot address or identify the processes 
involved. Whereas the focus of interest has moved on in mainstream psychology to look at more 
complex and private processes of the mind, the methodology hasn't and struggles to address the 
way we construct meaning and plan our actions. 
The presumption that an experiment takes place within a value-free or neutral context and 
provides objective outcomes which relate meaningfully to the subjects experience is also 
challenged. The psychological variables that are assumed by positivists to exist in reality and are 
measured within such an experimental setting are instead thought to be better understood as 
constructions or phenomenon that emerge in the interaction between the researcher and subject. 
Such a challenge does not dismiss the utility of the quantitative approach completely nor deny that 
there is a considerable degree of meaningful consistency and consensus within and between 
subjects' experience, but it maintains that the research cannot be independent of the physical and 
social setting of the study. The data that emerges from such research is not considered to be 
neutral but as value-laden as the theories or null hypotheses that the study sets out to test. Any 
claims that the outcomes are `correct' and an accurate representation of an external reality are 
challenged. 
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A qualitative perspective would argue that the complex and sophisticated practice of experimental 
research is such that it is prey to either the direct effect of personal and cultural value and 
influence, or the opportunity for it to have an indirect effect through the selectivity and behaviour 
of the researcher. During an experiment the investigator first selects a theory from which to 
hypothesise and chooses a question, then selects participants and interacts with them during the 
study to produce the data. This is followed by processes of selection and interpretation which 
shape the conclusions and presentation of the analysis including; the inclusion or omission of 
certain data, the examination of particular comparisons or associations and the explanation of 
unexpected, ambiguous or inconsistent findings. When the experimental process is described in 
this way the potential for selectivity is highlighted and this undermines the argument that it is 
possible to be discrete from the endeavour or treat the material or the findings of the research as 
an objective and correct record of `reality' or `truth' and not the product of a particular social 
practice. 
The logico-deductive model that is employed by the quantitative approach and dictates that theory 
drives the research and the related analysis is also criticised for limiting the development of our 
understanding of the processes related to private cognitive and affective phenomena. The 
application of deductive reasoning stands in contrast to the qualitative approach which does not 
geberally employ any `a priori' hypotheses and looks for theory to emerge through a more 
inductive process. Charmaz (1995a) argued that the experimental and deductive approach seldom 
leads directly to the development of theory in this way. 
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Exploring individual variability and personal meaning is often suppressed in quantitative 
experiments. The larger the group the more powerful and general is the statistical outcome and 
any idiosyncracy or anomalous outcome is not explored but often either reduced to the status of 
an experimental effect or excluded as a statistical `error'. The findings that emerge can then seem 
dislocated and unrepresentative of the individual experience of the subjects under study. 
There is a significant discrepancy between the methodology of a natural science that is obliged to 
freeze the subject under study in time in order to measure it and the natural phenomenon of 
human nature that exists in a dynamic form and is typified by its subtle variability and 
inconsistency. Measurement can be seen to constrain the study of human experience such that the 
conclusions that are drawn are an incomplete representation of the phenomenon under study. 
Equally, the constraints of statistical testing are such that they pare away the ambiguities, 
unpredictabilities and idiosyncracies that characterise human communication and behaviour. The 
quantitative approach is criticised for `reifying' numbers and elevating them to the status of 
absolute facts rather than recognising their limits and treating them as something that has emerged 
from a particular point of view (Yardley, 1997b). 
Qualitative researchers maintain that human behaviour is meaningful and contains a capacity for 
intention and anticipation that implies the presence of active and dynamic intra- and inter-personal 
processes. These processes are designed to make some kind of sense of what is going on, has 
gone on and might go on around us. The participant in a study is considered to be appraising 
their situation moment by moment and responding accordingly. The appraisal process draws from 
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many different sources and represents a powerful process that cannot be controlled for or 
measured within an experiment and it is thought by qualitative advocates to be an important focus 
for research in its own right. Many quantitative researchers also share such an interest but the 
methods that they would prefer to employ are limited in their ability to capture and explore the 
unfolding cognitive processes that are involved and it has been argued that the application of more 
qualitative methods is required (Lyons, 1999). 
This section has focused on how problematic the prescribed quantitative approach can be. 
Arguments against such an approach do not dismiss its utility and applicability but highlight its 
limitations and the need to develop different approaches. Yardley (1997) argued that it is the 
phenomenon and processes inherent in subjectivity and the construction of `reality' have been 
neglected and should now be the focus of psychological study, as aspiring for both objectivity and 
reliability could not be justified and inhibited further study: 
rather than striving for the illusory goal of objectivity, it is more productive to examine the 
way in which our reality - including the particular version of reality portrayed by scientists 
- is shaped by the purposes and conventions, aspirations and assumptions, which form an 
intrinsic part of human life. (p. 1) 
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Qualitative Approaches. 
A dissaffection with the quantitative approach prompted the development of various qualitative 
approaches (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Smith et al., 1995b). They. constituted a more discursive 
form of psychological study that attended to the active role personal, social and linguistic factors 
took in the mediation and construction of human experience. The criticism that qualitative work 
fails to meet orthodox scientific standards is matched by the counter accusation that positivism 
adopts too narrow and prescriptive a definition of science and so limits the scope of psychological 
study (Stevenson and Cooper, 1997; Smith, 1996a). As the epistemologies of the two camps 
remain in such contrast it is unlikely that the debate between them will be resolved easily. 
Researchers and theorists have addressed this by arguing both for an enlarged definition of 
`scientific' psychology that would establish useful criteria for assessing the validity of different 
types of research (Smith, 1996a), or by pressing the case for a different post-positivist approach 
that bridged the gap between the two camps (Stevenson and Cooper, 1997). Such an approach 
acknowledges that there is a form of external reality but accepts that it cannot be represented 
accurately because of the limits of human perception, interpretation and cognition. 
Qualitative research encompasses many different approaches that do not adopt identical 
epistemologies or draw upon the same philosophical or intellectual traditions. Two important 
approaches however are Phenomenology and Symbolic Interactionism. 
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Phenomenology. 
Essential to the phenomenological perspective is a commitment to attending to the individuals 
point of view and the meanings that they attribute to their actions. Human behaviour is conceived 
as a product of how people interpret their world in their attempt to make sense of their 
experiences and the task of the researcher is to examine the process of that ongoing construction 
of meaning, or `sense-making' Giorgi (1995). 
Phenomenology pays explicit attention to the conscious experience of our world and the 
exploration of subjective experience is an attempt to expose how our consciousness imposes itself 
upon and obscures reality. The process of interpretation that it is presumed this involves creates a 
distinction between subjective experience and what is termed objective reality. It calls into 
question exactly what is real to us and what it is we act upon. 
Phenomenology is based on the broad view that real objects in the world exist independently of 
our conscious knowledge or awareness and that we have direct access to them via our senses. 
Critical to this view however is that having translated this sensory information we then experience 
it as a `phenomena' in the form of its appearance to us as opposed to the thing itself as it really is 
in the external world: 
The world as we experience it, is a phenomenal world. (p. 2) 
(Spinelli 1989) 
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A phenomenological view of reality considers that the definition of `something' has as much to do 
with the individual and the meaning systems that they employ in the interpretation and translation 
process, as it has to do with the `thing' itself. The interpretational process is thought to be 
indivisible from reality and has to be incorporated into any statements about it. 
The phenomenological approach argues that adhering to a logical positivist view that adopts the 
assumptions and methodologies of a natural science ignores the fact that in psychology the subject 
possesses the same consciousness as the researcher and is actively involved in the research 
process all the time. This is seen to be one of the reasons behind the discrepancy that can exist 
between the reductive findings of quantitative studies and the rich and varied experience of the 
subjects or participants. 
According to phenomenology our experience of the world is best considered to be an interaction 
between the `raw matter' of the world and our personal mental apparatus. Emphasizing the 
importance and idiosyncracy of interpretation and translation does not deny that the process could 
be a stable one and have a shared social nature that would appear in the form of consistent and 
predictable behaviour, but argues that the correctness of our interpretations is more a function of 
social and cultural consensus than any objective laws or facts. Of clinical interest is that 
phenomenological theory decrees that as long as the explanation that we provide for our 
experience is acceptable to us, it serves to reduce the concomitant disturbance we experience. 
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The process by which the mind reaches out into the world in order to translate stimuli into a 
meaningful experience is termed intentionality. Phenomenologists believe that consciousness is a 
consciousness of `something' in that the basic interpretative act is to experience the world in 
terms of objects and that whatever sense we make of the world is derived intentionally by 
reaching out to those objects actively. Direct, raw or conscious access to the real world is denied 
us however as interpretation lays at the heart of our mental experience. 
The theories and processes outlined above gave rise to a broadly based phenomenological 
method. The intention of the method was to peel away the interpretation added to the stimuli as 
much as possible in order to arrive at a more accurate knowledge of the `things themselves' : 
strip away, as far as possible, the plethora of interpretational layers added to the 
unknown stimuli to our experience in order to arrive at a more adequate, if still 
approximate and incomplete, knowledge of `the things themselves'. (p16) 
Spinelli (1989) 
It could also be argued that much could be learnt about the nature, structure and processes 
inherent in the construction of the interpretation itself, regardless of the `thing' under 
study. Each qualitative approach appears to vary according to the degree to which they 
focus on exploring either the individuals process of interpretation, their account of it, or 
the nature of the thing or external object itself. There is some debate about how much or 
what one individual's account can tell you about the subject under study and this is evident 
in the description of the different approaches that are reviewed later in this section. 
Spinelli, in the above quote emphasised the focus on learning about the invarients of the 
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experience as if to learn about the thing itself, whilst Giorgi (1985) quoted earlier in this 
chapter highlighted the aim of the researcher to examine the process of `sense-making'. 
Both would appear to have value and which ever approach was taken would depend on 
the focus of the researcher and their research question. 
Symbolic Interactionism. 
Symbolic interactionism shared many of the assumptions of phenomenology but had its roots 
more in the social science approach to the study of human behaviour. It included a more explicit 
concept of the `self and paid direct attention to the social context within which we operate 
(Denzin, 1995; Blumer, 1969). 
Individuals were seen as existing within a social world and having a social self which consisted of 
a complex mixture of biological instincts, the `I' and internalized social constraints, the `Me'. The 
self was considered to be the outcome of the dialectic between the I and the Me and this 
interaction involved a continuous process of mutual interpretation between how we defined our 
situation and how we believed we would be received. 
Symbolic interactionism, like phenomenology considered that action was directed toward things 
on the basis of their meanings and that these were mediated via a process of interpretation, but 
believed that those meanings had been determined much more through a process of social 
interaction. 
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The goal of Symbolic Interactionism, according to Blumer (1969) was to discover how the 
process of interpretation sustained and directed the ways in which the participants determined 
their actions. Like phenomenology it depicted the `stimulus to act' as undergoing a process of 
interpretation before a response was forthcoming and the focus of research was also process 
oriented with the intention being to articulate the process of interpretation. 
Symbolic interactionism considers that our social world and the reality of our conscious 
experience is both complex and multi faceted. It focuses on subjective experience and feeling 
rather than objective fact and its roots trace back to a tradition of American sociological study 
based on the works of Mead (1934), James (1907) and Dewey (1927). The approach presumes 
that we create a world of phenomena and experience for ourselves and reflect upon it as we 
continue to experience things. Symbolic interaction is seen as the product of self-reflection and 
social interaction and the basis upon which we conduct ourselves within our social and personal 
worlds. Communication and its relationship to culture and society, social relationships and self 
and identity are key elements in symbolic interactionism and as a consequence have assumed a 
central role within the broad spectrum of qualitative approaches that it has influenced. 
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Qualitative Methods. 
Qualitative psychological research employs many different methods, many of which were derived 
from the positions outlined above and although they stand in contrast to the quantitative approach 
there is much debate within this area and it is not a unitary field. Much of the debate focuses on 
the status of a participant's account of their experience and how much of what people say about 
something actually relates to the thing itself. Many methods are employed in this area (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994; Murray and Chamberlain, 1999; Smith et al., 1995) but the following section will 
outline the elements of the qualitative approach to research by focusing on four prominent 
methods; The Phenomenological Method, Grounded Theory, Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA) and Discourse Analysis. 
Phenomenological Method. 
In order to study how people experienced their world and develop an understanding of the 
structure of that experience phenomenological researchers collect exhaustive, intensive and `thick' 
(Geertz 1973) descriptions from respondents in an attempt to approximate the participants 
perspective as truly as possible. The method as described by Giorgi (1985) will be reviewed here. 
Certain rules are adhered to in this approach, which are; 
(i) Rule of Epoche, whereby initial biases are set aside (bracketed) in order that an openness 
can be imposed and only the primary data is attended to. The prejudices of the researcher 
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are, as much as possible, kept in check. 
(ii) `Describe, don't explain'. By focussing on the immediate and concrete impressions only it 
becomes possible to derive an analysis from the individuals experience and not from the 
researchers or subjects `a priori' assumptions. 
(iii) Horizontalization. This further enables an open-minded approach, without prejudice, by 
treating each descriptive episode as equal and not imposing any hierarchical structure. 
The method involves four main phases: 
1. The researcher reads the participant's entire description of their experience in order to 
achieve an overall grasp and understanding of the statement, a `sense of the whole'. 
2. The researcher then returns to the beginning of the text and reads it, discriminating 
passages or incidents in the text that act as `meaning units' and convey something about 
the psychological phenomenon under study. 
3. Once all the `meaning units' have been defined they are examined and transformed to 
reveal the psychological insight they offer. 
4. Each of the meaning units is combined and a consistent statement is developed about the 
participant's experience. 
It is considered important in this approach that the discrimination of the meaning units takes place 
in a discrete step before they are examined further and transformed into a more integrated 
statement. This is in order to stay as close as possible to the participants' accounts. Giorgi 
94 
(1985) stated that different perspectives could be adopted within his phenomenological method 
and he was explicit both in his acceptance of this diversity and the cautious and tentative manner 
in which it addresses the conclusions that are drawn. A description of the structure of the 
participant's experience is preferred above any in-depth interpretation and it is assumed that 
human experience will always be consistently more complex than any one study or analysis could 
capture. 
Grounded Theory. 
Grounded Theory developed within sociology and emerged from a collaboration between Glaser 
and Strauss (1967) who developed a set of guidelines rooted in the symbolic interactionist 
tradition. It was developed to provide a method for conducting rigorous empirical qualitative 
research. It consists of, `a logically consistent set of data collection and analytic procedures 
aimed to develop theory' (p27) (Charmaz, 1995a). The number of procedures and practices that 
are applied as grounded theory is now so extensive that there is no one discrete or easily 
identifiable method and it has become a broad term (Chamberlain, 1999). The approach is 
`theoretical' in that it demands that a theory of the phenomenon should develop and `grounded' in 
that it is necessary that the theory emerges from the data as a result of a sequence of inductive and 
deductive thinking undertaken by the researcher (Chamberlain, 1999; Charmaz 1995a). 
Grounded Theory was typified by the employment of a prescribed process of repeated data 
sampling and coding techniques directed toward the development of an emergent theory. The 
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process of coding the data according to its content gives the data meaning to the researcher and 
categories are developed and inter-related until no further categories emerged. At that point the 
data is considered to be `saturated' in that it contains no further data that could be contained 
within a meaningful code or descriptive label. The researcher engages as closely as possible with 
the data through an ongoing and iterative process of re-reading, line by line coding and memo 
writing such that levels of abstract analysis are built directly upon the data and refined by 
gathering further data to the point where the analyst can attempt to capture, describe and theorise 
about the experience of the subject in a meaningful way. The `constant comparative method' is 
often employed where instances and categories of codes are compared continually for similarities 
and differences to divine as much as possible about the relationships between them. Having 
coded the data line-by line questions are asked of the data that help to lead to the development of 
more abstract categories. The data is reduced and a core category is identified which relates to 
the other categories and unifies the resultant theory (Chamberlain, 1999). Data collection is 
guided by theoretical sampling whereby participants are selected on the basis of theoretically 
relevant constructs, rather than for their statistical representativeness within a particular 
population. 
Grounded Theory can be employed to accommodate to either an interpretive or a structured 
positivist analysis (Charmaz, 1995a). It is not a single entity but it shares within it the adoption of 
a contextual perspective in the development of an understanding of how that person experiences 
the phenomenon under study (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992,1994). 
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Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is an idiographic qualitative approach that is 
rooted in both phenomenological psychology and symbolic interactionism, Smith (1996a). It is 
particularly committed to understanding and foregrounding the participant's personal perspective. 
It recognizes that this cannot be accessed completely as the participant's thoughts, beliefs or 
affect are not entirely transparent, but asserts that it can be achieved to a useful extent through the 
interpretative analytic work of the researcher. The final report is therefore seen as a co- 
construction between the participant and analyst in that it emerges from the analyst's engagement 
with the data. It involves the analysis of verbatim transcripts that are derived from in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with participants (Smith, 1995) and as it is the preferred approach used 
in this thesis the method will be covered in fine detail in the method section (chapter five). 
IPA has a commitment to the importance of the participants talk and their use of language but it 
also shares with the mainstream social cognition paradigm an interest and acknowledgement of 
the chain between someone's account, their cognition and physical state. It does not subscribe to 
the view that those cognitions are fixed or static in any way but sees them as complex, malleable 
and dynamic entities that are formed and reformed as the participants' endeavour to make sense 
of their condition and articulate it to the listener. 
A number of studies have been published using IPA which have focused on a range of different 
topics in both health and social psychology (these are referenced in chapter four). It shares a 
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considerable amount of common ground with both the phenomenological and grounded theory 
methods and although there are clear differences between them it would be wrong to define them 
by what amount to subtle contrasts, or to see them as existing in conflict with each other. They 
are both data driven and have a commitment to divining the meaning inherent in a persons 
experience by looking at it from that person's point of view and trying to see how they construct 
and interpret their world. 
The IPA approach endeavours to get close to the participant's private and personal experience 
and its commitment to interpretation as a means of articulating the person's view contrasts with 
the phenomenological method that aims more to develop an understanding and description of the 
structure of the experience. In this way IPA focuses more closely on establishing an idiographic, 
case-study account of the subject, than discerning its general or shared, `invarient' structure. 
IPA's commitment to interpretation as a means of analysing the data also means there is no formal 
attempt at `bracketing' as it is referred to in the phenomenological method whereby the 
researchers personal biases are set aside. Instead, the researcher is considered to engage with the 
data immediately and this is acknowledged as key to the analytic process. Bracketing is not 
rejected as a notion and steps are taken to ensure the analysis remains grounded in the data. The 
principle of equivalence and horizontalisation are adhered to in that no part of the transcript is 
excluded as potential data in the beginning. 
Both grounded theory and IPA have clear steps in their method of analysis, although grounded 
theory studies reflect a greater diversity in its application to the extent that there is not a single 
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grounded theory method (Chamberlain, 1999). Rather than identifying `meaning units' or coding 
the data, in IPA a series of stages enables the researcher to identify themes within the data that 
capture the participants experience and remain rooted within them. The themes are combined into 
a final write-up and statement where passages and extracts from the transcripts are used 
extensively to illustrate and argue for the relevance and importance of the emergent themes. 
IPA displays a strong commitment to foregrounding the participant's personal psychological 
experience and to developing an idiographic perspective which captures how the participant 
processes and internalises their experience. This more psychological perspective distinguishes it 
from grounded theory which most often adopts a sociological analysis and does not föcus on the 
individual and intra-personal meanings for the participants to such a degree. Its recognition of 
the link between the participants' accounts and their cognitions also enables IPA to relate more 
closely to the mainstream quantitative research (Smith 1996a). Unlike grounded theory, IPA does 
not engage in theoretical sampling as the analysis proceeds, whereby data is deliberately selected 
later in the study as a means to deve(op the theory, but sticks within its original homogenous 
sample. The commitment of grounded theory, inherent in its title, toward the development of 
theory using a sequence of inductive and then deductive reasoning and theoretical sampling 
(Chamberlain, 1999) contrasts with IPA, which is more committed to elaborating the emergent 
themes and developing a rich interpretative account of the participant's experience. 
IPA, at present, uses verbatim transcripts of semi-structured interviews as the principal source of 
data whilst the phenomenological and grounded theory studies also draw upon other sources. It 
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is difficult to identify this as a critical theoretical difference in the approaches as the development 
of the application of IPA is at an earlier stage. Just as phenomenological and grounded theory 
methods could be adapted to look very closely like IPA, it is just as possible that IPA could be 
applied to other sources of data such as video recordings, personal diaries etc. 
Discourse Analysis. 
Discourse Analysis emerged from a different tradition to the other qualitative approaches outlined 
above and stands in contrast with them in its attitudes toward the status and nature of a 
participant's account and its relationship with the subject under study. Discourse Analysis is 
sceptical of the claim of a connection between account, cognition and behaviour, preferring to 
concern itself with how accounts are constructed rhetorically and how language is used to serve 
social and discursive ends. It represents a move within social psychology that drew from a 
constructivist, post-modern and post-structuralist sociolinguistic background and views 
knowledge and experience as something that is produced within a social context and influences 
our interpretations of reality directly (Potter and Wetherell, 1987,1994; Edwards and Potter, 
1992). It was a significant challenge to the social-cognition approach to research at the time it 
emerged and regards the use of language and speaking (discourse) as an active social process that 
is worthy of study itself. Discourse is seen as a mechanism through which multiple forms of 
meaning emerge and are represented and the reality of a phenomenon to the individual, such as 
their health and illness, is felt to be evident in the discourses they employ in their talk. Critically, 
these discourses are not treated as if they are related to internal attributes but are considered to be 
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culturally and socially specific and representative of phenomena that go beyond the individual. 
Key to Discourse Analysis is a focus on how people used language to construct versions of their 
social world. Realism is rejected and the study of the variation, idiosyncracy and flexibility in the 
person's account is the prime focus in the examination of the many different functions, both global 
and specific, that an individuals language can serve (Lupton, 1992; Potter and Wetherell, 2001). 
It involves the close reading and re-reading of text and utilises a form of deconstruction to access 
the meanings inherent in the accounts (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Edwards and Potter, 1992). 
Discourse analysis is not a unitary approach and this is typified by debates surrounding the 
relationship between discourse and the real world. These include, whether or not analysts should 
be politically engaged or whether there are some underlying consistent and `real' physical and 
subjective experiences that might be encompassed within a new realist approach in discourse 
analysis that allows for the presence of both constructed objects and a reality that is not 
contingent to a cultural frame of reference (Wetherell, 2001). 
The rejection of a relationship between the participant's account and their thoughts or feelings 
toward an object means that discourse analysis contrasts with approaches such as IPA in its 
attitude toward the value of the personal description of experience. Radley and Billig (1996) for 
example stated that illness accounts said little about the illnesses themselves and that `people use 
health beliefs to make themselves accountable to others and to articulate for others their own 
position in the world' (p222). The IPA approach does not dispute that this is a part of what 
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people do when giving their accounts of health and illness but argues that it is neither the only nor 
the most important thing that they do. 
The qualitative approach encompasses within it a diverse range of perspectives that sometimes 
adopt contrasting approaches and epistemologies that lead them to study things from very 
different perspectives. The advantage of this is that there now exists a range of options for study 
that reflect the complexity of the subject under study and can be selected according to the 
research question and the focus of the researcher. 
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Chapter Five. 
Method. 
Introduction. 
The studies in this thesis took an idiographic, case-study approach using IPA to study small 
groups of participants drawn from the patients that attended the chronic pain out-patient clinic 
at Montague Hospital, Mexborough, South Yorkshire. The data set for the studies consisted 
of transcribed semi-structured interviews. 
As the studies were qualitative the participants were not regarded as exemplars of the 
`chronic pain patient' or expected to speak explicitly for their peers, but rather to provide 
specific instantiations of the psychological experience of chronic benign low back pain. 
Personal Background to the Research. 
This research was conducted as part of a larger initiative to evaluate the needs of patients 
attending a chronic back pain clinic. The object of this thesis for myself was to learn as much 
as possible about both the personal and `lived' experience of chronic benign back pain and 
the qualitative approach to psychological study. 
In addition to being the researcher, I was also the clinical psychologist attached to the clinic. 
I had a limited experience of working with chronic pain sufferers and was keen to develop it 
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by exploring their experience from a perspective that was not common in the literature. In 
this way I felt I could both develop my understanding of what it was like to endure pain on a 
daily basis and make a contribution to the study of chronic pain that complemented the 
literature and appeared to be in demand. The research provided an excellent vehicle for 
continuing my professional development and developing my interest in Health Psychology. 
Chronic pain represented an enigma to me which I was keen to understand as much as 
possible. I hoped that the thesis would help me to do this and also learn about more general 
aspects of human experience, illness, duress and good health. 
I had no experience of qualitative work prior to this thesis and valued the chance to learn 
more about it, to develop my ability to use it and broaden my understanding of research in 
general. Although the nature of qualitative work precludes any a priori hypothesising I was 
keen to restrict the focus of the work to only those people with chronic benign low back pain 
as opposed to all chronic pains in general so as not to treat chronic pain sufferers as an 
homogenous group. 
Prior to and during the thesis I had no personal experience or family history of chronic pain, 
or any kind of severe acute pain. My interest was not rooted in any personal illness 
experience but an interest in pain, illness and the value of studying the personal and 
subjective view of an experience. The enigma of pain and how exploring it could help us to 
learn more about human nature in general is something that I have always found quite 
compelling. Pain is something which is both universal and idiosyncratic, it helps to define 
our lives but at the same time, for all its ubiquity, it often defies any simple description or 
explanation. As such, perhaps understanding pain could also tell us more about ourselves in 
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general. 
As a Clinical Psychologist employed to help people in pain I felt it was vital to understand the 
experience of pain from the perspective of the sufferer and at the time I began this research 
this was not too evident in the literature. The following three studies explore some of the 
themes which help define the meanings of chronic benign low back pain for the sufferer and 
although this was not intended to be a clinical thesis, I found the research very useful in my 
clinical work. It helped me to gain a better appreciation of the personal nature of chronic pain 
and how best to support people who endure it on a daily basis. In particular I feel I am now a 
more empathic psychologist and it has reinforced my belief in the importance of the 
psychology of chronic pain and of always viewing it within a personal, social and moral 
context. I discuss this in more detail in the final chapter. 
Participants. 
Each participant had been referred to the Pain Clinic, Montagu Hospital, Mexborough, by 
their General Practitioner. Each was considered on assessment by the members of the pain 
clinic team to have chronic benign low back pain with no treatable peripheral organic 
pathology and significant distress and disability. From a clinical point of view their pain 
behaviours and symptoms and signs were considered `inappropriate' according to the criteria 
described by Waddell and Main (1984) and were recognised to be an index of their distress 
and a communication of their broader pain experience (Waddell, 1987; Waddell et al., 1992). 
They were part of a particular group of chronic pain patients who reported high levels of 
distress and disability with little organic peripheral pathology and as a result are often termed 
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to have `Chronic Pain Syndrome' (IASP, 1994). 
The participants were all from the local area of South Yorkshire and in each case they were: 
- European Caucasian. 
- Described by themselves as coming from a working class background. 
- No longer in paid employment. 
- Aged between thirty-five and fifty-five. 
Each of the participants had also: 
- Endured their pain for a minimum of five years. 
Experienced a variety of bio-medical assessments and treatments during that time 
which had achieved little therapeutic effect. 
Been informed that bio-medical treatments were no longer considered to be 
appropriate or effective for their condition. 
Each participant had been informed that the services that were now available to them were 
palliative in focus, designed to help them with symptom control and to manage their chronic 
pain in the best way possible. Part of this service could involve the attention of a clinical 
psychologist or attendance on a pain management programme at some point in the future. 
The participants were approached to take part in this thesis at an early stage in their 
attendance at the clinic. They were all new patients to the clinic and as such had no prior 
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contact with any similar service. The studies were part of a broad evaluation of the clinic and 
participants were asked if they could help the clinic team to develop their understanding of 
the experience of chronic benign low back pain by being interviewed as part of a qualitative 
psychological study. 
Certain exclusion criteria were applied in the study to both try to minimise the influence of 
other diseases or mental health problems in the participant's experience of their pain and to 
recruit participants whose experience had not yet been influenced by prior contact with a 
formal therapeutic rehabilitation service. The criteria were: 
- No other serious physical problems or diseases. 
- No history of psychiatric difficulties or record of anxiety problems. 
- No previous contact with clinical psychology services. 
- No previous contact with chronic pain rehabilitation services. 
- No ongoing litigation or compensation cases involved 
- No ongoing acute diagnostic medical investigations for their pain. 
- No evidence of regular abuse of strong opiate medication or daily use of physical aids 
such as motorised wheelchairs. This was very rare but was included because patients 
with these difficulties were referred on to in-patient services immediately and it was 
felt unethical to include them and important not to cause confusion for them by 
discharging them from the clinical service but maintaining contact for research 
reasons. Similarly, the presence of opiate abuse and a dependence on aids often 
caused other medical and physical problems that would exclude the participant. 
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Ethical Approval. 
Ethical approval was granted by the Doncaster Royal Infirmary and Montagu Hospital NHS 
Trust Local Research Ethics Committee as part of a multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary 
evaluation of the service for patients with chronic benign low back pain (see appendix for file 
copy of approval letter, patient consent and information forms). 
Participants were informed that the object of the study was to help us at the pain clinic to 
understand their situation in more detail through recording and analyzing their accounts, 
given in their own words, of their experience of chronic benign low back pain. It was stated 
explicitly that participation was voluntary, separate from any clinical contact they might have 
with the clinic, that they were free to withdraw their participation at any time without giving a 
reason and that this would have no influence on the service that was available to them at the 
clinic. The measures that would be taken to guarantee confidentiality and anonymity were 
also illustrated. 
The participants' names along with any other identifying information were changed or deleted 
from the transcripts to preserve their anonymity and guarantee confidentiality. Having 
transcribed the tape of the interview and removed any identifying information the tapes were 
either returned to the participants or erased, according to their wishes. Participant consent 
was secured prior to conducting any interview in the studies. 
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Data Collection. 
The semi-structured interview procedure followed that described by Smith (1995). It 
involved the construction of an interview schedule that outlined the areas of interest to be 
discussed during the interview. The schedule was not intended to be prescriptive but to act as 
a guide for the interview and not dictate its exact course. Participants were asked to talk as 
freely as possible about their experience of chronic pain and were told that there were no right 
or wrong answers as it was their experience that was important. 
In each study an interview schedule was developed which involved up to ten main questions 
directed toward the area of interest. The schedules are illustrated at the appropriate point 
within each of the empirical chapters. Each main question had two or three shorter questions 
that could be used if the participant struggled to understand it and would help to `funnel' 
them towards the subject. The main questions would be open-ended, not closed and invite 
the participant to say whatever they felt was important about the subject in the question. An 
example of a main question would be, `can you tell me about your pain? ', this is perhaps the 
most obvious question to ask but if it was too open or broad for the participant to answer the 
funnelling questions would be `how long have you had it? What does it feel like? How did it 
all begin? ' 
The interview was semi-structured in that the researcher followed the lead of the participant 
and only referred to the schedule to guide the interview toward the main research interest if 
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necessary. The interview schedule did not dictate the interview but served to ensure that as 
many of the important areas of focus were attended to. The early questions would be 
introductory and designed to both gain a description of the participants pain and help them to 
feel at their ease and become comfortable with the process of being interviewed. During the 
interview questions were adapted in response to whatever emerged and the researcher probed 
any interesting issues that arose at the time. The interviews took place at the pain clinic, were 
taped and lasted between 60 to 90 minutes. The tapes were then transcribed and served as the 
raw empirical data for the studies. 
The aim of the interview was to facilitate the participant telling their own pain story and not 
to check the investigators preconceptions of pain. The verbatim transcripts of the interviews 
served as the raw data to be analysed using the interpretative phenomenological method' 
described in the previous chapter (Smith et al., 1999; Smith et al., 1997). 
The transcription notation that will appear in some of the extracts used in the analysis is as 
follows: 
Pause 
[]- Elision 
[text] - Clarificatory information 
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Maintaining Quality within the Analysis. 
A range of criteria have been published to evaluate qualitative studies and these are reviewed 
in more depth in the final chapter with regard to the thesis as a whole. Particular criteria were 
employed in each of the analyses in this thesis as guidelines for auditing quality. They were 
drawn from those recommended by Yardley (2000) and Smith (1996b). 
Two guidelines outlined by Smith (1996b) were observed closely, these were: `internal 
coherence' and `presentation of evidence'. `Internal coherence' referred to the need to 
concentrate on whether the argument presented in the study was internally consistent and 
justified by the data, i. e., if the emergent themes relate meaningfully to the participants' talk, 
whilst `presentation of evidence' demanded that sufficient verbatim evidence from the data 
should be presented in the write up of the analysis to allow the reader to interrogate it. 
Yardley (2000) also suggested other criteria in addition to those described by Smith. Similar 
to Smith, Yardley recommended providing sufficient empirical data to allow the reader to 
make judgments and for evaluating the persuasiveness of the write-up. In each study both my 
supervisor and a colleague acted as auditors to check for the coherence of the emergent 
themes and the degree to which they were grounded in the data. Yardley also recommended 
the use of triangulation, where a number of different sources of data are used within an 
analysis to help form a statement and as a means to enhance its power and persuasiveness. In 
the analyses in this thesis this was observed where ever possible by drawing on more than one 
participant's account to establish the case for adopting a theme rather than using data from 
other sources outside of the verbatim interview transcript. 
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Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis: the process of analysis. 
This section will articulate the step by step process that was undertaken in the analysis of the 
data from each of the three studies in this thesis. As described before IPA is an idiographic, 
case study approach. It is data-driven in that it focuses on the analysis of the verbatim 
transcripts of semi-structured interviews and places the participants accounts of their 
experience at the centre of the study and development of theory. 
In summary, the analytic process proceeded as follows: 
1. Looking for themes in the first case. Interview transcripts were read and re- 
read a number of times to ensure a general sense was obtained of the 
participant's account. During this stage notes were made in the left hand 
margin of potential themes and the process was informed by the researcher's 
experience of the interview itself. Returning to the beginning, the text was 
then re-read and any emergent themes identified and tentatively organised in 
the right hand margin. 
2. Looking for Connections. Attention was then focused on the themes 
themselves to define them in more detail and establish their inter-relationships. 
The focus was on the psychological content of the phenomenon under study 
and the data was now being condensed. 
3. A Table of Themes. The shared themes were organised to make consistent 
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and meaningful statements which could contribute to an account of the 
meaning of the participants' experience that was grounded in their own words. 
4. Continuing the Analysis with Other Cases. The process was then repeated for 
other transcripts, using the first table of themes as a guide to look for further 
instances of the themes that have already been established and to highlight the 
emergence of any new themes. 
5. Writing Up. The themes were translated into a narrative account that 
conveyed, hopefully, the interesting or important things in the participants 
experiences. 
In this way, the analysis that followed was organised around themes that emerged from the 
transcripts, rather than constructs predicted in advance. These themes were then considered 
in relation to the extant literature in the discussion sections. 
To illustrate the process more completely a worked example now follows using some of the 
data from study one in this thesis `The Personal Experience of Chronic Pain'. In showing the 
method in such detail is hoped to help the reader understand the analytic process in as much 
depth as possible. Providing this evidence, presenting a case for the research method and 
establishing the researchers commitment to the project are considered to be important criteria 
in the evaluation of qualitative studies (Yardley, 2000; Elliot et al., 1999). 
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1. Looking for Themes 
The process began by looking in detail at the transcript of one interview first before 
incorporating others. This followed an idiographic approach to analysis, beginning with 
particular examples and slowly working up to more general categorization or theory. 
To begin with the transcript was read a number of times, using the left hand side of the 
margin to note down anything that was significant or important. The transcript was read and 
re-read closely in order to become as intimate as possible with the account as each reading 
had the potential to throw up new insights. Some of the comments were attempts at 
summarizing or paraphrasing, some were associations or connections that came to mind and 
others were preliminary interpretations. 
In the following example the notes in the left margin focused on how the participant, Linda, 
struggled to understand the chronic nature of her pain and how the implications for her self- 
concept began to emerge: 
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I. What's it like being in pain? 
shoulds, ideals, expectations, age appropriate 
own age 
frustration, bothered 
other people 
mobility, restriction, trapped 
watching others, comparing with others 
compared to sisters, family context/reference 
compared to past, biography reference 
when fit/strong 
ideal past/doubt, 'I thought' not `I was' 
adjustment, shock 
big loss/change 
L. I'm only 50 and I should be doing this and 
that and the other cos they say life begins at 
40 but I can't and I s'pose it does bother me. 
it's frustrating that people of my own age are, 
you can see them flying their kite and you feel 
as if you can't, well you can't. 
I. You can't 
L. No which is so stupid, I just think I'm the 
fittest because their are girls (her sisters) 
and I'm the middle one and I thought well 
I'm the fittest and I used to work like a 
horse and I thought I was the strongest 
and then all of a sudden it's just been cut 
down and I can't do half of what I used to 
do. 
The other margin was then used to document emerging theme titles, using key words to 
capture the essential quality of what was found in the text. At this preliminary stage the key 
words were not considered to be definitive, but helped to articulate something about the 
concept that was identified. 
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I. What's it like being in pain? 
L. I'm only 50 and I should be doing this and 
that and the other cos they say life begins at 
40 but I can't and I s'pose it does bother me. 
it's frustrating that people of my own age are, 
you can see them flying their kite and you feel 
as if you can't, well you can't. 
Loss, of ability, of future? 
social comparison - others 
I. You can't 
L. No which is so stupid, I just think I'm the 
fittest because their are girls (her sisters) and 
I'm the middle one and I thought well I'm the 
fittest and I used to work like a horse and I 
thought I was the strongest and then all of a 
sudden it's just been cut down and I can't do 
half of what I used to do. 
social comparison - family 
nostalgia - selective recall 
sudden loss vs chronic condition 
sense of self 
This process was continued through the whole interview, making preliminary notes in the left 
margin first and then proceeding to abstract theme titles in the right margin afterwards. At 
this stage all of the transcript was treated as potential data and no attempt was made to omit 
or select particular passages for special attention. 
2. Looking for Connections 
On a separate sheet the emergent themes were then listed and connections were made 
between them. Some of them appeared to cluster together, whilst others were regarded as 
more super-ordinate concepts. At this stage it was also possible for new super-ordinate 
themes to emerge that helped to pull together a number of the initial categories that had been 
identified. 
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In the table below is the initial list of all the theme titles from the right hand column of the 
transcript of Linda's account, including those from the extract above at the beginning: 
- Loss, of ability, of future? - Implications for the self-concept 
- Social comparisons - others - Confusion and anger 
- Social comparison - family - Self-critical 
Nostalgia - selective recall - Self-doubt 
sudden loss vs chronic condition - Social comparison with self before 
- Sense of self the pain 
Loss 
- Anger and pain - Bereavement and shock 
Struggle to accept self and identity - - Mobility/physical restrictions 
unwanted self - Adjustment 
- Lack of control over self - Planning activity 
- Responsibility, self vs pain. - Social problems 
- Shameful self - struggle with - Social withdrawal 
unwanted self, fear of judgement - Embarrasment 
Unwanted self rejected as true self - Guilt 
- Attribution of unwanted self to the - Pacing 
pain - Concealment in public 
- Defence of original self - Confusion 
- Ranking duress, self vs pain - Unpredictability 
- Shame of disclosure - Lack of control 
- Searching for an explanation - Withdrawal 
- Response to uncertainty - Expressing anger 
- Lack of understanding - Burdening others 
- Fear of feeling out of control - Avoiding social contact 
- Frustration - Hostility 
- Surprise at own feelings Judgement 
- Trying to make sense - Fear of rejection 
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The list was then reviewed, reduced to remove any redundant or unrepresentative theme titles 
and the remaining themes were clustered together in the following way: 
- Trying to make sense 
- Searching for an explanation 
- Response to uncertainty 
- Lack of understanding 
- Frustration 
- Unpredictability 
- Confusion and anger 
- Hostility 
- Anger and pain 
- Implications for the self-concept 
- Sense of self 
- Self-critical/self-doubt 
- Loss, of ability, of future 
- Sudden loss vs chronic condition 
- Loss/bereavement and shock/adjustment 
- Social comparison - others 
- family 
- with self before the pain 
- Nostalgia - selective recall 
- Mobility 
- Physical restrictions 
- Planning activity 
- Pacing 
- Social 
- Identity problems 
- Embarrassment 
- Guilt 
- Avoiding social contact 
- Burdening others 
- Fear of rejection 
- social withdrawal 
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As the clusterings of themes emerged these were checked back to the transcript to make sure 
the connections worked for the primary source material. This form of analysis involved a 
close interaction with the text. The attempt to understand what the person was saying drew 
upon the researcher's interpretative resources as themes were selected to create some order 
from the array of concepts and ideas that had been extracted from the participant's responses. 
3. A Table of Themes 
The next stage was to produce a super-ordinate list or table of the themes, ordered coherently. 
The process had identified a certain number of major themes which seemed to capture most 
strongly the respondent's concerns on this particular topic. As before, care was taken to 
check back with the data to ensure that each theme was represented in the verbatim transcript. 
At this point certain themes were renamed if it was felt a different title described the theme 
better, or dropped completely, for example a theme related to `planning activity', which was 
present in the first theme list was deleted as it neither fitted well into the structure of themes 
and sub-themes, nor was it very rich in evidence within the transcript. An identifier was 
added to each instance to aid the organisation of the analysis. This indicated where in the 
transcript instances of each theme could be found by giving key words from the particular 
extract plus the page number of the transcript. It also helped to code the instances in the 
transcript with an identifier. A sample of the table of major themes from Linda's transcript is 
given below. The three super-ordinate themes that emerged are shown, plus a few examples 
of the sub-themes that related to them. As the whole list of related sub-themes is extensive 
only a few are given here to illustrate the process, (note - 2.9 = page 2, line 9). 
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1. Searching for an explanation 
Response to uncertainty 2.9 No idea 
Frustration 4.15 Can't do it 
Anger and pain 2.20 Mad 
2. Self evaluation and social comparison. 
Social comparison - others 10.12 Other people 
Social comparison - family 11.3 Fittest of all 
Nostalgic - selective recall 11.7 Like a horse 
Index of loss/bereavement 16.20 Used to be 
Social problems 
Embarrassment 23.14 Embarrassed 
Fear of rejection 24.7 Rejection 
Social Withdrawal 24.12 Stay in 
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Some of the themes were linked to the semi-structured interview schedule whilst others were 
at a higher level, acting as pointers to the respondent's more general beliefs or style of 
thinking and talking. For example, in study one in this thesis the topic under discussion was 
the participants' experience of their chronic pain but a theme emerged that was not 
anticipated involving a broader exploration of the utility of social comparison in self- 
appraisal and evaluation. These emergent themes prompt the researcher to think about the 
focus of the project and can take it in a slightly different direction. 
4. Continuing the Analysis with Other Cases 
A single respondent's transcript could be written up as a case study in its own right or, as in 
the case of the studies in this thesis, the analysis can move on to incorporate interviews with a 
number of different individuals. The super-ordinate theme list from interview one was used 
to begin the analysis of the second interview, looking for more instances of the themes that 
were identified from interview one but identifying new ones that arose. New themes that 
emerged in subsequent interviews were tested against earlier transcripts. 
This system works well with studies that employ a small sample size of up to about ten 
participants, such as those in this thesis. The number of participants is small enough for one 
to retain an overall mental picture of each of the individual cases and the location of themes 
within them. 
In this worked example, the super-ordinate list from Linda's account was used to inform the 
analysis of the other transcripts. By remaining aware of what had come before it was possible 
121 
to identify what was new and different in the subsequent transcripts more easily and at the 
same time to find responses which further articulated the extant themes. 
As each transcript was analysed following the interpretative process a final list of super- 
ordinate themes emerged. From the analysis of the study used in this example, four main 
themes emerged. A new theme `Not being believed' emerged from subsequent transcripts 
and on checking back to Linda's transcript instances were found that related to it. In the 
example below, the identifiers shown to the right of the sub-themes are taken from the 
accounts of only two out of the nine participants and not all the sub-themes are shown. In 
practice, each participant was represented. The four super-ordinate themes, with examples of 
instances within the transcripts, are shown below: 
1. Searching for an explanation. Linda Nina 
- response to uncertainty 2.9 3.15 
- participants' explanatory models 5.9 
- bio-medical dominance 9.17 
- self-criticism 2.20 
2. Comparing this self with other selves 
- with others 10.12 7.12 
- with self in the past 7.15 
- with self in the future 12.3 
- nostalgic recall of self 11.7 
- upward and downward comparison 14.18 
- equivocal coping strategy 12.11 
- index of loss and threat 16.20 
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3. Not being believed 
- Invisibility of chronic pain 31.15 
- assumptions of others about pain 10.4 
- understandings/expectations of others 31.21 
- implications for identity/pain roles 22.13 34.12 
- judgements of others 33.2 
4. Withdrawing from others 
- private experience vs social appearance 11.12 
- shame and embarassment 23.14 28.6 
- misunderstandings 30.17 
- fear of rejection 24.7 
- stigma 34.18 
5. Writing Up 
The final section was concerned with moving from the master themes to a write-up and final 
statement outlining the meanings inherent in the participant's experience. The division 
between analysis and writing up is to a certain extent a false one, in that the analysis 
continues during the writing phase. 
This stage was concerned with translating the themes into a narrative account. The results 
can take the form of a presentation of the typology of responses that emerged during the 
analysis, or represent a theory to explain the participants' answers. The table or index of 
themes was the basis for the account of the participants' responses which, each time, took the 
form of the argument interspersed with verbatim extracts from the transcripts to support the 
case. Care was taken to distinguish clearly between what the respondent said and the 
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analyst's interpretation or account of it. The write-ups can be found in the following three 
empirical chapters 
In each of the studies in this thesis the thematic account was prioritized in the write up and 
used the verbatim extracts to elucidate or exemplify each theme as part of a constructed 
narrative argument. Each study presented the themes together in one analysis section while a 
separate section was devoted to exploring and discussing their implications in relation to the 
existing literature. A final discussion section will review the three studies and draw together 
the themes and observations that relate them into a broader statement about the personal 
experience of chronic benign low back pain. 
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Chapter Six. 
Study One. 
The Personal Experience Of Chronic Benign Lower Back Pain. 
Introduction. 
The aim of the first study in this thesis is to explore in a very broad sense the personal and 
lived experience of chronic benign low back pain using Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA). In the absence of other studies of this kind in the literature this represents an 
initial reconnaissance of the area that adopts a qualitative, data-driven idiograph approach and 
looks to achieve an understanding of the `insiders perspective' (Conrad, 1987) of chronic 
benign low back pain. If the individual and personal meaning of chronic pain is to be explored 
fully then such an intensive qualitative approach would complement the extensive body of 
research that has been published to date. 
The reviews in chapter two (Psychology of Pain) and chapter four (Chronic Pain and 
Meaning) in this thesis describe compelling evidence of the inherent psychological nature of 
chronic benign low back pain, its significance as a major public health problem and the limits 
of our understanding of it. It shows how much more there is to learn about how chronic 
benign low back pain unfolds over time and what mediates its characteristic unpredictable, 
idiosyncratic and unpleasant nature. 
Explicit in its definition is the unpleasant and offensive nature of chronic benign low back pain 
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which has a damaging and deleterious effect on both those who endure it and the people 
around them. Pain has been associated with an extensive range of negative affect, cognitive 
dysfunction and distortion, maladaptive behaviour and disability. For each individual, this 
profile of sensation, distress and disability is unique in both its intensity and quality. What is 
needed is a better understanding of the personal meaning of the individual experience of 
chronic pain. 
Most psychological research or clinical intervention into chronic pain is based on a broad 
cognitive-behavioural approach. It probably represents the largest body of health psychology 
research into a single illness and has established psychology as a key discipline in the study of 
pain (Jensen et al., 1994; Jamison et al., 1994; Gatchell and Turk, 1999). The limits of 
quantitative cognitive-behavioural research has been pointed to earlier in the thesis, as has the 
case for applying more qualitative approaches to develop our understanding of the area. The 
personal and subjective meaning of pain has been identified as an important avenue of study 
(Leventhal, 1993; Price, 1999) and qualitative methods have been shown to be potentially very 
helpful in this regard so far. 
In chapter four of this thesis (Chronic Pain and Meaning) the qualitative study of chronic pain 
was reviewed and it showed how very few data-driven or empirical qualitative studies have 
been published in the psychology literature on chronic benign low back pain. There remains a 
pressing need for further studies that take a psychological and idiographic focus and work to 
explore as much as possible about the personal experience of chronic benign low back pain. 
This study is concerned explicitly with articulating the personal experience of chronic low 
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back pain. It adopts a phenomenological approach and if the meaning of pain to the patient is 
to be fully explored then it could be argued that such an intensive idiographic approach that is 
firmly rooted within a psychological tradition is required. Due to the paucity of qualitative 
studies in this area it was appropriate for this first study to be an initial exploratory 
reconnaissance of the subject, looking to see what substantive themes emerge that capture the 
conscious and subjective experience of the participants and reviewing them in the light of the 
extant literature. 
Method. 
The method employed in each of the studies in this thesis is outlined in detail in chapter five. 
To avoid unnecessary redundancy it will not be repeated here and only factors specific to this 
study will be described. 
The first nine participants that matched the criteria and agreed to take part in the study were 
recruited as an homogenous sample group and interviewed at the pain clinic. In this study 
they were all women, although men were not excluded from the sample. I presented myself to 
them as a psychologist studying the personal experience of chronic benign low back pain and 
they were also aware that I worked in another capacity as the Clinical Psychologist at the 
clinic. 
Each of the interviews with the participants was based on the same semi-structured interview 
schedule, they were then transcribed and analysed in series according to the procedure 
outlined in the method chapter (chapter five). Once this was complete it was felt that there 
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was sufficient data to write up as a meaningful statement. A further group of participants 
could have been recruited in the same way if it had been felt that more data was required. 
The data set for this study consisted of transcribed semi-structured interviews with nine 
women who attended the out-patient pain clinic. They are all white, european caucasian 
women from a working class background who no longer worked in paid employment due to 
their pain. Their ages and length of time in chronic pain are tabled below. 
Anonymised Name Age Pain duration. 
(Years) 
Linda 50 10 
Alice 35 9 
Becky 46 8 
Gail 52 6.5 
Ruth 48 5 
Nina 37 12 
Nelly 46 15 
Mary-Ann 53 8 
Rachael 49 7.5 
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The interview schedule was as follows: 
1. Could you, to begin with, describe your pain to me in your own words please? 
- what does it feel like? 
- How long have you had it? 
- Does it change in any way? 
2. How did your pain start? 
- How long have you had it? 
- How did it come on? 
- Has it changed over time? 
3. Does anything affect your pain? 
- Does anything make it better? 
- Does anything make it worse? 
4. Do you know why your pain persists? 
- What causes your pain? 
- Why hasn't your pain been cured? 
5. Has your pain changed things for you at all? 
- Is anything different now? 
- Do you do anything or feel differently since you had the pain? 
6. Why do you think that has (or hasn't) happened? 
- How has pain affected things for you do you think? 
- Why do you think those changes happened? 
7. What do you think pain is? 
- How would you explain pain to some-one? 
- Why do you think we can feel pain? 
8. What's the most important thing about your pain from your perspective? 
- What do you think of first when you think of your pain? 
- How would you sum up your pain? 
9. Has your pain affected you at all? 
- Has it affected the way you think or feel or behave? 
10. Why has that happened do you think (if it has)? 
- Why do you think you think/feel/behave that way? 
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This study was exploratory in focus and the questions were chosen to encourage the 
participants to talk as extensively and in as much depth as possible about their experience of 
their pain. No specific aspect of pain was privileged over any other and the questions were 
designed to be as open as possible to avoid restricting the participants' answers to particular 
themes. 
The transcripts were analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. At 
each stage of analysis in this study my supervisor reviewed the themes to ensure that 
they appeared to be grounded in the transcripts and well represented within the data by 
adequate examples. A work colleague also reviewed the analysis to check for the 
coherence and clarity of the themes and whether the themes were represented well in 
the data. 
Care was taken after each interview to provide time to address any anxiety or distress 
that the participant might have experienced as a consequence of the interview. In this 
study none of the participants reported feeling unduly distressed at the end. 
Analysis. 
This section presents the four super-ordinate themes that emerged from the analysis, which 
were: 
Searching for an explanation 
Comparing this self with other selves 
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Not being believed 
Withdrawing from others 
The first theme `Searching for an explanation' sets the scene for those which follow as it 
articulates the participants' attempts to understand what is happening to them and is a 
prerequisite for the subsequent self-reflection. Because such questioning recurs throughout 
the analysis, it is only presented briefly at the outset. 
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Searching for an Explanation. 
The participants showed a strong motivation to understand and explain their situation, to 
know `why? ' : 
I just keep asking myself why the pain is there and I haven't got an answer. I 
don't know how I should feel really it's just that I don't think it should be there 
why should I have it? I would have thought that after all this time it should 
have eased up and gone away but it hasri t. 
(Linda) 
Participants regularly stated they simply could not `believe' that nothing more could be done 
to relieve their pain. There was a marked contrast between their pre-occupation with their 
pain and their inability to account for it's chronic presence. Despite their long history of pain 
and extensive contact with the health service they neither felt informed about their condition, 
nor able to influence it. Their pain was often felt to act of its own volition. `it just comes and 
goes when it wants really (Alice). ' 
Linda's account of her situation suggested that despite wanting to understand why she had 
chronic pain, she could not, to her it was `unbelievable really'. This was not a simple account 
of ignorance but a profound state of bewilderment as she failed consistently to understand why 
she should be suffering, or being punished despite not having done anything wrong. As the 
best efforts of others had failed, she felt she could only blame herself: 
I'm sort of mad at myself I start banging things and getting so aerated with 
myself that it's there and I cari t get it to go away. 
Becky also had no answer as to why her pain remained, except to imagine the presence of 
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physical damage or deterioration: 
Well I always thought you had pain to tell you when there was something 
wrong. 
Participants could not explain the persistence of their pain in any manner which was 
meaningful to them beyond the notion that `there was something wrong', something bio- 
medical which demanded attention. Their disbelief and bewilderment prompted frustration, 
anger and in Becky's case, despair: 
But I don't know why you have to keep suffering it and suffering it and 
suffering it for ever and ever. 
Each participant rejected the judgement that their pain was `unreal' i. e. psychogenic but could 
not explain it's reality in a manner that was meaningful to them. Their accounts revealed their 
attempts to cope with their pain despite a profound lack of either understanding or 
information. This uncertainty and ambiguity pervades their experience and will continue to 
appear as an important factor in each of the following three sections. 
Comparing this Self with other Selves. 
As participants described their pain they compared themselves with other people and with 
themselves both in the past and projected into the future. 
This creative process of comparison captured the pernicious impact of their pain. One 
participant, Linda, appeared to reach out to what she saw and by comparing her present 
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situation with selected events she had witnessed, used those comparisons as benchmarks: 
I'm only 50 and I should be doing this that and the other cos they say life 
begins at 40 but I can't and I s' pose it does bother me, it's frustrating that 
people of my own age are you can see them flying their kite and you feel as if 
you can t. 
Linda could not do the things she felt she `should' be able to do like other women of her age 
who were active and enjoying life. Her comparison was not just of reduced mobility but of the 
denial of pleasure in activity. Others her age could enjoy their life and celebrate it free from 
pain `you can see them flying their kite' and this emphasised her feelings of loss. In one 
passage Linda recalls a description of her pain-free self set amidst her immediate family: 
I just think I'm the fittest because there are 3 girls and I'm the middle one and I 
thought well I'm the fittest and I used to work like a horse and I thought I was 
the strongest and then all of a sudden it's just been cut down and I can't do half 
of what I used to do. 
Linda's description of her loss was exacerbated by the recall of an idealised past where she 
was not only fit, but the `fittest' and worked not just hard, but `like a horse'. 
As she anticipated the future Linda was afraid that she could only worsen progressively. She 
could not predict her future and emphasised her pessimism by her comparisons with two 
people, her mother and a school friend, who both died in distressing circumstances. She 
admitted that neither of them had chronic pain but her uncertainty meant she that could not 
guarantee she would not share their fate: 
She was a school mate and she was 15 month older than me and it was last 
year she started, I don't know what she died of she was getting these aches and 
pains I just don't want it to be any worse as I don't want to be pushed round in 
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a wheel chair. 
Gail also described her situation as one where continual pain had eroded her mobility but 
responded differently to the comparisons she made with others: 
When I see all of my friends, I saw one running for the bus the other day I 
thought Oh my God it's ages since I had a good run or a good walk, you 
know. So for about 5 minutes I felt sorry for myself and then I saw somebody 
else in a wheelchair so you know, I'm not quite as bad as that. 
Through comparison, participants often ranked themselves against others and this served to 
highlight their loss or disability. Linda felt demoted within her family whilst, for Gail, although 
she felt better off than some-one in a wheelchair she became embarrassed when considered 
alongside her 81 year old mother-in-law: 
You think oh well can I make it over there or shall I say no we'll leave it for 
another day. I feel so stupid especially when my mother-in-law is 81 and she's 
trotting about and I am hobbling. 
Other participants related similar comparisons. Their sense of social order had been disturbed 
and in attempting to re-establish their personal status, participants, like Gail, also took refuge 
in thinking of those in a worse situation than themselves: 
I try to tell myself I'm luckier than a lot of people, you know I haven't got cancer. 
(Ruth) 
The use of others as an aid to resisting the sense of decline and loss that pain provided was 
equivocal and in some cases detrimental, serving only to exacerbate and define their distress. 
Participants' uncertainty in their prognosis handicapped any compensation that a `worse- 
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world' offered. When Linda witnessed those more disabled than her she felt she may be 
looking at herself in the future `I just don't want it to be any worse as I don't want to be 
pushed round in a wheel chair'. Nina also admitted that, although she looked at others in a 
worse position it could not compensate for her own sense of deterioration and only increased 
her fear for the future: 
I've done heaps more things than other people have done so I think well, I 
would, you always think well there's loads of people far worse off than you 
you know so you try to think of other people who are permanently in 
wheelchairs and it's supposed to make you feel better which in a way it does 
but basically its frightening. 
The comparison with others who were more unfortunate was intended as a strategy for 
enhancing self-esteem but often turned into a reinforcer of despair. Chronic pain promoted 
distress in each participant when they recalled how they were before it began and a sense of 
grief pervaded their accounts. Although a few took pride in their ability to cope, they often 
defined themselves as bereaved. 
Nelly believed she had lost everything, her comparisons were global and catastrophic, whilst 
Mary-Ann was more operational and explicit about the change she had experienced and 
revealed how her pain frustrated her personally: 
It's stopped everything, its stopped my life completely. 
(Nelly) 
I can't do what I used to do I'm not one for staying in house if I can get away 
with it I go out I dori t like stopping in house. 
(Mary-Ann) 
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As with Linda, when participants reflected on their situation they often recalled a better time, a 
nostalgic time associated with a better sense of self. Memories were recalled to help maintain 
some morale in the present: 
When you don t feel you have a future, you live in the past. (Rachael) 
Participants often referred to a past where they were as they had always wished to be, fit, 
active, able to stay slim, interesting and sociable. Alice grieved for her personality, she wanted 
to be the `old Alice', the Alice who could exercise regularly to keep her weight down, do and 
eat what she liked and feel confident and happy: 
Well my personality's gone, I used to be right bubbly and lively and you know, 
but its, that's gone and even my mum says that I've changed, she never really 
says in what way, she says I've got more snappy and more nasty you want the 
old Alice back but you can't. 
The nostalgic recall of the past provided some comfort but was again a comparison that 
proved to be equivocal. The idealised accounts of the past served as a painful index of what 
had been lost and what now had to be endured on a daily basis, rather than as a haven of 
reassurance and source of self-regard. The strength of their loss was accentuated by the fact 
that the past self was often considered to represent the real self, replaced irrevocably by a new 
but false persona: 
You feel like just not particularly giving up but you don't feel the person that 
you are that you're capable of feeling or capable of doing basically. It makes 
you feel a bit down and a bit miserable. 
(Nina) 
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`The person that you are' is the person Nina was in the past, the person without pain. 
Through their selective use of social and personal comparison participants highlighted the 
impact of their pain on their self-regard and the equivocal nature of their attempts to cope with 
its imposition. Pain denied them the chance to be who they once were and preferred still to 
be. Their contemporary self-regard contrasted with a nostalgic recall of their past and those 
around them and their comparisons served almost inevitably as an index of their sense of threat 
and loss. Attempts to buttress self-esteem by comparison with those more unfortunate often 
proved counter-productive and served only to remind participants of their own gloomy 
prognosis. 
Not Being Believed. 
Apart from their behaviour, the participants' condition revealed no visible signs that would 
give credence to any of their claims to suffering or disability. The participants, who 
themselves endured a profound sense of uncertainty regarding the aetiology or legitimacy of 
their pain, felt vulnerable to the judgements of those around them: 
It's like anger building up in you. It's like if you're talking to people you're 
forever, its as though you've got to try and convince them that there's 
something wrong with you, that get's you down. 
(Alice) 
The participants felt a continual need to justify their pain as `real', that is not in any way 
psychogenic which was synonymous with `mad or bad': 
It's quite embarrassing because its not something that you can see and I do feel guilty, 
I know that my back really does hurt and I'm not making it up and I feel sort of angry 
that I can't do it and I think well I wish I could just prove to them that my back really 
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is bad and that I really must not do it, because if I do I put myself back weeks. 
(Nina) 
In the absence of any recognition that their pain could persist, participants were by default 
required to be defensive about their condition, but were unable to make use of any credible 
explanatory story and as a consequence were often frustrated: 
You feel as though no-one believes you, unless people who have got bad 
backs, it's only them who'd believe you. 
(Alice) 
Pain had caused a shift in the participants' social roles and relationships and denied them the 
opportunity to be the kind of daughter, grandmother, or lover that they, or others, might wish 
them to be. Ruth and Gail were well aware of the potential problems of being mis-understood 
by their lovers and parents: 
I mean you don't look ill, you're not flat on your back, so you know, is it an 
excuse, oh I've got a headache, do you know what I mean [not too have sex 
with her husband]. (Ruth) 
She [mother-in-law] wanted her house decorating the other week. I said I can I 
even do my own and I feel guilty that she s going to have to pay somebody to 
do it. (Gail) 
Each participant's account exposed their awareness of the threat of rejection, not just because 
they were a burden and unproductive but because they might be disbelieved. In Gail's case, 
the lack of credible evidence prompted a feeling of guilt that others suffer too. 
Mary-Ann was concerned with being judged as `useless' because she could not look after her 
family. This was a judgement she endorsed herself as, in common with Nelly and other 
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participants, she felt uncomfortable at being the recipient of care, unable to reciprocate: 
I know I am ill, but I think well why should I have to put that on to somebody 
else's shoulders I don't want people to look after me and I know they love me 
but I don't want it. It's degrading. 
(Nelly) 
The difficulties of feeling believed had a paradoxical effect on the behaviour of participants as 
a healthy appearance was considered by those around them to be incompatible with any claims 
of chronic pain, suffering or disability: 
If I went round with no make-up and bags hanging down my face or something 
and just look really badly they'd probably think well yes, but you cant see pain 
so they don't know do they so they automatically assume that there's nowt 
wrong with you. (Alice) 
Appearing healthy or mobile whilst remaining in pain was problematic and participants felt 
obliged to appear ill and disabled to satisfy the requirements of others. Unfortunately, 
appearing ill left them feeling equally as prey to the consequences of pity as condemnation. 
Pity to Nelly was a stigma. It degraded her, challenged her place in her social world and was 
incompatible with how she wanted to view herself or be seen by others: 
I just want to say `hello', you know, `how are you' and I go `alright thanks'. 
Not look at me as though I'm a cripple. I'm not a cripple. 
The ambiguity of pain behaviour and the lack of understanding in others left the participants 
feeling vulnerable to being misjudged or rejected. The suspicion they felt they were under 
often drove them to appear more in pain than they needed to and in each case they felt their 
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pain denied them the opportunity to relate to others free of its influence. 
Withdrawing from Others. 
Rather than endure their chronic pain and continue to meet the demands of their social world, 
the participants tended to withdraw from public view: 
I just want to be on my own. I can't stand anybody, I'm mardy and I'm mardy 
with everyone else. You know what I mean. I'd rather just take off upstairs. 
(Mary-Ann) 
They felt a burden to other people and there appeared to be no agreed way of relating to 
others that they could employ. It was easier for them to conceal their condition than to rely 
on the understanding of others. For Gail, rather than explain that it was her pain that caused 
her to avoid social events she found it easier to lie and risk appearing unsociable: 
If anyone asks me if I am going anywhere, come on, no. Rather than tell them 
why [the discomfort of pain] I just say I cant be bothered they probably think 
I'm a bit of a misery it's better than going out with them and spoiling their fun. 
Misery and being boring with little to talk about except pain was felt by the participants to be 
unacceptable in company and they withdrew from social contact to avoid the potential for any 
embarrassment or rejection: 
But I mean we just don't go, we wori t go anywhere now because of that I get 
too embarrassed and I just hate being in company and you always get onto that 
subject [pain]. And if you're out for social evening the last thing people want 
to hear is what your misery is, so I just, that's why we don't go out that often. 
(Becky) 
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There was a tension between the participants need to withdraw from other people and their 
fear that this would leave them isolated or abandoned. They felt their relationships were at 
risk and were aware of the limits of others' compassion. Ruth admitted how before her pain 
she used to avoid any-one who appeared unwell as she could not tolerate their misery and she 
now hides her own distress so as not to prompt others to reject her: 
I've been around poorly people all my life and I think I get a little bit naffed off 
myself and I cross the road cos I've thought, oh gosh, I can't stand Mrs so an 
so today and she may be a really poorly woman, this is why I don't want to 
burden anybody else because they must feel just the same as I do. 
When in public, Linda not only felt easily irritable but also conspicuous and now prefers not to 
go out. Her social world could not accommodate people who had chronic pain and required 
supportive chairs or who needed to move constantly or lie down if necessary. Her disability 
was in part mediated by social acceptability and appearances: 
I didn't even go out Christmas or New Year because I knew what it would be 
like, there'd be no sitting down because it would be all packed and theres no 
way I'd like to stand up and if there were a seat I'd have to get back up so I 
can't remember the last time we went out. 
Participants felt that when in public they could neither afford to show their distress, nor appear 
healthy and mobile. Their social world which, prior to their pain, they recalled nostalgically 
was now transformed from a sanctuary and supportive network to something aversive and 
threatening. Regard and respect had been replaced by a perception of disgust or pity. 
Participants felt trapped, unable to secure the understanding of others and retreated to the 
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safety of their own company, effectively cutting themselves off from any benefit of social 
support. 
Discussion. 
Searching for an Explanation. 
The `sense-making' process that is often referred to in qualitative research was revealed in the 
participants accounts in this study through their drive and wish to understand why they should 
have chronic pain and their inability to achieve that understanding. The ongoing and active 
process of constructing understanding that is a key element of both the phenomenological and 
cognitive approach was present in the participants accounts and took the form of an ongoing, 
unfinished search. They remained confused as the personal models of their pain that they had 
constructed failed consistently to match their experience. 
The participants were pre-occupied with their pain but despite frequent contact with the health 
services they remained confused. They were convinced that something bio-medical was 
wrong with them, could not understand why their pain should persist and reported despair that 
given this was the case no-one appeared to be doing anything medical to help them `there 
must be something wrong but nobody seems to want to help (Becky)'. 
Uncertainty is an important experience in chronic health conditions and has been identified as a 
key factor in its related distress (Radley, 1994; Härkäpää et al, 1996). The degree of 
information that is available to the chronically ill to assist them in their understanding is often 
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sparse, or in a form that they cannot utilise (Bury, 1991; Locker, 1991). Uncertainty has been 
shown to correlate with distress, helplessness and reported pain intensity (Williams and Thorn, 
1989; Idler, 1993; Jensen et al., 1991) particularly if it is believed to be due to chance, to 
endure with no relief or to be mysterious in origin. Similarly, Baszanger (1992) described the 
`problematic factuality' of chronic pain and emphasised how difficult it was for health 
professionals to `decipher' chronic pain to their patients as it did not adhere to a simple 
explanation and was different to acute pain. 
According to one form of attribution theory, seeking an explanation which establishes a cause 
is a typical response to uncertainty (Brewin, 1988). No one particular attributional style has 
been linked to distress in pain and chronic illness (Radley, 1994) and for the participants their 
frustration and hopelessness appeared not to be consequent upon a discrete attributional 
category but to follow from their more fundamental inability to attribute any cause at all. 
Brewin (1988) concluded that `explanation is almost certain to be an integral part of any 
reaction to adversity' (p108) and for those in benign chronic pain it appears to be especially 
difficult to establish any form of useful explanation. 
In the absence of facts they can understand patients with chronic illness often use whatever 
`common-sense' concepts they have to hand and construct their own meaning and 
representations of their illness (Leventhal and Diefenbach, 1991) such concepts appear to 
serve the sense-making process which appeared to unfold relentlessly for the participants 
despite their resources. Holzman and Turk (1986) recognised this process in their chronic 
pain patients: 
Patients will behave during illness in ways that are consistent with the 
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conceptualizations they hold about their symptoms... When information is 
ambiguous they rely on general attitudes and beliefs based on prior learning. 
These beliefs determine the meaning and significance of the problem. (p5) 
The participants in this study were grossly dissatisfied with their understanding of their illness 
and exposed the inadequacy of their own, primarily medicalized, illness representations. There 
was a contrast between the reality of their chronic pain and their lack of any useful framework 
to explain its chronic nature. Despite the well established presence of the gate-control theory 
of pain and the bio-psychosocial model, very little of this had become available to the 
participants although where the obstacle to this understanding was is not clear from their 
accounts alone. 
The participants' frustrations highlighted the dominance and essential weakness of the 
application of a purely biomedical model in their attempts to conceptualise their situation. 
Such medicalization of our understanding of our bodies is referred to extensively in the 
medical sociology literature (Bendelow and Williams, 1995; Frank, 1990) and is shown in this 
study to be a major impediment to the participants' endeavours to understand and 
accommodate to their pain. To date their efforts to understand the ambiguity and 
uncertainties of their pain had had only punitive and disabling psychological and social 
consequences. Without an explanation they could understand they could not establish any 
basis for taking therapeutic action, retain a sense of control, or establish and defend the 
credibility and legitimacy of their illness or themselves. 
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Comparing this Self with other Selves. 
The participants evaluated their situation by using comparisons with others and themselves in 
the past, present and future. This often revealed their sense of loss and threat in relation to 
their chronic pain and the debilitating impact of their experience on their self-concept. To 
them, their pain had imposed change upon them and denied them the opportunity to be who 
they once were and wished still to be. Any contemporary self-regard was poor and stood in 
contrast to a nostalgic recall of a past when they described themselves at their very best, in an 
idealised form. 
As part of coming to terms with and accommodating to the demands of their chronic pain it 
has been argued that an individual must interpret and repair the disruption such pain causes in 
such a way that it makes sense in the context of their life story (Williams, 1984; Bury, 1988). 
The participants showed through their comparisons only partial fragments of such a reparation 
and despite lengthy pain careers remained pre-occupied with a sense of confusion, loss and 
threat. Their accounts were similar to those related by Charmaz (1983) who described how 
the chronically sick suffered in a constant struggle to lead socially valued lives and maintain 
definitions of the self which were positive and worthwhile: 
A fundamental form of suffering is the loss of self in chronically ill persons who 
observe their former self-images crumbling away without the simultaneous 
development of equally valued new ones. (p. 168) 
The need to reconstruct or reshape a self-concept in the face of the impact of a chronic illness 
has emerged as a theme in several studies on a wide range of chronic conditions and these 
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were reviewed earlier in chapter four (Existing Qualitative Work on Chronic Pain). For the 
participants in this study any positive self-image had faded to become the stuff of nostalgia. 
They often retreated into their past to maintain some self-regard in the face of their experience 
of chronic pain, however, the focus on an idealised past only appeared to amplify their sense 
of loss and disabled their ability to adapt to their situation constructively. Helstrom (2001) 
related how the participants in her study also described their ideal selves as those from their 
past and how this often prevented them contemplating any productive progress into the future. 
Comparison with others is considered to be instrumental in the formation of attitudes 
(Festinger, 1954) and utilised to cope with uncertainty and anxiety when information is 
limited, as in the case of chronic illness (Molleman et al., 1986). Festinger s theory suggests 
that people need to have stable appraisals of themselves and will use social comparison as a 
means to achieve this, particularly in the absence of more objective measures. 
Studies have suggested that downward comparisons with those considered to be in a worse- 
off situation or with an imagined `worse-world' can promote positive affect and well-being in 
individuals under stressful conditions by enabling them to resist the erosion of their self-regard 
and optimism (Taylor and Lobel, 1989; DeVellis et al., 1990). However other studies such as 
those by Buunck et al., (1990) and Hemphill and Lehman (1991) have suggested that the 
relationship is neither strong nor direct and that the comparison with those in a `worse-world' 
can also promote negative affect under certain conditions. The downward comparison with 
`worse worlds' has been identified as problematic in a number of chronically ill populations 
(Aflleck et al.,, 1988; Blalock et al., 1990). Jensen and Karoly (1992) showed that 
comparative evaluation was really only effective in those with short pain careers and of little 
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use in long-term chronic pain. The anxiety inherent in the physical condition itself has also 
been shown to play an important mediating role (Vanderzee et al., 1995). 
In this study the participants' comparisons stood in contrast to the argument that views them 
solely as a beneficient coping strategy. They found no sanctuary in being better off than those 
who were in a wheel-chair or dying of cancer and were often more frightened as a result. 
Their uncertainty denied them any guarantee that their own condition would not deteriorate 
and that one day they might not inhabit the `worse-world' already inhabited by others they 
compared themselves with. 
The participants employed a wide variety of comparisons with themselves in other situations 
and with other people around them in their attempts to describe and evaluate their situation. 
They compared themselves downwards with `worse worlds' and upwards with better ones 
interchangeably and no one single form appeared to serve a particular or discrete function. To 
be understood best each comparison needed to be seen in its personal context and it was in 
their complex network of comparisons that the individual's sense of their situation was 
revealed. Overall, comparison was an equivocal coping strategy and served best as an index 
of the participant's view of their situation. It revealed their attempts to manage their distress 
and uncertainty and helped to expose the personal meaning of their chronic pain. 
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Not Being Believed. 
To the participants, the awareness and understanding that other people had of their chronic 
pain was poor and being believed and judged appropriately could not be guaranteed. Having 
pain regarded as `real' is a major cause of concern for those taking time off work (Tarasak and 
Eakin, 1995; Pinder, 1995) and the need for this kind of `legitimation' of the illness has been 
identified as an important aspect of the social experience of being ill (Kotarba, 1983). Bury 
(199 1) described the problems that could arise if the validity of a chronic condition was 
brought into question. He stated that having a `real' illness was important to: 
re-establish credibility in the face of the assault on self-hood, personal integrity 
and threat to social status. (p456) 
Bury (1988) emphasised the lack of any social stability for the chronically ill as each of their 
relationships was put at risk `relationships do not guarantee particular responses' (p92). He 
emphasised how unstable the social environment was for those with a chronic illness and how 
as a result they could not assume they had retained any positive or valued social identity. 
In common with the experiences of people with chronic cardiac illness that were related by 
Radley (1994) the participants in this study endeavoured to continue to live in their social 
world of healthy people, often appearing and trying to appear healthy themselves but failing 
habitually to live up to the expectations and responsibilities they felt were implicit in that 
world. As a consequence they were often both self-critical and defensive. Unable in their 
uncertainty to justify to others or themselves why they should remain in pain they felt 
vulnerable to criticism and disapprobation. 
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Expressive pain behaviour has been described in the past as a form of attention seeking 
maintained by secondary gain (Fordyce, 1976; Heaton et al, 1984) and the aim of some clinical 
interventions has been to extinguish such behaviour by not responding to it or rewarding it 
with any kind of attention. The participant's behaviour in this study argues against taking such 
a simple stimulus-response perspective and shows how the participant's behaviour takes place 
within a dynamic social setting. They felt obliged to appear ill as any appearance of good 
health was considered by others as evidence of unreal, invalid pain or malingering. Rather 
than seeking attention, the participants appeared to be trying to both deflect any potential 
criticism and conform to the expectations that others had about the appearance and identity of 
those who claimed to have pain. No reward or understanding was felt by those whom, whilst 
remaining in pain, improved their health, appearance or mobility, instead they felt more 
vulnerable to misunderstanding. 
There was an ongoing tension between their private experience of their bodies and their social 
identity and Kelly and Field (1996) maintained that this was at the core of the everyday and 
distressing experience of people with chronic illness. For the participants in this study the 
invisibility and day-to-day variability of their chronic pain left their appearance unchanged, 
whereas the restrictions and intense unpleasantness of their body eroded their private 
experience of their quality of life. Consequently, overt and visible distress and disability was 
often the only currency or vocabulary that was available to them to establish the legitimacy 
and `reality' of their pain to others although this was also difficult given the confusion of 
chronic benign low back pain, what Baszanger (1992) referred to as the `problematic 
factuality' of chronic pain. The participants struggled to achieve or agree a collective or social 
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understanding of their chronic pain that was either stable, valued or `real' i. e. legitimate. 
Withdrawing from Others. 
To the participants, their chronic pain was problematic as it was an invisible and private 
experience but had profound social consequences, some of which have been outlined in the 
previous section. They were required to reconcile the restrictions of their pain with the 
demands of their social network and more often than not this was tbo demanding and resulted 
in their withdrawal from social contact. Their accounts showed how the utility of social 
contact and comparison for self-affirmation and support was negated by their fear of 
'misunderstanding and rejection. 
The tendency to seek out others for support when under stress has been shown to decrease 
under certain conditions (Buunk and Hoorens, 1992). Charmaz (1987) and Kotarba (1983) 
also described how feeling discredited by others and unable to reciprocate social support or 
fulfill the obligations implicit in past role-relationships were important factors in the suffering 
and subsequent social withdrawal related to chronic illness and pain. 
In common with the experience of sufferers of rheumatoid arthritis (Bury, 1988) the 
participants in this study felt their pain affected their relationships with those around them. 
They had no `role prescription' in their social network to guide their social interaction. They 
were unable either to perform ordinary activities in socially appropriate ways or explain why 
they could not and found it easier to be alone. 
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In a study on a similar sample of patients with benign pain Rose (1994) identified a four-stage 
process through which the participants in the study had proceeded as they accommodated to 
their pain. Similar to those in this study each participant had found it hard to make sense of 
their condition and in their failure to do so had developed a strong sense of emotional and 
social isolation, loneliness and alienation. They had found it hard to exist in their social world 
and safer to retreat from it, returning only after having re-established some form of self-regard. 
In each case they re-entered their world in a different place to that occupied by their previous, 
pain-free life-style. 
The accounts of the participants in this study highlighted how their experience of chronic pain 
was closely linked to a sense of stigma and apologism. Chronic pain left them anticipating and 
fearing misunderstanding and rejection and while the lack of social contact was mourned, the 
personal costs associated with the engagement with others meant that on balance they 
preferred to withdraw from that social world. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the study. 
The particular strength of this study lies perhaps in the perspective it provides into the 
experience of chronic pain. The participants were able to give rich accounts of their 
experience of their pain and these highlighted and reinforced its multi-dimensional and 
personal nature in a way which complements the extant quantitative research. In particular it 
reinforced the degree to which chronic benign low back pain existed within a dynamic 
personal and social context. 
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The study was limited in various ways. To begin with the sample was only women with 
chronic pain syndrome and how much the themes apply to men or people with chronic benign 
low back pain but lower levels of distress and disability can only be speculated. Similarly, the 
interviewer was a male clinical psychologist and the interviews took place within a hospital 
setting. The impact this would have had on the participants is hard to gauge. Although no 
explicit reference was made to this factor by the participants during the interview, it cannot be 
ignored as something that could have influenced and inhibited the participants' accounts. 
Reviewing this issue specifically at some point within the interview could have gone some way 
toward addressing or evaluating the nature of its effect. The study also used quite a narrow 
source of data. It was drawn from one interview and so limited the opportunity for using 
triangulation within the analyses. Additional sources of data, perhaps using repeated 
interviews with the same participants or diaries or journals could have added strength and 
depth to the analysis. 
Conclusions. 
Mainstream empirical research highlights the `puzzle of pain' and the lack of concordance 
between pain sensation, disability and organic pathology but has been criticised for being too 
correlational, able only to speculate on the processes involved in a patients pain career 
(Jensen et al., 1991). Through adopting the phenomenological approach it was possible in this 
study to access the individual, `insider's perspective' (Conrad, 1987) of living with chronic 
pain and focus on some of the underlying processes involved in a way which complements the 
extant research. 
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The accounts of the participants in this study revealed the multi-dimensional nature of their 
experience of chronic pain. They shared an inability to explain the persistent presence of their 
pain or reconstruct any contemporary self-regard. In their uncertainty, despite having a benign 
condition, they feared for their future. They could not establish the legitimacy of the chronic 
nature of their pain either to themselves or to others in their social world. As an appearance 
of good health or activity was generally considered to be incompatible with any claim to 
remain in pain, the participants felt obliged to appear ill to satisfy the requirements of others. 
By default participants treated their own pain as a stigma and tended to withdraw from social 
contact. 
The participants accounts highlighted how their pain frustrated both their need to attribute a 
cause for its chronic presence and to attain a stable appraisal of their situation from which they 
might establish a sense of control or positive self-regard. They felt a pervasive sense of loss 
and as they failed consistently to understand or explain why their pain should persist they also 
felt threatened, unable to guarantee themselves a benign future, free of chronic pain or social 
rejection. They employed many different forms of social comparison and it appeared to serve 
as an equivocal coping strategy. It served best as a window into the participant's view of their 
situation. It revealed their attempts to manage their distress and uncertainty, appraise their 
situation and helped to expose the personal meaning of their chronic pain. 
The themes which emerged in this study highlighted the need to attend to the psychological 
processes and constructs that the patients in chronic pain live through and bring to a pain 
clinic. This initial study emphasised how the participants experienced their chronic pain not 
just as a simple sensory phenomenon that produced cognitive and behavioural reactions but as 
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something that was embedded within a powerful and dynamic social and historical context. 
Their chronic pain experience was connected to their ongoing appraisal of their bodies, their 
social worlds and their biographies and it appeared to defy their attempts to make sense of it in 
any benign or useful way. 
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Chapter Seven. 
Study Two 
The Personal Experience of Chronic Benign Low Back Pain: The 
change in its meaning during a simple hypnotic pain management 
exercise. 
Introduction. 
The themes that emerged from study one underscored how the participants experience of 
their chronic benign low back pain was embedded deeply within a personal and social 
context. To follow on from this study two focused more closely on the private 
description of the pain itself in order to try to explore it more fully as an object of 
reference in its own right and examine the ways in which the participants described, 
appraised and related to their pain as a discrete `thing'. 
To focus on the pain in this way the participants experience was studied before and after 
a simple pain management exercise that was designed to palliate their experience of the 
pain. By exploring their experience of pain as it changed (or not) it was hoped to learn 
more about the nature of that experience. 
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The pain literature indicates strongly that people experience their chronic benign low 
back pain as a composite, multi-dimensional phenomenon. The services to help people 
with such pain reflect this and are most often grounded in the biopsychosocial model. 
Many studies have shown the utility and efficacy of pain management programmes (Flor 
et al, 1992; Morley et al., 1999) in helping to change and improve the experience of 
chronic benign pain for those whom attend. Pain programmes vary according to their 
composition and approach but it is likely that virtually all are based on the gate-control 
theory of pain (Melzack and Wall, 1988) and include the use of some form of attention- 
based pain management and relaxation exercises (Gatchell and Turk, 1996; Hanson and 
Gerber, 1990; Main and Spainswick, 2000). 
Tension and anxiety have been identified as important factors in the chronic pain 
experience and attention and attribution have been identified as potentially key elements 
in the mediation of the influence of anxiety on pain (Price, 1999; Arntz et al., 1994). 
This process was reviewed in chapter two of this thesis where it was shown that although 
attention appeared to be the key factor in acute pain, in chronic pain it appeared that both 
attribution and attention were likely to play a critical role (Eccleston and Crombez, 
1999). Eccleston (1995a, 1995b) has argued strongly for the need to direct research 
toward the relationship between central attention structures and chronic pain. 
Eccleston's research argued that the ability of pain to access our consciousness 
automatically was so strong due to its noxious and fluctuating nature, that any attempt to 
divert attention away from it was futile in the long term. To be constructive and 
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therapeutic attention needed to be directed toward chronic pain and not away from it so 
that a more adaptive attribution of the pain experience and its meaning can develop. 
An approach that has the facility to employ both attributional and attentional processes in 
chronic pain is clinical hypnosis and a range of hypnotic techniques for pain have been 
developed and published (Hart and Alden, 1994; Syrjala and Abrams, 1996). During 
hypnosis the participant is taken through a process of induction and deepening toward a 
state of highly focused attention, at this point suggestions are given that are directed 
toward either altering their perceptions or sensations of pain or achieving some other 
therapeutic effect. Chaves (1994) in a review of hypnosis and pain management 
concluded that in order to maximise outcome, the attributional and contextual elements 
which defined the meaning of the pain had to be incorporated into the suggestions. 
A cognitive exercise that is complex enough to challenge the sufferer's pain for the finite 
resources of central attention is the use of imagery (Skevington, 1995). Although 
imagery is not essential for hypnosis it has been identified as a powerful therapeutic 
agents in pain management (Turner and Jensen, 1993; Fernandez, 1986). 
Imagery can also, if focused on chronic pain, reveal the meanings of the pain to the 
sufferer in the form of the descriptions, attributions and anxieties that they hold about it. 
Fernandez (1986) proposed a classification system for cognitive coping strategies for 
pain. These were (i) imagery, (ii) self-statements and (iii) attention-diversion. Imagery 
strategies were similar to applied hypnotic techniques and revolved around the 
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production of particular images with pain-attenuating potential. These were either 
imagery associated with events that were inconsistent with pain or, transformative 
imagery that sought to modify specific features of the pain. Although quantitative studies 
of the effectiveness of imagery are criticized for a lack of rigour they often report an 
increase in the client's ability to cope with pain that is consonant with the Fernandez 
classification system (Barber, 1986) and could help us to understand better how chronic 
pain and attention inter-relate. 
This study was set up to explore the participants' descriptions and experience of their 
chronic benign low back pain as they went through a simple imaginal hypnotic 
procedure. The objective was to analyze how the participants experienced their chronic 
pain in the process of change and to see whether adopting such a perspective helped to 
gain a different insight into its lived experience. The pain management procedures were 
informed by the Fernandez classification of imagery, using either transformative imagery 
where the suggestions were directed explicitly toward altering the pain experience or 
incompatible distractive imagery where the experience of a pleasant, relaxing scenario 
was suggested to counter the aversiveness and unpleasantness of the pain. 
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Method. 
The data for the study consisted of the transcribed interviews with ten participants taken 
before and after a six-week course of either hypnotic transformative pain-imagery or 
relaxation imagery. The participants were allocated randomly to either group by a 
colleague who was blind to their identities, each participant was allocated a number and 
these were divided into two groups. 
As in study one the participants had attended the pain clinic for an initial assessment 
appointment and been informed that their pain was not amenable to any aggressive or 
curative medical treatment and was chronic in nature. They were then referred internally 
to one of the options for chronic pain management. Whilst they were waiting to receive 
an appointment they were approached by myself to ask if they would like to take part in a 
study into the personal experience of chronic benign low back pain. The information 
they were given was the same and given in the same way as outlined in the method 
chapter (five). 
Ten participants were recruited in a short space of time and once they had agreed to take 
part in the study they attended the clinic once a week for six weeks for the pain 
management exercise which was also recorded to enable them to practice the exercise at 
home. The research interviews took place one week before and one week after the course 
of sessions. 
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Five participants followed a course of hypnotic induction, deepening and suggestion 
directed toward inducing a state of somatic relaxation that was incompatible with the 
tension related to their pain. During the session no other suggestions were given and no 
reference was made to the participant's pain, their attitude toward it or their self-concept. 
The other five participants followed the same course of hypnotic induction and deepening 
but the suggestions were directed at transforming their personal sensation of pain toward 
a more tolerable state. The suggestions were agreed prior to the intervention and based 
on the imagery elicited from the participants at interview. For example, for one 
participant the suggestions were directed toward helping transform the pain into 
something `further away' whilst for another the suggestions were directed toward turning 
the pain into something less aggressive or `belligerent'. No other suggestions were given 
and no other suggestions were made about the participants or their pain. 
The ages of the participants plus the length of time they had been in pain is listed on the 
next page. As in study one they were all white, european caucasian, from a working 
class background and no longer worked in paid employment due to their pain. This study 
used a mixture of male and female participants, their anonymised names, ages and length 
of time in pain are tabled overleaf: 
As with study one the first ten participants who fitted the criteria and agreed to participate 
in the study were recruited. In this study there was a mix of men and women. The 
interviews were conducted in the pain clinic, transcribed and then analysed in the manner 
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described in the method chapter. Sufficient data emerged in the analysis of this batch of 
participants to proceed to the final write-up. A further group would have been recruited 
in the same way had it been clear that more data was required. 
I presented myself as the researcher in the same manner as in study one, as a psychologist 
researching the personal experience of chronic benign low back pain. In addition I 
explained that I would be the person administering the brief intervention in this study. 
They were aware that I worked as a Clinical Psychologist in the pain clinic but that I was 
not otherwise involved in their care in any way. 
Anonymised Name Age Duration of Pain 
(years) 
Adrian 42 10 
Paul 38 5 
Lily 51 9 
Jim 54 11 
Jo 39 13 
Monica 43 7 
Annie 52 6 
Tim 42 10 
Henry 55 15 
Brenda 37 7 
My supervisor monitored the development of the themes throughout the process of 
analysis and a work colleague reviewed the analysis its overall clarity, coherence and 
presentation of evidence. 
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The pre-intervention interview schedule began in the same way as study one and then 
focused more on the particular experience that was of interest in this study, which was to 
focus more closely on the participants' description of the pain itself. Following some 
broad non-directive introductory questions where the participants were asked simply to 
talk about their pain, questions were then chosen to encourage the participants to talk as 
freely as possible about the imagery they associated with their pain, what was different 
about their experience following the intervention and what factors they felt might have 
influenced that change. To avoid asking leading questions which restricted the response 
options of the participants the questions were open ended as much as possible. 
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Could you describe your pain to me in as much detail as possible in your own words please? 
- What does it feel like? 
- How long have you had it? 
- Does it change in any way? 
2. How did your pain start? 
- How long have you had it? 
- How did it come on? 
- Has it changed over time? 
3. Does anything affect your pain? 
- Does anything make it better? 
- Does anything make it worse? 
4. Do you know why your pain persists? 
- What causes your pain? 
- Why do you think your pain hasn't gone? 
5. Can you control your pain in any way? 
- What makes the difference between good days and bad days? 
- How do you cope with it? 
6. What makes your pain change? 
- what happens on a bad day/good day? 
- what causes a flare-up do you think? 
7. When you think about the pain itself what comes into your mind? 
- How do you relate to your pain? 
- What would sum up your pain? 
Post-intervention the participants were asked the same questions plus additional ones 
asking them to comment on any changes that might have occurred as a result of the 
exercise. These were: 
164 
1. Have you noticed any change in your pain due to the exercise? 
- Does your pain feel any different now? 
- If it has, how has it changed? 
2. Have you noticed any other changes since the exercise? 
- Is anything else different? 
- Have you noticed anything new? 
3. What do you think caused the changes to happen (if any)? 
- How do you think it helped? 
- What made it work do you think? 
4. Why don't you think it helped (if it didn't) 
- If everything is the same why do you think it didn't change? 
- Why don't you think it worked? 
Care was taken to leave time at the end of each interview to attend to any distress that 
might have emerged for the participants during its course. In this study none of the 
participants reported any undue anxiety following the interview. 
Analysis. 
Pre-Intervention 
In the pre-intervention interviews the participants were asked to describe their pain in as 
much depth as possible. Their accounts clustered around three broad themes, which 
were; `Pain Taxonomy', how each participant classified the various sensations related to 
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their pain; `Mechanisms and Causes', the metaphors used by the participants to describe 
the processes related to their pain; and `Intrusion', the perceived impact of the 
participants' pain on particular domains of their quality of life. 
Pain Taxonomy. 
Each participant had developed a personal classification system, which they employed to 
rate and rank their pain's variable quality and intensity. To describe their pain they each 
focused on it as if it took two broad forms, pain at its worst and pain at its best. Each 
participant employed their own particular criteria to define the differences between the 
two. There was a uniformity about the quality of the participants' `pain at its best', 
related to its chronicity and persistence. Accounts of the pain `at its worst' however, 
revealed the personal and individual nature of each participant's fear and distress related 
to their pain. 
Adrian described his pain in two discrete forms, which he labeled an `ache' and a `pain', 
`... there's a difference between back ache and back pain, to me it feels different. ' His 
everyday ever-present chronic pain was an `ache' and he reserved the term `pain' for that 
which was capable of producing an overt display of distress: 
To me pain is, making me crying, you know, I was just laid on the floor 
and I used to be crying in agony and I mean crying. 
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Although it was not considered pain, Adrian was careful to emphasise the aversive nature 
of his `ache', `.. Oh I can get terrible with it, I start sweating with it sometimes and get 
annoyed.. ' His ache was notable not for its intensity, but for its persistence. It endured 
with no respite and left him feeling unable to know what to do for the best: 
Its all day really, not being able to settle. 
When it's bad it's just there and I just don't know what to do with myself. 
Adrian s `ache', although it remained a hurtful and unpleasant sensation, was restricted to 
a feeling of irritation and frustration rather than the despair he associated with pain: 
It's like dull, that's why I call it. its more annoying than anything else, it's 
really annoying to me, but it hurts. 
The other participants also conceived their pain in two polarised forms, a mild and a 
strong form. In contrast to Adrian it remained for them a `pain' at all times as Paul 
describes: 
only two [types of pain], that's not too bad and the very bad indeed, It's 
always the same pain all the time. 
At its best their pain was similar to Adrian's `ache'. It was marked by its persistence, its 
intrusion and the associated feelings of frustration and irritability: 
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It's just annoying, niggling, when it is like it is now its maddening because 
you know its not that bad but you know its there and its interfering with 
your life all the time. (Lily) 
As with Adrians `ache', Lily's pain at its best, although not intense appeared to offer no 
respite, no possibility of a relief or a cure: 
Lily. It's annoying, you know you could have your toothache out 
but. 
Int. you can't have your back out? 
Lily. No. 
For Lily, at its worst, the pain was typified by a disabling, dissociated and withdrawn 
psychological state: 
Oh its terrible, I feel sick, I'm in a world of my own, I don't hear or see 
anybody. I'm just shut off into my own little cave, I'm like a zombie. 
The continuum upon which Lily placed her pain was related to a sense of proximity. At 
its best it was `distant', whilst at its worst it felt closer, more intrusive, `it gets nearer and 
more intense. ' 
Other participants' accounts defined their pain according to cognitive and affective 
dimensions rather than simple sensory intensity, but retained the polarised taxonomy. 
Jim's account described the pain as if it were a social or interpersonal phenomenon. The 
pain was defined by how intimidating and afraid it made him feel: 
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Jim. It comes in two flavours 
Int. Flavours ? 
Jim. Yeah, two kinds ? 
Int. How do they differ ? 
Jim. They make you feel different, one is vicious, scares you 
shitless, its like it's after you like. The other one can't have 
you like, its irritating and it won't leave you alone but it's 
not like, after you. 
There was a concensus amongst the participants in their accounts of their pain at its best, 
where it was considered more bearable but notable for its persistence and relentless, 
unending quality `it just won't go away what ever you do' (Jo). Monica described her 
pain when at its best as, `peaceful, but its not like being able to move into another room 
where you can't hear it, its there all the time'. The concept of pain as `peaceful' 
contrasted with the aggression and anger she felt it was like when it was at its worst. 
The participants' pain was at its most personal and idiosyncratic when described at its 
worst. Annie felt her pain at its best was `bearable' and equivalent to a `moan', but at its 
worst it revealed its personal meaning to her, her fears for the future and her inability to 
predict how she would end up: 
Its [the pain] somebody screaming, the agony, the despair, I do imagine 
what I think I am going to be like when I'm sixty, how bad is it going to 
get, am I going to be able to stand it. 
Each of the participants revealed the individual nature of the distress they felt in relation 
to their pain when they described it in its worst of two forms. For example, Adrian was 
physically crippled, doubled-up and in despair at what to do for the best, Lily withdrawn, 
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dazed and nauseous and Jim and Annie were both frightened either for the future or as if 
they were in danger of being assaulted. 
Mechanisms and Causes. 
In addition to describing and categorising their pain, the participants' imagery also 
focused around what they imagined caused their pain and it's associated distress. 
Adrian maintained his distinction between a `pain' and an `ache' in his use of causal 
imagery. In each case they were associated with descriptions of on-going organic 
pathology and a memory of an episode of intense acute pain. The `ache' was associated 
with an exposed nerve: 
Like my nerve showing, I mean when I had that tooth out at the back 
there, it were an hole I'd got in it like and it, but I don't call that pain. 
To qualify as `pain', Adrian required more active organic pathology: 
What I call pain is when my disc were out of place and it were wrapped 
around, apparently it were wrapped around the sciatic nerve and it were 
gradually doubling me up like that. 
Like Adrian, Lily associated her pain with a memory of a painful episode and with 
aversive images of active organic pathology. The memories were traumatic and the 
imagery both dramatic and impossible. Adrian imagined his vertebral disc as if it were 
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`wrapped around' his sciatic nerve, whilst Lily associated her intense pain with an image 
of her back as if it were splitting in half: 
I get that tingling and then it feels like, along the bottom that it's going to 
crack, that's how I had when I passed out. It was terrible. .. 
if I bent either 
way I feel as though it would split. 
When her pain was not at its worst and more like the `ache' Adrian described, Lily 
pictured her back being damaged and physically eroded, in a less traumatic way: 
Even when they gave me that rocking exercise to do, I could hear it like 
grinding, something grinding. 
Jim described his worst pain in the form of nerve damage, but it was more metaphorical 
in content, related to his feelings of intimidation, powerlessness and the fear of assault: 
Its as if some-ones got hold of you and is ripping at your back, its torture 
and all you can do is lie and wait for them to stop. 
Jo's account was more mechanical than neurological and conveyed his sense of 
immobility and the hopelessness of feeling as if he was on the `scrapheap': 
When its bad I'm rusted solid, there's absolutely nothing you can do about 
it. My hips will just seize, go stiff and everything comes to a halt, scrap 
heap. 
Jim and Jo 's descriptions of their pain bridged between the aversive images of severe 
biological damage and those of more metaphorical or abstract concepts. Jim considered 
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his pain at its worst to be an aggressor, intent on assaulting him and damaging his spine, 
whilst Jo described his with the finality and immobility of a rusted and seized engine. 
Many of the other participants shared Jim's account of their pain being the consequence 
of a violent and brutal assault that they felt helpless to resist. For example Paul described 
his pain at its best as being like, `somebody has just got their knuckles in middle of your 
back, just giving it a little dig', whereas, at its worst his pain was like an assault, `a good 
kicking' and one which seemed to continue endlessly: 
its like somebody punching, but its constant, its a constant pain, its like 
somebody punching but its a punch which never comes off [never stops] 
... as 
if somebody's got top and bottom and they've twisted it, twisted it 
round. 
Other participants continued the theme of helplessness in the face of assault and specified 
the type of damage inflicted, as if by a knife: 
You get like a shock through your system, through my back and down my 
legs, its like its just like somebody putting a knife in you. (Tim) 
The theme of assault was extended by Annie to include what she imagined it would be 
like to be struck by lightning: 
It's excruciating like being struck by lightning, it's like my back all 
tightens up and like somebody's shoving a knife up me. 
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Participants also used more abstract and purely psychological terms to describe their 
pain. Lily saw the pain as a malignant force, as evil, `a red devil with great big horns on', 
which she associated with a feeling of nausea, `something gets you in a knot and you feel 
a bit sickly'. Annie echoed Lily's account of the malignancy of her pain and described 
her own situation as if her pain was involved in a parasitic process, draining her of any 
motivation: 
It feels like something's attacking your body isn't it ... I'm always tired, 
when it's bad it's like everybody's plugged into my back and all the 
energy's gone, it's dead ... all sucked out. 
In a similar vein Jo and Paul described their pain as `vindictive' and `cruel'. To them it 
was senseless and appeared to act only out of malice, existing only to prevent them from 
doing what they wished to do and to deny them pleasure: 
It's mean, vindictive, I get to the point where I can do things and then it 
just comes in and spoils everything just so I can't, I can do nothing, it 
hates me. (Jim) 
It doesn't seem to be giving me a chance at all just lately ... 
it's like 
somebody's got their hand inside your spine and every time you think 
about doing something they just give it a little squeeze. 
(Paul) 
Whether physical or more metaphorical in description the participants' imagery for their 
pain, like their taxonomies, reflected more the quality of their distress, their sense of 
despair, powerlessness and frustration than the technical level of their understanding of 
the processes of chronic pain. 
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Intrusion. 
Each participant considered their pain to have had a profound impact on their quality of 
life, but varied according to the quality and degree of this intrusion. 
Adrians's pain had changed his life extensively, but he felt that its effect had been 
restricted to only certain domains: 
It's changed my life 90%, my lifestyle but it's changed my lifestyle 90% 
but me actual home life and personality, it hasn't changed me that way. 
Adrian felt no sense of shame or responsibility for his pain and felt that its persistent 
presence did not reflect upon him as a person, or influence his personality or self-regard: 
I don't think I've changed as a person because I'm not disappointed in 
myself if you get what, I've done nothing wrong and I can accept that, you 
know, I've done nothing wrong and I've not, It's just.. . 
how I actually did 
it I don't know I'm not like annoyed with myself that way because it's just 
one of those things. 
Lily described a similar reduction in her levels of activity, `... it ruins my life really... it 
does it sort of cuts your life in half... ', but in contrast to Adrian, her pain not only 
restricted her life, but pervaded both it and her sense of self, `... it's part of me now... ' It 
was associated with a sense of permanence and powerlessness as it intruded into her view 
of her future where she imagined it would persist endlessly: 
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At least with a toothache you can go to the dentist and have it out, can't 
you, with a back you're stuck with it, forever. 
For Henry, the intrusive and pernicious nature of his pain extended yet further, to the 
point where he felt his pain defined him as an individual: 
It's so bad it takes over my body, it takes over my mind, it makes me 
short-tempered you know, talking about the pain I've got, it makes me a 
pain, it's that feeling of knowing that I must be a pain to others. I'm a 
bother. On a daily basis it's destroying me, it's stopping the pleasure of 
my life. 
Tim and Jo both ascribed qualities of malice and cruelty to their pain and felt this was 
directed toward interfering with their relationships by making them both intolerant and 
hostile. Similar to Henry, but in contrast to Adrian they felt their pain had intruded into 
their personality and that they and those around them suffered as a consequence: 
It's made me into a monster, sometimes, Jekyll and Hyde. Made me full 
of hate, so no one wants to know me. I've lost people cos of who I am 
now. (Jo) 
Tim's pain was associated with a significant degree of somatic tension and he saw pain 
management as a dual task which he felt he often failed to achieve and which, like Jo, 
had changed his identity: 
I tense up with my back pain the rest of my body is going haywire you 
see, you're not just coping with back pain, you're coping with the rest of 
your body ... 
it's made me a different person, I'm usually really placid, up 
to getting this I could cope with anything, I've never been stroppy and 
short-tempered and snappy like I am now. 
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Lily related a similar process whereby her experience and response to her pain interfered 
greatly with her social relationships. But in contrast, rather than becoming aggressive in 
the face of her pain, she was prompted to withdraw into a state where she dissociated 
herself from her surroundings. As Lily retreated, in fear, from the pain and the memories 
of past pain episodes she also became estranged from those around her: 
Nobody can get through to me when it's like that. I'm just in my own little 
world ... 
I just tend to shut off from it [the pain] when it gets so intense I get 
frightened cos I know from when I passed out with it, it wasn't very nice 
at all, horrible, I've never had pain like that and I don't want to have it 
again. 
Annie felt that coping with her pain drained her of energy and the ability to feel pleasure, 
`you've lost the vitality of life'. For Tim coping with such ever-present and persistent 
pain represented a test of stamina. His pain remained within his consciousness and often 
caused problems with fatigue: 
It's always there and its at the back of my mind, eventually it gets through 
to me, you know I can keep, what is it, I can't keep switching off, you tend 
to like think I haven't got it, but you can't do it all the time. 
Many participants, like Jim described how the simple physical restrictions associated 
with their pain, `... you can't do anywhere near as much as you could. '. However Jim also 
emphasised how his pain's intimidating quality also dictated his disability: 
When it's bad, that's when its out to get you and you're afraid to do 
anything in case it does. 
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The participants' disability was as much a function of the degree of apprehension they 
held in relation to their pain, as of it's physical restrictiveness. Their lack of confidence 
in their ability to predict or withstand a severe flare-up of pain when they were away 
from their home regularly restricted their mobility. Paul felt this quite acutely: 
I haven't got the confidence to go out without my stick, I haven't got the 
confidence just to go around the corner to shop. 
For Paul his pain was omni-present, dictatorial and persecutory, actively disabling him: 
It never goes away, its like somebody's got their hand in and every time 
you think that maybe I can do this, you start something and it gives you a 
kick, you always pay for what you do. 
Each participant, having defined the unique meanings and qualities that typified their 
pain also described how this intruded into specific personal and public domains of their 
lives and lifestyle. The participants' experience of pain extended beyond an unpleasant 
sensation or restriction in movement to influence directly their self-concept, self-efficacy 
and relationships. 
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Post - Intervention. 
In the participants' accounts following the intervention each groups appeared to have 
received a similar therapeutic benefit that was independent of the style of the 
intervention. For each of them their pain remained the same and the benefits were not 
related to the explicit content of the intervention. Pre-intervention the participants 
described their pain in personal and contrasting ways and this variety was also reflected 
in their report of the outcomes of the intervention. 
Pain Taxonomy and Mechanisms and Causes. 
The participants reported, post-intervention, that their pain remained unchanged. The 
same pain taxonomies and causal beliefs they applied prior to the intervention were 
retained. Adrian emphasised his distinction between a `pain' and an `ache': 
I class pain as, what can I say, like sharpish, you know to be sharp, where 
as my back problem, I wouldn't say it's sharp, it's dull. 
Adrian s `ache' continued and it's persistence and demand for attention remained a 
central problem, as it also did for Tim: 
It's just there, it's I don't know whether it's just, it's in your brain all the 
time. (Adrian) 
It grinds you down, it goes on and on and on and on and on, you can't 
ignore it forever. (Tim) 
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Post-intervention the participants reinforced the focus on the persistence and perceived 
endlessness of their pain when it was at its best: 
Its still there, it won't let up, even when its not too bad its still there and 
you think, its going to be here forever. (Jo) 
I've got the same pains, most of the time its just there bugging you, not 
scaring but bugging you and you can't imagine what its like without it. 
(Jim) 
Similarly, post-intervention none of the participants changed their descriptive imagery as 
it related to their ideas about the causes of their pain. All but one of the participants 
reported that their pain had not changed. They felt it continued to persist and that the 
processes related to its presence had not been altered or modified. However, each also 
felt more able to manage their pain, `the pain's the same but I'm better in myself' 
(Brenda). The participants reported an increase in the degree of self-confidence they felt 
in the face of their on-going pain. In asserting that their pain remained, the participants 
highlighted the change they felt had taken place: 
its still like vicious, no difference, but I think I can deal with it a bit better, 
like I'm not running away, I'm stronger. (Jim) 
One participant was an exception, Lily, who had employed more descriptive rather than 
causal imagery reported that her pain had moderated in that, pain post-intervention, it had 
became more `distant'. It remained a pain which `nagged', but one which did so from 
further away, palliating its effect: 
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It's [the pain] still there but its, as I say its distant, it seems further away 
than, not as incessant as what it normally is you it's always there nagging, 
but its not bothering me at all. 
Intrusion. 
The change in the degree of intrusiveness and impact of the participants' pain on their 
quality of life and self-concept emerged, from the participants' perspective, as the 
primary effect of the intervention. It now disabled them less. 
Adrian's ache remained a widespread sensation that influenced his perception of his 
whole body rather than one discrete part of it: 
You get because you can feel it. You feel it and all your body like seems 
to know about it, you know what I mean. Er, what can I say, your brains 
telling you you've got pain-my head can feel the pain. 
Following the intervention Adrian described the continuing presence of his pain but an 
improvement in his ability to tolerate it and reduce its influence over his mood: 
It's not actually getting rid of your back pain, or even helping. Its not like having 
an injection or something to get rid of the pain or something like that, its just 
mentally wise, I feel better, I feel a lot better for it. 
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The other participants' accounts of their pain showed that although it persisted within 
their body as it did for Adrian, it was no longer as intrusive as it had before the 
intervention. Jim, for example reported how he now felt less afraid of his pain. It 
retained the potential to assault him, but he felt more able cope with it: 
Its still there and its still mean, but I reckon I can handle it better now, it 
won't get me as much. 
Lily's distress receded as she felt her pain intrude less: 
It used to spoil a lot of things. So yeah I feel a lot better, I'm aware of it 
but that's it, it was over-powering at times. 
As she felt better, Lily's disability improved, she was able to resume some of her social 
activities and feel more in control of her every-day life: 
I look after my granddaughter a couple of days a week. I can cope better 
with that, when she's a bit grumpy, I just can cope with life better, I feel a 
lot better in myself. 
The participants recounted how their pain no longer intruded upon their mood as much as 
before and that as a consequence they felt more able to contain their emotions. Jo felt he 
had become more predictable and better able to manage his social life: 
It's still there, the pain, no different, but I'm different, I'm calmer, I'm not 
so ballistic. I can have the pain and not be so hateful, I'm still in pain. 
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Other participants also described how they felt better able to manage their pain and its 
effect upon them: 
Its still there but I'm better in myself, not so ugly, monster, I can cope 
with it and its not winding up my body like it was. (Tim) 
I don't think the pain as such is any better, I reckon its all worn out and 
rusted and the tape hasn't kind of lubricated that way, but I can stop it 
being so mean, spoiling things. (Jo) 
Paul considered that his pain had worsened marginally during the time of the 
intervention, but he felt that the process of deterioration had been slowed and that he 
could manage his pain better. He put this down to an improvement in his mood: 
It's [the pain] a little bit worse, but I seem to be a lot happier now than I 
was. Being happy seems to lessen it or slow it down, I was finding myself 
more relaxed and I started to sleep easier. 
The experience of empowerment and increased self-confidence in the face of pain were 
similar in both groups. For example, like Paul in the transformative group, Henry and 
Annie in the incompatible relaxation group both felt their pain had not improved but that 
they had become able to manage it better and control their depression and anxiety: 
As I say it's definitely slightly worse but I've not been getting so 
depressed, I try to relax, I mean you panic, I don't get so much you know, 
what I did in the shops, that definitely works, I don't get so panic-stricken. 
(Henry) 
I think your mood has a lot to do with it yeh, I'm a lot happier now, but er, 
you know the pain is still as bad, I think I'm coping with it better. 
(Annie) 
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The participants accounts showed that their situation had changed most, post- 
intervention, in the degree to which their pain intruded upon and influenced their 
particular social worlds and their sense of self-regard or self-efficacy in relation to their 
pain. 
Active Ingredients and Processes. 
Each participant described how they felt a beneficial change as a result of the 
intervention. However, this was not related to the explicit content of the intervention. In 
the respective groups their pain had not been transformed and there was no report of a 
significant decrease in somatic tension. Although no suggestions had been included in 
either intervention toward developing greater self-efficacy, or self-regard, it was in these 
areas that the participants perceived an improvement. Contextual factors, particular to 
both groups such as the relationship with the therapist emerged as the important 
therapeutic ingredients for the participants. 
Jo felt that the pain-management context of the intervention, rather than the content, 
enabled him to manage and endure his pain better by promoting a better sense of self- 
efficacy and reducing his sense of hopelessness in the face of it: 
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As I say nothings gone and I don't feel more relaxed but I'm better with 
the pain, I can ignore it longer and stop it spoiling things for a bit longer 
and the tape helps you put your mind to it, makes you think its possible, 
although it doesn't say that like. 
Despite not feeling a change in their levels of tension or pain related to the suggestions 
embedded in the interventions, the participants each felt better able to manage and 
reduce, the intrusiveness of their pain into their consciousness. This, in turn, enabled 
them to engage in other activities. By `blocking' his pain in this way, Henry felt he was 
able to feel pleasure again: 
your really blocked off with it and, eh, I get absorbed that way and I can 
sort of relax a bit more. I can't say it takes the pain off, but it's a different 
sort of feeling, you know what I mean, sort of pleasurable. 
Paul described how he felt able to dissociate from his pain and imagine he was 
`somewhere else'. The pain continued but he could now achieve a degree of control over 
its intrusion and secure some respite from it: 
I think its not being there, you're somewhere else, not in your own house, 
somewhere you want to be, I think that helps more than anything else. 
Adrian felt the exercise assisted him to manage his pain by supplying a form of social 
contact and support, a therapeutic alliance to help him to endure his pain at its worst and 
ease the sense of isolation his pain imposed: 
Its like another person involved with you. Where as when it's just you, 
when it's just your back and your brain that's the way I can put it 
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like. 
.. there's just you two like knowing about it and coping with it at the 
time. 
That ten minutes, twenty minutes or half an hour whatever you want to do 
it like... involves somebody else in your back pain. (Adrian) 
Jim and Brenda were explicit about the sense of social support the intervention offered. 
It provided them with a sense of moral support and gave them a feeling of confidence in 
the face of their pain, it was no longer as traumatic to them: 
It doesn't say it like but the tape, its like a mate and when you've got your 
mates with you you feel stronger like, so now I feel like its not just me. 
(Jim) 
Having some one else give you the confidence to resist it, not panic like 
you'd been stabbed but stay calmer and slow down. (Lily) 
Each participant referred to the non-specific inter-personal elements of the intervention, 
Adrian and Jim specifically and Lily more obliquely. For Lily the important ingredient 
involved taking some specific time out of her daily life on a regular basis to learn to relax 
and listen to the sound of some-one talking. This helped her to gain a sense of cognitive 
clarity: 
Just taking that half-hour, to yourself and the droll of your voice... it gives 
you time to gather your thoughts and things really. 
In each case the intervention enabled the participants to ameliorate the sense of social 
withdrawal and estrangement that had accompanied their pain. Adrian received it 
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directly from the exercise and others, such as Lily and Jo were able to improve their 
disability through re-engaging in the kind of social contact their pain had denied them 
access to through it's impact on their mood: 
I look after my granddaughter a couple of days a week now. I can cope 
better with that, when she's a bit grumpy. (Lily) 
Now that I'm a bit better with people, not so Jekyll and Hyde-y it means I 
can see people more. I still get tired but I'm not such a miserable git now, 
better to live with. (Jo) 
Discussion. 
The analysis of the participants' accounts showed that they felt they had experienced a 
beneficial change in their pain and attributed the change directly to the intervention. The 
effect they reported was independent of the style or explicit content of the intervention 
and more a result of the contextual and non-specific factors that were common to both 
groups. 
The participants' accounts of their chronic pain in the pre-intervention interviews 
revealed the richness and uniqueness of the imagery they associated with their pain. 
Their imagery, `at its worst', provided an insight into the personal nature of their 
representations and beliefs about their illness. No change occurred in their descriptive 
pain taxonomies or causal pain-imagery which suggested that their representations and 
beliefs about the nature of their pain remained the same. Their self-concepts however 
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did appear to have changed and they reported feeling better able to manage and contain 
the anxieties they felt in association with their pain at its worst. In each case the 
participants had re-appraised the degree of personal threat that their chronic pain 
represented to them. 
No explicit suggestions were made to either group during the intervention toward 
enabling more self-confidence or self-efficacy with regard to managing the fear and 
anxiety inherent in the participants' pain. However, this was the improvement they felt 
had occurred. Their attributions and self-perceptions had become more adaptive and as a 
result their health anxiety was less intrusive, catastrophic or disabling. They were less 
fearful of their pain despite its persistent and unchanging nature and less disabled as a 
result. 
The results of this study support the findings of Fisher and Johnston (1998) who 
examined the role of distress and control cognitions on the pain-disability relationship. 
They found little support for the mediating role of control cognitions and concluded that 
it was emotional distress that mediated the pain-disability relationship. In a similar study 
Sullivan et al (1998) examined the relationship between catastrophisation, a particular 
cognitive distortion related to anxiety in pain patients and distress and disability. They 
defined catastrophisation as an exaggerated and negative response to a pain experience 
and their results showed that it was associated with heightened levels of pain, disability 
and unemployment. In particular, rumination, the intrusion of health anxiety cognitions 
was most strongly associated with disability. 
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The participants' accounts of their pain at its worst revealed the personal nature of their 
most fearful and catastrophising cognitions about their pain. At the post-intervention 
interview their accounts of the nature of their pain were unchanged but its personal 
implications and consequences for them were less catastrophic. They reported that the 
resultant reduction in ruminative and intrusive cognitions enabled them to improve their 
disability and functioning. Crombez et al (1998) were able to show this effect in both an 
experimental study and with a clinical sample (Crombez et al, 1999). They examined the 
impact of catastrophic thinking on attention and concluded that catastrophisation 
appeared to amplify somatosensory information and prime fear mechanisms that rendered 
the sufferer unable to divert their attention away from pain. 
Leventhal et al (1980) proposed that each person actively assembled their own cognitive 
representation of their illness using their lay beliefs and `common-sense' models. This 
representation had six main dimensions of which `consequences' was one. The pre- 
intervention powerlessness and anxieties that the participants in this study felt in the face 
of their worst pain appeared to have improved. Their representation of their pain, 
according to Leventhal's model perhaps was that it now had different consequences, a 
different meaning with regard to its threat and their future quality of life. Their pain did 
not threaten them as much and it's reduced level of intrusion enabled them to feel less 
pessimistic. They were able to retrieve some of the activities they had lost or surrendered 
due to either their fear of movement or social withdrawal and felt more hopeful. 
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The participants' accounts support Eccleston s (1995b) recommendation that pain 
management was best facilitated, not by avoiding conscious thought about the pain, but 
by `directing attention toward the pain and engaging in a meaningful and positive 
adaptation of the pain thought'. Both Eccleston (1995b) and Skevington (1995) asserted 
that simple distraction if it was not associated with an adaptation of the meaning of the 
pain to the sufferer could only serve as a short-term and equivocal coping strategy. 
There is further support for this hypothesis in Kleinman's (1988) anecdotal account that 
he related in the preface of his book. The patient in particular had to endure a regular and 
very painful procedure and his role, as a junior doctor, was to support her during it. At 
first he struggled to do this until he elected to ask her to focus on her pain: 
angered by my own ignorance and impotence, uncertain what to do besides 
clutching the small hand and in despair over her unrelenting anguish, I found 
myself asking her to tell me how she tolerated it,... she told me. While she spoke, 
she grasped my hand harder and neither screamed nor fought off the surgeon or 
the nurse. Each day from then on, her trust established, she tried to give me a 
feeling of what she was experiencing ... the 
little burned patient seemed 
noticeably better able to tolerate the debridement. (pp xi-xii) 
Kleinman abandoned his attempts to simply distract the patient and began to ask her to 
relate her experience to him. This in turn enabled him to begin to form a relationship 
with her which she seemed to find helpful. The experience had a significant effect on 
him and he concluded that: 
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it is possible to talk with patients, even those who are most distressed, about the 
actual experience of illness and that witnessing and helping to order that 
experience can be of therapeutic value. (ppxi) 
Kleinman's account and those of the participants in this study suggests one of the 
possible therapeutic ingredients, that is through the act of `witnessing and helping to 
order that experience' (pxi) and in particular through directing conscious attention toward 
the source of the threat in the situation, the distress of the pain sufferer could be eased. 
The relationship between the patient and the health professional and their joint focus on 
the patient's pain and situation appears to be an effective therapeutic ingredient. From 
the participants' perspective it was an integral part of helping them to develop their self- 
confidence in the face of their pain. Adrian, Jim and Brenda each provided examples of 
how that contact empowered and helped them: `it's like another person involved with 
you... two like knowing about it and coping with it at the time' (Adrian), `it's like a mate 
and when you've got your mates with you you feel stronger' (Jim) and ` having some-one 
else give you the confidence to resist it, not panic like you'd been stabbed but stay calmer 
and slow down' (Brenda). Brenda's account highlighted how the intervention helped her 
to stay calm in the face of her pain, not catastrophise or panic as she had done in the past. 
The primacy of the contextual non-specific factors in an intervention was echoed in a 
study by Koutanji et al (1998). They also found no difference in the comparative benefits 
of a relaxation exercise versus an hypnotic technique for pain management, suggesting 
that the active therapeutic agents were those that were implicit in the interventions and 
common to both. 
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The participants in this study identified both the relationship with the therapist and the 
pain-specific context as the most important factors to them. Through the rapport they 
established with the therapist they felt better able to manage their anxieties about their 
pain. Similar processes have been identified in psychotherapy research where widely 
different therapies have been found to be broadly equivalent due to the over-riding effects 
of common factors (Stiles et al., 1986). Of those factors the facillitative conditions and 
the therapeutic alliance from the perspective of the patient have been shown to relate 
most positively to outcome (Barkham, 1996; Bergin and Garfield, 1994). 
Psychotherapy practitioners have focused explicitly on the importance of the therapeutic 
relationship as a vital ingredient in the helping process. Malan (1997) defined rapport as 
`the degree of emotional contact between the patient and the therapist' (p21) and 
identified it as the critical on-going measure of therapeutic efficacy `the universal 
indicator by which the therapist may be constantly guided' (p85). According to Malan, 
without adequate rapport other therapeutic processes cannot take place. An important 
one of these is `containment' which Casement (1985) described as the process of 
enabling the client to cope with their most unpleasant and difficult feelings, anxieties 
which up to that point they had struggled to manage. Casement argued that such 
containment could not be achieved through diversion or the provision of technical 
reassurance or information alone but took place within the context of a good therapeutic 
alliance. What was required and sought after by the individual was a relationship with 
some-one, `a person', who was available to help. Through focusing on and identifying 
the patient's most uncomfortable feelings within the therapy session they could then 
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begin to overcome and re-appraise them. The accounts of the participants in this study 
appear to support this argument and showed evidence that this phenomenon also takes 
place within a simple brief pain-management intervention. The therapeutic relationship 
that had developed had, in part, helped them to focus on the most difficult and 
uncomfortable aspects of their pain at its worst and adapt the meanings they had attached 
to that situation. 
Brewin and Power (1999) reviewed the role of such transformation of meaning in 
different schools of psychotherapy. They argued that the success of any psychological 
therapy lay in its ability to transform the meanings that the clients had attached to their 
symptoms, relationships and life problems. In particular they highlighted a small 
number of themes that they felt were of clinical significance. Of particular relevance to 
this study were those that centred around the self including, `the self as powerless', `the 
self as inferior', `the self as non-existent' and `the self as futureless'. The accounts of the 
participants in this study suggested strongly that they had achieved some progress in 
these themes as a result of the intervention. They felt more confident, less powerless and 
with more hope. Other themes not related to the self, such as `the other as hostile' 
appeared not to change i. e., the participants' pain-beliefs remained stable. 
In partnership with rapport and the therapeutic alliance, the pain-management context of 
the intervention was an important factor for the participants. It distinguished it from 
other supportive relationships that the participants had, as the following segments 
illustrate: `the tape helps you put your mind to it, makes you think its possible' (Jo) and 
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`it wouldn't work unless it sounded like, this is for the pain, this will help, helps you feel 
you can do it that way, wouldri t work if you were just encouraging like, or if you went 
on about gardening and being all nice, it's the pain bit you need' (Jim). This adds weight 
to Casement's conclusion that a good rapport and alliance is both therapeutic in itself and 
enables a therapeutic process to occur. In this case the containment of the participants' 
pain anxieties and sense of threat and powerlessness. Jarrett et al. (1999) found that 
palliative care patients actually expected this kind interpersonal relationship as part of a 
therapeutic service. `Support' and `someone to talk to' emerged as a discrete themes in 
their study of patients' perceptions of a specialist palliative care team. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the study. 
The main strength of this study, as with the previous one, lies perhaps in the nature of the 
themes that emerged and how they captured and articulated an aspect of the participants 
experience that would have been difficult to explore otherwise. The analytic process was 
flexible enough to respond to the themes that emerged and as a result it was possible to 
explore both how the participants experienced and managed their pain and speculate as to 
what the active therapeutic process might involve. 
As in study one the participants were exclusively those with chronic pain syndrome and 
how the themes relate to those patients in less distress and disability requires further 
research. Similarly, the analysed data was restricted to the verbatim transcripts of the 
interviews with the participant before and after the intervention. Other sources of data, 
such as journals or pain diaries could have provided a greater opportunity to triangulate 
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the participants accounts and add weight to the emergent themes. The follow up 
interview was immediately after the intervention and it would have been interesting to 
repeat the interviews over a lengthier period of time to see how their experience unfolded 
and whether the changes they reported were maintained. 
The participants' accounts could have been influenced in some way by the context of the 
study, in particular that the interviews took place within a clinical setting and that the 
researcher in this study acted both as the therapist for the intervention and was a member 
of the clinic staff. Separating the therapist and the researcher roles would have addressed 
that problem and further research to see how this might have influenced the participants 
accounts would be valuable. At the very least the participants could have been asked to 
describe how they felt it influenced them. 
Conclusions. 
The simple interventions in this study made no reference to developing the participants' 
self-efficacy, confidence or empowerment and it could be argued that a more powerful 
effect could have been achieved through focusing directly and explicitly on those themes. 
However, if progress was achieved mainly through the effect of non-specific factors such 
as the quality of the therapeutic relationship this may not have an effect. Further research 
would be useful to see whether the processes and factors that have previously been called 
`non-specific' would be more powerful if they were identified and made `specific'. 
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Employing the approaches and techniques of psychotherapy research may help us 
understand more about the efficacy of pain management interventions. 
The participants' accounts described a positive change in their experience of their pain 
and the particular nature of the change in meaning that involved. They had re-appraised 
themselves and now related to their pain differently. They were better able to improve 
their quality of life and reduced their disability through an increase in their ability to 
contain their anxieties that were associated with their `worst' kind of pain. Their pain 
beliefs remained the same but they perceived themselves as better able to manage the 
consequences of its presence and its disabling claim upon their attention receded. The 
explicit suggestions and focus of each intervention did not emerge as an important factor, 
although the pain-related context was important. The participants identified contextual 
factors and the therapeutic relationship was the most important ingredients to them. This 
highlighted the importance of establishing a secure relationship between the patient and 
health professional wherever possible and suggests that, if this cannot be established, 
such simple interventions will be of only limited help. 
The participants experience of their chronic pain changed in this study although from 
their perspective it was the same `thing', or phenomenon. A simple intervention enabled 
them to appraise themselves in a more positive light. This reduced the degree of active 
and disabling threat that had been associated with their pain, it intruded into their 
consciousness to a lesser degree and they were better able to function. This suggests that 
the manner in which the individual appraises themselves is important in the meaning of 
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their experience of their chronic pain, the nature of its unpleasantness and the process by 
which it disables the person suffering it. 
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Chapter Eight. 
Study Three. 
Chronic Benign Low Back Pain and the Self. 
Introduction. 
The themes that emerged from the first two studies suggested that the 
meanings of the participants' chronic pain were not related solely to the beliefs 
they held about their disease but also to their sense of self. The participants 
made several references in each of the first two studies to the impact of their 
chronic pain on their personal evaluation of their self and their self-definition. 
For example: 
You feel like just not particularly giving up but you don t feel the 
person that you are that you're capable of feeling or capable of doing 
basically. It makes you feel a bit down and a bit miserable. 
(Nina - Study One) 
It's so bad it takes over my body, it takes over my mind, it makes me 
short-tempered you know, talking about the pain I've got, it makes me 
a pain, it's that feeling of knowing that I must be a pain to others. I'm 
a bother. On a daily basis it's destroying me, it's stopping the pleasure 
of my life. (Henry - Study Two) 
These changes were associated strongly with the participants' pain and were 
evident in the participants' accounts in their complaints and discomfort at 
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experiencing and displaying particular emotions or sentiments such as 
hostility, irritability, withdrawal, alienation, pessimism, frustration and anger. 
They interpreted such behaviour as a sign of a key change in their sense of self 
or personality: 
Well my personality's gone ... 
I've got more snappy and more nasty 
you want the old Alice back but you can't. (Study One) 
it's made me a different person, I'm usually really placid, up to getting 
this I could cope with anything, I've never been stroppy and short- 
tempered and snappy like I am now. (Tim - Study Two) 
The participants self-evaluations had often become self-critical and indicated a 
deterioration in their self-regard. In some cases this was to the extent that they now 
described a negative self-concept, defining themselves as having become undesirable, 
`a monster' (Jo) or `I am a pain' (Henry) and revealing evidence of a punitive self- 
regard: 
I'm sort of mad at myself I start banging things and getting so aerated 
with myself that it's there and I can't get it to go away. 
(Linda - Study One) 
It's made me into a monster, sometimes, Jekyll and Hyde. Made me 
full of hate, so no one wants to know me. I've lost people cos of who I 
am now. (Jo - Study Two) 
The evidence from the participants' accounts in the first two studies suggested that it 
would be valuable to explore further the relationship between the self-concept and the 
experience of chronic pain. In the first two studies this was an emergent element but 
it was not explored in any depth. It was the aim of the third study to investigate this 
aspect of the lived experience of their chronic pain in more detail. To see how the 
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participants' experience of their pain influenced and inter-related with their self- 
concept and if it was a useful concept in the study of the dynamic relationship 
between chronic pain sensation, distress and disability. 
Concepts related to self and identity have been utilised in a wide variety of ways 
within psychological research although the explicit concept of `the self as a 
phenomenon has received relatively less attention. The concept of the self is attended 
to in both Symbolic Interactionism (Denzin, 1995) and Phenomenology (Spinelli, 
1989). 
According to the symbolic interactionist approach the interpretation process itself 
which defines the symbolic nature of objects is only thought possible `by virtue of 
possessing a self' p12 (Blumer, 1969). With the self-concept an individual can then 
become an object for their own attention and action and they are able to relate to 
themselves as well as others. The self as an object and the meanings related to it are 
considered to emerge through a process of social interaction. The self is viewed as 
both process and product, continually unfolding and changing yet also organised and 
resistant to rapid change. 
The self is also conceived as an integral aspect of consciousness and a necessary 
product of intentionality, the sense-making process and drive for coherence that is 
referred to in the phenomenological approach (Spinelli, 1989; Giorgi, 1995; Chapman 
et al., 1999). It is considered as a phenomenon in its own right, it enables a 
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perspective or point of view to be established that aids interpretation and provides a 
source of continuity over time. The fluid and dynamic nature of the self within 
phenomenology allows for the presence of multiple selves, for self-deception and for 
the notion of a self that can be related to 
Concise and consensual definitions of the self are elusive, for example Stevens (1996) 
outlined five discrete approaches to the study of the phenomena and in doing so 
highlighted its inherent multiplicity. Definitions have had to be broad to capture the 
dynamic complexity of the self and not represent it falsely as an inert monolith 
(Kihlstrom and Kihlstrom, 1997). They most often refer to it as a stable but dynamic 
collection of core beliefs, constructs or cognitions that are utilised by the individual to 
define themselves both privately and in their presentation to the outside world (Kelly, 
1992; Kelly and Field, 1996; Ashmore and Jussim, 1997). 
The self-concept is typified by its many elements, for example; it can be both private 
(intra-personal) and social (inter-personal) in its structure (Contrada and Ashmore, 
1999); it can be rooted in time with a focus on `past, present and future selves', 
(Charmaz, 1991; Helstrom, 2001); or differentiated and sub-divided as both subject 
and process, `the I' and object and content, `the Me' as was advocated by James 
(1890) and more broadly within Symbolic Interactionism (Denzin, 1995). 
Ashmore and Jussim (1997) followed James' differentiation of the self into the `I' and 
the `me' where the `I' (process) organises and manages the `me' (content). The person 
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is seen to engage in an on-going process of self-regulation (the `I') managing the self- 
definitions, self-standards and self-judgements that make up its structure (the `me'). 
The self-concept can also be both social and personal and has the potential to link the 
two domains together. It includes our beliefs about what others think of us and our 
perception of the differences between ourselves and other individuals and groups. As 
such it is a useful concept for exploring the relationship between individuals and 
larger social systems and between the private and the public domains of our 
experience. 
Authors such as Stevens (1996) have argued that the self has now become a primary 
source of meaning in contemporary western society. It has a critical influence over 
our ongoing sense of self-worth or self-definition and provides a form of intra- 
personal and developmental continuity for us as we live through events over time. 
Charmaz (1991) emphasised the importance of time in relation to the self and argued 
how the self-concept provided meanings for the individual and this process unified 
our subjective experience over time. Both Helstrom (2001) and Charmaz described 
how that the dimension of time allowed a range of different selves to be organised 
according to the past, present and future. Particular selves were not necessarily 
grounded in reality but could be `spurious' (Helstrom) or `fictional' (Charmaz) and as 
such were often dissonant with other aspects of contemporary experience. They could 
represent a self that did not acknowledge the presence of a chronic condition and 
would be problematic if they contrasted too much with other contemporaneous 
experiences or required too great an act of self-delusion to maintain. 
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Until recently there has been relatively little research into the relationship between 
concepts of self and identity and physical health or the utility of adopting such a 
perspective within psychology. The potential utility of this approach was highlighted 
in a collection edited by Contrada and Ashmore (1999) who concluded that, `self and 
identity related concepts can contribute to the understanding of causal processes that 
underlie physical disease, as well as those instigated by its occurrence' (p8). They 
established evidence to assert that the self-concept could play a key buffering or 
mediating role in the relationship between distress, duress and physical health. 
Examples were drawn from; racial identity and racism (Williams et al., 1999); trauma 
and recovery (Pennebaker and Keogh, 1999) and living with chronic illness 
(Charmaz, 1999 ; Leventhal et al., 1999) and in each case the need to maintain, 
reconstruct or repair a coherent and constructive sense of self was considered to be 
key to the individuals good welfare and physical health. Idler and Benyamini (1997) 
found a similar effect when studying their subjects evaluation of their own bodies. 
Having controlled for objective bio-medical factors they concluded that self-ratings of 
physical status predicted mortality and disease course. Those people who saw 
themselves as robust and healthy, independent of their medical health status were in 
far better physical health over the years that followed. 
The importance of the self to physical health was referred to by Taylor (1983) and 
incorporated into her theory of cognitive adaptation. Taylor studied the process of 
adjustment to the threat of breast cancer and concluded that three themes were of 
critical importance, the search for meaning, the need for control and mastery and the 
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need to maintain self-esteem through self-enhancing evaluations. The process of 
`self-enhancement' guided the selectivity of the participants' social comparisons 
which were selected and interpreted in such a way as to leave the participant 
appearing to themselves to be well adjusted. Progress in each of the themes defined 
by Taylor was shown to contribute to better physical health and disease course 
(Taylor et al., 1998). Taylor's themes and the importance of the self were later 
echoed by Baumeister (1991) in the four themes he defined as key to establishing 
meaning in every day life, notably the need for purpose, value, efficacy and self- 
worth. 
Work by Charmaz (1983,1991,1995) has been reviewed earlier in the thesis (Chapter 
Four, `Qualitative Research in Chronic Benign Low Back Pain' and Chapter Six, 
`Study One') and it showed how the loss of social identity was a factor in the distress 
and disability related to chronic disease. The experience of chronic illness was shown 
to be typified by feelings of a lack of social value, loss, restriction and isolation that 
threatened to discredit the individuals sense of self and social identity. Charmaz 
emphasised the importance of maintaining a socially valued self definition in the 
management of chronic illness and described how problematic this was for those 
concerned and their families and friends. 
Aldridge and Eccleston (2000) used a Q-methodology to explore the ways in which 
their participants made sense of their everyday chronic pain. Eight themes were 
derived and common to all of the accounts was the theme of how pain related to the 
self and in particular whether pain could change the self. The notion of a coherent 
and consistent self emerged as something quite central to the participants' process of 
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making sense and accounting for their experience of pain. Pain was seen as a 
powerful threat to the self, capable of overwhelming and changing it permanently and 
for the worse. Living with pain was shown to involve an ongoing and everyday 
process of both resisting the `delegitimisation' of self and trying to maintain or 
rebuild the self as rational, competent and endowed with some form of moral worth. 
The notion of the self has been neglected in mainstream psychological research 
although recently there have been developments within cognitive research into 
chronic pain that show an emergent interest in it as a topic of study (Pincus and 
Morley, 2001; Aldrich and Eccleston 2000; Chapman et at, 1999). 
Chapman et al. (1999) argued that there was a need to develop the biopsychosocial 
model to include the idea of consciousness and the self. The self was identified as a 
key feature of consciousness and one that had the potential to link the relationship 
between the physical and the psychological aspects of pain, providing a pathway from 
transduction and nociception through to the development of an internal model of the 
world and the self that informed and guided our actions, intentions and pain. They 
hypothesised that pain emerged from the complex patterns of a large amount of 
parallel distributed processing that occurred throughout the brain and the perceiver's 
model of the self and world. The self was seen as a mechanism that enabled the brain 
to organise such enormous amounts of information from a coherent point of view and 
was conceived as a complex phenomenon that could include within it many different 
versions of the self. Different versions could include; a `body self' (e. g. Melzack's 
body matrix, 1990) which allowed a phantom limb to occur and a sense of whole to 
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remain when a physical part is lost, a private self-appraisal and a higher level of self- 
organisation related to the roles and identities that defined us within our society. 
Pincus and Morley (2001) published a review of studies into cognitive processing 
bias in chronic pain and suggested that the self, as a schema, could play a pivotal role 
in the experience of chronic pain. They concluded that patients with chronic pain 
selectively processed pain-related information in comparison with other types of 
stimuli. The nature of the bias was unclear from the studies but led them to propose 
that it could be the product of the interaction between three schemas representing 
pain, illness and the self. They theorised that the individual experience of chronic 
pain related to the degree to which the three schemas had gone beyond over-lapping 
toward a form of enmeshment where the parallel activation of elements from 
different schemas resulted in elements of one being incorporated into another. 
Consequently, events that formerly activated one schema would then be capable of 
eliciting unwanted effects in another and a pathway, via the self, was hypothesized 
between the physical and psychological dimensions of chronic pain. Pincus and 
Morley considered that the self schema was particularly important in the enmeshment 
process and they speculated that it was the degree to which chronic pain disrupted the 
aspects of the person's schema of the self that determined the focus and degree of 
enmeshment: 
the degree to which the chronically activated pain schema `traps' negative 
aspects of the self. As a consequence, the pain experience is viewed in terms 
of its behaviour and affective implications for the self and not just its sensory 
characteristics. (p611) 
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Pincus and Morley argued specifically that more idiographic approaches should be 
developed to further our understanding along these lines. 
Aldrich et al. (2000) reviewed one particular cognitive process related to the 
competition for attention, that of `worry', in relation to chronic pain and argued that 
this too was related closely to the self. Chronic benign low back pain was considered 
to be particularly suited to generating `worry', which in turn served to maintain the 
experience of chronic benign low back pain at a prominent level in the consciousness 
of the sufferer. 
chronic benign low back pain is one environment in which the potential for 
failed or thwarted problem solving is great, and which provides the conditions 
for worry to thrive. (p461) 
Aldrich et al. argued that in chronic benign low back pain there were many different 
objects of worry, including some that are social or cultural in origin and that worry 
was not only directed at aspects of the pain, but also about the self. Repeated attempts 
to solve an insoluble problem have been shown to provoke frustration and an increase 
in the negative focus upon the self (Wells, 1994) and Aldrich et al theorised that that 
chronic benign low back pain patients could become locked into a form of self- 
perpetuating rumination that maintained a heightened level of vigilance and worry 
toward pain as a prime threat to the self. 
The studies related above explored the relationship between the self and physical 
illness and showed it to be relevant to the experience of the sufferer and a potential 
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mediating factor in the course of their disease and quality of life. More specifically 
Charmaz (1991,1995) and Eccleston and Aldridge (2000) showed how the experience 
of chronic illness and pain represented a threat to the self and that managing that 
threat was a core aspect of coping with the disease. Neither, however, studied benign 
chronic pain nor adopted a phenomenological approach. Charmaz focused on many 
chronic conditions from a sociological point of view whilst Eccleston and Aldridge 
adopted a q-methodology which could not go in any depth into the participants' 
individual accounts or experience. Further study focusing on benign chronic low 
back pain and exploring in depth the personal accounts of the sufferers could 
contribute further to their findings and illuminate the intrapersonal as well as the 
inter-personal processes involved. 
The aim of this study was to explore the nature of the relationship between the 
participants' chronic low back pain and their sense of self. In particular, to establish 
how the participants' pain impacted on their sense of self, whether it was a factor in 
the associated pain sensation, distress and disability and if the participants experience 
of their pain could inform us about the structure of the self. 
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Method. 
This study involved a single interview with seven participants and followed the same 
procedure as that used in study one and two and outlined in chapter five. 
The same sampling procedure was used as in the two earlier studies. Seven 
participants were recruited, interviewed and the transcripts of the interviews analysed. 
After presenting the draft analysis to both my supervisor and a colleague it was 
considered that sufficient data was present at this point to enable an internally 
coherent and persuasive statement which articulated the emergent themes to be 
written up. Consequently no further participants were recruited. In this study the 
same importance was paid at the end of the study to the addressing any anxieties that 
might have emerged on the part of the participants as a result of the interview and in 
this study three participants reported feeling distressed. 
Again, as with the two previous studies, the ages of the participants plus the length of 
time they had been in pain is listed below. They were all white, european caucasian, 
from a working class background and no longer worked in paid employment due to 
their pain. This study used a mixture of five male and two female participants. 
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Anonymised name Age Pain duration 
(years) 
Helen 37 5 
Lynette 52 9 
Simon 45 11 
Frank 51 7 
Kevin 36 13 
Tony 44 15 
My supervisor again reviewed the themes to ensure that they appeared to be grounded 
in the transcripts and well represented within the data with adequate examples. As in 
the earlier studies a work colleague also reviewed the analysis to check for the clarity 
and coherence of the analysis. 
In this study the focus of the interviewing was specific to the participants' accounts of 
their self-concept. Early questions were directed toward engaging the participant in 
the interview process by asking them to give a general account of their pain. The 
questions then progressed to those aimed at facilitating as rich and extensive an 
account as possible of the participant's experience of their self-concept in relation to 
their pain. To this end and to avoid leading the interview within this area of inquiry, 
all questions were open-ended. 
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The interview schedule was as follows: 
Could you, to begin with, describe your pain to me in your own words please? 
- what does it feel like? 
- How long have you had it? 
- Does it change in any way? 
2. How did your pain start? 
- How long have you had it? 
- How did it come on? 
- Has it changed over time? 
3. Does anything affect your pain? 
- Does anything make it better? 
- Does anything make it worse? 
4. Do you know why your pain persists? 
- What causes your pain? 
- Why hasn't your pain been cured? 
5. Has your pain changed things for you at all? 
- Is anything different now? 
- Do you do anything or feel differently since you had the pain? 
6. How would you describe yourself as a person? 
- What would sum you up? 
- How do you think/feel about yourself? 
7. Has having pain changed the way you think or feel about yourself? 
- Are you any different now as a person after having pain? 
- Do you see yourself differently? 
- In what ways are you a different person now? 
8. Why do you think that change has happened (if it has)? 
- What has caused the changed? 
- What has brought that change about? 
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Analysis. 
Participants were asked to talk as widely as possible about the different ways their 
pain had affected or influenced their feelings, attitudes or beliefs about themselves. 
The participants' accounts clustered around four broad themes, which were; `Living 
with an unwanted self', `The social aspect of the self: dealing with other people', `A 
self that cannot be understood or controlled' and `Living with a body separate from 
the self. Each of the themes are reviewed in turn below. 
Each of the participants related how, as a consequence of living with their chronic 
pain they had experienced a deterioration in their sense of self and were engaged in a 
struggle to manage that process. The phrase `self-concept' was not used by the 
interviewer, the participants were asked to describe in their own words if they felt 
living with their chronic pain had affected the way they saw or felt about themselves, 
`as a person'. None of the participants reported any problems understanding this 
concept, referring to it as `me' and `who I am'. 
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Living with an Unwanted Self. 
Helen's account captured much of the participants' despair in relation to the 
deterioration in their self-regard and their struggle to assimilate that aspect of their 
experience of living with pain into their self-concept. The changes Helen reported 
were associated with significant distress that, at times, out-weighed that caused by the 
pain sensation and prompted to her to withdraw from social contact for fear of harsh 
judgement: 
Int. How long has it been like that? 
Hel. Since it started getting bad, I was always snappy with it but not like this, it's 
not who I am its just who I am if you know what I mean, it's not really me, I 
get like that and I know like, you're being mean now but I can't help it. It's 
the pain, it's me, but it is me, me doing it but not me do you understand what 
I'm saying, if I was to describe myself like you said, I'm a nice person, but 
then I not am I and there's other stuff, stuff I haven 7t told you, if you knew 
you'd be disgusted I just get so hateful. 
Int. When you talk about you and then sometimes not you, what do you mean? 
Hel. I'm not me these days, I am sometimes, I am alright, but then I get this mean 
bit, the hateful bit, that's not me 
Int. What's that bit? 
Hel. I dunno, that's the pain bit, I know your gonna say it's all me, but I can't help 
it even though I dori t like it. It's the mean me, my mean head all sour and 
horrible, I cant cope with that bit, I cope with the pain better. 
Int. How do you cope with it? 
Hel. Get out the way, [tearful] sit in my room, just get away, look do you mind if 
we stop now, I didn t think it would be like this, I don t want to talk any more 
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Helen's account emphasised the distress she felt as she struggled to manage or 
comprehend her situation. Helen referred to feelings and behaviours she had about 
herself since having pain, of being `hateful', that she found disturbing and alarming. 
They gave her feelings of self-disgust and a fear that if others were aware of them, 
they too would share that disgust, `there's other stuff, stuff I haven't told you, if you 
knew you'd be disgusted I just get so hateful'. 
Helen was not explicit about what she does that is so `hateful', but showed that it was 
sufficiently threatening to warrant its concealment. Her use of the term `hateful' was 
not explicit, but implied that she felt that in being `mean', she was both full of 
feelings of hate toward others and also worthy of hate from others. 
She showed a need to see herself in a positive light, as a `nice person', but struggled 
to do so. This was reflected in her confusion about her sense of self and her attempts 
to separate the undesirable behaviour from her self-concept and attribute it to the pain, 
`, it's not who I am its just who I am if you know what I mean, it's not really me', or, 
` It's the pain, it's me, but it is me, me doing it but not me'. Helen appeared to be 
engaged in an ongoing process of defending her self-concept to retain a sense of self- 
worth, but she could not reject completely the implication that her `disgusting' 
behaviour was not just a function of her pain but also related to her self, `, I know 
your gonna say if s all me'. The battle to retain a sense of self-worth in the face of her 
confusing experience of her deteriorating physical and emotional state and disability, 
was more difficult to bear than the sensation of pain itself, `It's the mean me, my 
mean head all sour and horrible, I can't cope with that bit, I cope with the pain better'. 
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Another participant, Simon, talked explicitly about the difficulties he experienced in 
relation to the way he felt he had changed. He described the new and different 
elements of his self-concept, as if they belonged to another person: 
It's like living with this guy who follows you around all the time, he never 
leaves, you're cursed with him and he gets in the way, he embarrasses me. 
He's unsociable and sometimes downright rude, most of the time he's just a 
waste of space. 
Like Helen, Simon tried to disown the characteristics he associated with the change in 
his self-concept. Simon attributed them to another person, in an attempt to preserve a 
positive view of himself. He was aware of this as a conscious coping strategy and this 
highlighted the importance he attached to maintaining a self-concept that he valued: 
Int. This seems to mean a lot to you? 
Sim. It does, if I can't be the image that I think I am ... then 
I'm in trouble. 
Int. What kind of trouble? 
Sim. I'm not sure now you ask, worse than it is now, I'm sure, when you think 
about it, it just feels ... 
horrible. I know when I'm mean it is me, I know 
there is no `guy', I'm not mad , but 
it's not me, that's not me, I'm not like that. 
Simon was explicit in his need to retain a desirable self-concept `if I can't be the 
image that I think I am ... then 
I'm in trouble' and as such was engaged in the same 
process as Helen, albeit more consciously. Helen appeared less aware of the process. 
She did not distinguish explicitly between different selves, but did make constant 
reference to a division marking that which was attributable to her, the `me' and that 
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which was not, the `not me', `me doing it but not me'. Both Simon and Helen 
referred to the distinction between what was `me' and `not me', when relating their 
conscious lived experience. 
Other participants described how they resented and struggled to accept that they had 
changed, although they varied according to how conscious they were of the process 
and their resistance to it. Frank, described a similar deterioration in his self-concept 
and his related frustration and irritation: 
Int. have you ever been like this before? 
Frk. I was always easy going and I hate the way I am now, I've never been like this 
before, no, I hate it, drives me up the wall. 
Int. what's so bad about it? 
Frk. being the bad guy 
Int. the bad guy? 
Frk. Yeah, being miserable all the time, I used to have a laugh, but it's like there's 
nothing I can do now, I'm a miserable git. 
Like Simon, Frank rejected the way his self had developed whilst he had suffered 
chronic pain. However, unlike Simon, Frank did not distinguish between two 
different selves or make any attempt to disown the undesirable characteristics he 
related. Instead he felt overwhelmed by them, as if they now dominated his self- 
concept. 
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Simon and Frank's accounts showed a contrast in their response to the way they felt 
they had changed and emphasised the difference in the degree to which each of the 
participants were conscious of the changes they had gone through and how much it 
represented a change to their original and preferred self-concept. Lynette, for 
example, like Simon, retained a distinction between two different types of self, her 
self-concept that had not changed and a new self due to her chronic pain: 
Int. have you changed at all? 
Lyn. I suppose if you ask people who know me then they'd say I had. I'm not so 
lively anymore, more quieter and reserved. Sometimes I don't want to go out 
because I don't want to go out. You know, I don't feel like it, its too much 
bother or I just feel a bit nervy about it. I've lost a lot of confidence out and 
about seeing people and I used to be quite assured, quite assertive. 
Int. how would you describe yourself now 
Lyn. that's difficult because I don't think I'm different inside, but I am different, 
outside, like I just said. 
Int. how would you define the difference 
Lyn. well, I still think of myself as I used to be and that's still there, inside, but this 
pain it's a parasite and its causing problems and I end up doing things which 
aren't me, not really. They don't feel like me anyway but I can't control it 
very well sometimes. 
Lynette tried to define a difference between how she saw herself, which remained 
desirable and how she behaved and appeared to other people, which she felt was 
unattractive at times and distressing. Unlike Frank she retained her original, pre-pain 
self-concept, which hadn't changed, `I don't think I'm different inside, but I am 
different, outside'. Like Helen, she attributed the difference to the malign influence 
of her chronic pain: 
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Lyn. miserable, it means, I don't know I'm just crap, I'm not worth knowing, no 
good to any-one ... I' m 
just a cow. 
Int. Is that how you see yourself 
Lyn. well no not really, but that's how I come across isn't it, miserable, 
unpredictable, sulky, but that's not me that's the pain. 
Int. how would you describe yourself. 
Lyn. well I was happy and good to know, but maybe I'm not now. Inside there's 
someone who loves people and enjoys things but maybe I am a cow, I've 
become a cow and I'm sure I'm no fun to be around. 
Int. but how would you describe yourself? 
Lyn. I am a nice person, but the pain takes over and stops it sucks it all out and 
leaves me miserable and tired ... and those who 
know me know its not me but 
I suppose it is and if you didn't know me you'd think I was a miserable cow, 
so maybe I was a nice person and now I'm a cow. 
Lynette's account exposed the difficulties she had in maintaining a distinction 
between an unchanged self-concept and a newer undesirable pain-self. Throughout 
her account phrases like `maybe I was a nice person and now I'm a cow' and `and 
those who know me know its not me but I suppose it is' implied that, like Helen her 
belief in that distinction was not complete and that she struggled to accept the idea 
that her self-concept now included the undesirable aspects she referred to. Like the 
other participants, it was important to Lynette to maintain a desirable self-concept and 
she attributed her undesirable behaviour to the pain `but that's not me that's the pain'. 
However, she displayed doubt that this was still so and at times referred to herself 
very negatively, describing herself more like Frank `I doff t know I'm just crap, I'm 
not worth knowing, no good to any-one'. Her reported belief that she retained a 
positive self-concept `I am a nice person, but the pain takes over and stops it sucks it 
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all out' was not sufficient to prevent her from having significant feelings of 
powerlessness and worthlessness. 
Another participant, Kevin, accepted that he had changed and now displayed and 
experienced a range of socially undesirable feelings and behaviours. However, unlike 
Lynette, he asserted unequivocally that his self-concept had not changed and that his 
undesirable characteristics were a function of his chronic pain. They were not 
attributable to any change in his sense of self, that which he termed `me': 
now its me with this bit that doesn't fit, doesn't belong to me, causing all the 
problems, what you need to understand is that the pain is not me its attached to 
me, doing it to me, but its but its not me, it's a part of my body which doesn't 
belong to me anymore, its different. 
Kevin described the distress and in particular the anger and aggression he felt in 
relation to his lifestyle with chronic pain. Kevin attributed responsibility for this 
directly to his pain, over which he felt he had little control. He was able to articulate 
particular scenarios where he felt his pain controlled his behaviour and left him with 
no compassion or concern for others: 
Kev. well its like I said, I am me, nice guy, the pain is this but I've now got this 
pain, it hurts but its evil gives me a nasty head and makes me hateful, 
irrational. Like, I hate it when they all leave in the morning and I'm left on 
my own and I hate it when they all come back in the evening, but I've been 
watching the clock waiting. Waiting for what, so I can be mean when they get 
in 
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Int. so you feel things and you do things that don't feel like you 
Kev. yeah, if something sad happens to some-one, I' m not sad, sometimes I' m 
pleased, especially if they do their back in or get a headache, no sympathy, 
I'm just glad some-one else is miserable and you have these stupid rows about 
nothing and you know they're stupid but you have them any-way because you 
get to spray a bit of hate about. 
Kevin did not relate having any conscious awareness of endeavouring to maintain a 
desirable self-concept, as the other participants had. However he disapproved off the 
characteristics he attributed exclusively to his chronic pain and found them difficult to 
endure. They were the source of further distress and he was uncomfortable talking 
about them to the point where, like Helen, he asked for the interview to be terminated: 
Int. yes of course we can. You've talked a lot about how having pain has changed 
things for you, the way you see yourself and your body, apologising, what's 
the hardest part out of all that, the most difficult to manage on a daily basis? 
Kev. the bits that aren't me, I cant be me, the hardest part is the pain obviously, but 
the fact that I'm like this monster, I get mean, I do things and I think things 
which are mean, things which I'd never tell anyone and I'll not tell you so 
don't ask, I get so and I can't stop myself and I hate it and I know it's wrong 
but I cart do much about it except say sorry afterwards or just keep it to 
myself, the family understand I know but that's the hardest part now you ask. 
Its not me to think that, I've had enough now, ... lets stop now 
Int. ok thankyou. 
Each of the participants had to make sense of aggressive, hostile and socially 
undesirable behaviour that they experienced through having pain and disapproved of 
themselves. It was these experiences, those too threatening to disclose in any detail, 
that represented such a challenge to the maintenance of their self-regard and 
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compounded other negative feelings of loss and worthlessness they felt due to the 
impairment of their pain. 
Like Helen, Kevin experienced things which he felt were too socially undesirable to 
disclose, `I'm like this monster, I get mean, I do things and I think things which are 
mean, things which I'd never tell anyone'. Kevin also described himself as `hateful' 
and directed this at other people, he now lacked compassion or sympathy for the 
suffering of others and took pleasure in their misfortune, `if something sad happens to 
some-one, I'm not sad, sometimes I'm pleased, especially if they do their back in or 
get a headache, no sympathy, I'm just glad some-one else is miserable'. 
Living with feelings of aggression and bitterness were particularly problematic for the 
participants, most notably the manner in which their anger and resentment had come 
to dominate their feelings towards others. It was described in various ways i. e., 'I'm 
like this monster' (Kevin), or by Helen, who used the term `hateful'. A further 
example was given by Tony who, over time, had become resigned to the fact that his 
contemporary experiences were now central to his sense of self. Not only did he think 
less of himself, but he felt his bitterness and frustration at his own predicament had 
left him unable to care for other people. This reinforced and confirmed his negative 
view of himself, as a `miserable old git', just as Kevin's aggression and pleasure at 
the misfortune of others had compounded his view of himself as a `monster': 
Int. right, how else has it affected the way you feel about yourself. 
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Tony. just bitter and you know what, I don't know if anyone else has told you this 
but you stop caring, if someone else gets a pain you're not sad for them, 
you're glad that some-one else knows how you feel, you end up being glad 
that some-one else has got pain too, that's awful, you get like you're pleased if 
someone else is suffering or miserable too, instead of like, sad for them, you 
think not just me then, or you don't think anything, you don't care, people 
come to the door collecting money and you think, why is it never for chronic 
pain, what about me why doesn't anyone collect for us and you send them 
away and it might be cancer in children or something but you just think I don't 
care anymore, I' m not just miserable to know I am miserable, miserable old 
git. 
Int. are those your words 
Tony. yeah, wife hates it when I say it but I'm right. 
Tony describes above the extent to which his bitterness dominated his feelings 
towards others at times and how this compounded his critical view of himself. At 
times Tony only thought ill towards others, he welcomed their misfortune and pain, 
rejected their need for help or and wished pain upon them. Tony actively felt pleasure 
at the suffering of others, rather than indifferent and was appalled to have such 
feelings. He highlighted the extent to which this had gone by emphasising how, when 
he felt like that, he wouldn't even care for children with cancer and in doing so 
underlined his view of himself as undesirable and miserable. Helen too experienced 
both negative feelings toward others and destructive social behaviour, which under- 
mined her attempts to retain or preserve a positive self-view: 
Hel. No not really, well, you don't want to think you've changed at all and I don't 
think about it, you've asked me and I'm trying to think and yeah, I don 7t want 
to, but I think. I'm not a bad person, perhaps, yeah, it brings you down and 
then you end up spoiling things. 
Int. How do you mean? 
Hel. No one is going to hear this tape right? 
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Int. Like we agreed, anonymous and confidential, you get the tape after I'm done. 
Hel. Right 
... the pain makes me mean. 
I don't want to be, but I get like, mean, I 
don t care about other people, nothings funny and I get mad if they try to be 
nice, like pity. It's not really me, but it is me if you know what I mean, I 
don't like it but I do it, do you understand and I end up saying sorry, if I've 
snapped like, it's the pain it's killing, it does that sometimes. 
Each of the participants gave accounts of either overt behaviours or more covert 
cognitions or affect, that had developed as a result of living with chronic pain and 
which they disapproved of and saw as indicative of a degradation of their self 
concept. Some of the participants attempted to attribute this change to the 
development of a new `self with pain' that was discrete from their core and original 
pre-pain, sense of self `that's who I am when the pain's not around' (Lynette) and 
responsible for their undesirable behaviour. This was not associated with the absence 
of any distress however, they remained distressed by the behaviours themselves and 
the struggle to retain some self-regard was typified by anxiety and confusion. 
The Social Aspect of the Self: dealing with other people. 
The participants' distress related to their self-regard, was at its most acute when in a 
social context, either when interacting with other people, evaluating themselves in 
relation to other people, or considering what other people thought of them. Their 
uncomfortable feelings about themselves emerged into their consciousness when in 
the presence of others. 
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One participant, Tony, identified explicitly how he could manage his situation more 
easily if he did not have to interact with others, specifically his children. Social 
isolation appealed to him, not because of the behaviour of others, but because his 
feelings about himself emerged into his consciousness less and the pressure to portray 
a particular identity was absent, `to be away from people and not have to be 
something else your not, that would be bliss': 
Tony. yeah you know that desert island discs 
Int. the radio show 
Tony. I'd love that, don't get me wrong I'd miss my kids and I don't mean it, but to 
be away from people and not have to be something else your not, that would 
be bliss 
Int. you'd be happier that way 
Tony. yeah, no well, no I'd still be a miserable old git but it wouldn't matter, its only 
when other people come around that it matters, if you can just be yourself it 
doesn't matter what you do, I'd probably shout and swear all day but it 
wouldn't matter I wouldn't have to put on that front so it'd be easier 
Int. so a lot of how you feel depends on who's around 
Tony. I suppose it does, but not the pain, that just happens. Dealing with the pain I 
suppose is different. You could say if I didn't have kids I wouldn't be like 
this. 
Tony described the pressure he felt to behave in a particular way when in company, 
specifically, to conceal his distress and be sociable, or to model socially desirable 
behaviour to his children. He saw this as a separate task to managing the sensation of 
pain `not the pain, that just happens. Dealing with the pain I suppose is different'. 
Managing and living with himself in different social contexts was to Tony, as with the 
other participants, an additional and more distressing task `I wouldri t have to put on 
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that front so it'd be easier'. As before, the participants' struggle to manage the 
assault upon their self and identity and function within a social context, was more 
problematic, more disabling, than tolerating the pain sensation. 
Tony's overt behaviour was, to him, not a reflection of how he felt about himself 
privately, but the expression of an alternative self. He described it as `putting on a 
front' and `not being the real me' and found it exhausting when he socialised to the 
point that he now dreaded the prospect of meeting and having to engage with other 
people: 
Tony. yeah, you're just bitter and disappointed you had all this to look forward to 
and not now and you end up just dreading everything, I used to be all 
optimistic and look forward to things but not now you just wish you didn't 
have to do things and when you go out you end up like you can't wait to get 
home, back to base, like a real party pooper, people ask you or invite you and 
you think oh god do I have to and then you think of the wife and you think 
well I should make the effort so you put a front on and you go out but all the 
time you're looking at your watch and thinking about when you can go home 
and go upstairs and lay on the bed and get some relief, get a break. 
Int. what do you mean by `putting on front' 
Tony. its all just happy go lucky, smiley happy, how are you, I'm fine, no problem, 
just being sociable, no more just being normal and making sure no-one knows 
you're in pain or agony so it doesn t spoil things for everybody and you don't 
have to talk to people about your pain, so you look normal. 
Int. is that easy to do 
Tony. oh yeah you get used to it, its second nature and it's a lot easier than telling 
people the truth which they have no idea what to do with you just go into the 
act, its easier 
Int. but you said you dread going out and having to do it 
Tony. yeah, its easier not to see people at all 
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Int. so you'd rather not put the front on 
Tony. no you do it cos you have to, to get through it, but because you have to do it 
and its knackering you can't wait to stop and you count down the minutes 
before you can leave, like I said there's no point having me around I' m not 
good company, I'm miserable. 
For Tony, social contact was now aversive, threatening and tiring. Masking his 
private experience when in public had become an automatic and tactical necessity, 
`you do it cos you have to, to get through it', `its second nature and it's a lot easier 
than telling people the truth' and the cause of much distress as it undermined his sense 
of self `there's no point having me around I'm not good company, I'm miserable. ' 
and the effort involved left him physically exhausted `and its knackering you can't 
wait to stop'. 
More specifically, as a result of his pain and the associated disability Tony felt he had 
become a poor role model to his children, 'I'm embarrassed to be around, you should 
be someone your kids can look up to'. Tony felt he could not fulfil his role as a 
father and found this distressing. It was at its most unbearable when his children were 
around, to the extent that he avoided them when he could. The way he now saw 
himself was brought into focus when he described how he imagined his children saw 
him, as inferior and somehow broken, as `a bit of a man'. This was self-critical, Tony 
gave no indication that his children shared this view, `I can't bear to have them see 
me like this, its pitiful'. Tony's critical view of himself was at its most unbearable in 
the presence of others, his children. Where possible, in their presence he tried to 
over-compensate for self-criticism and become very active, despite the resultant 
increase in his pain: 
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Tony. no its just how I feel, like I'm some waster, they should have someone who's 
impressive, to look up to but how can they look up to me with what I do all 
bad tempered and crippled, dossing about lying down every 10 minutes. All 
they see is a bit of a man 
Int. how does that make you feel 
Tony. terrible, I try and keep out of their way or when they're around I make sure I 
try to do lots so at least they have something to look up to, but I can't bear to 
have them see me like this, its pitiful 
I. what do they see when they see you 
Tony. like I said, pitiful really, a dosser, nothing to be proud of like, when they get 
older they'll probably want to hide me. 
For Simon, the distress related to the change in his sense of self was also at its most 
acute, to the point of being unbearable, when he interacted with other people. He 
found contact with other people aversive and intimidating and as a consequence 
managed his behaviour and his environment in such a way as to remain as isolated as 
possible. Like Tony he made no reference to the behaviour of the people he met, but 
articulated the discomfort he felt about himself, when with others and the way this 
compelled him to behave: 
I just can't do it. It makes me sick to be around them and look them in the eye. 
If I stay in the house, in the garden I'm ok, you should see my house, it's like 
Fort Knox, if some-one came to the house they wouldn't think any one was in, 
I've set it up that way even the postman puts the letters in a box on the wall, I 
don't answer the phone. (Simon) 
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Other participants, like Frank below, also related how they had retreated into their 
house and had become anxious at the prospect of talking to anyone as this triggered 
the emergence of their most punitive thoughts about themselves: 
Frk. I don't go out, I don't answer the phone, I live at the back of the house and I 
dread it when the postman comes. 
Int. why's that? 
Frk. cos I don't know what to say, or anything, I just feel embarrassed. You just 
think what do they think of me 
Kevin found it necessary to defend himself constantly against the notion that he was 
in some way inferior to others, or responsible for his predicament. This left him 
feeling insecure about the social consequences of others knowing he had pain and 
frustrated and angry that he should be judged in that way. To him, this was a key 
element in his experience, it was a form of persecution: 
Int. so how does that leave you feeling? 
Kev. a bit like I need to be careful about people and a bit worried about what's 
going to happen to me, are we all going to get rounded up and taken to a camp 
somewhere and then really angry 
Int. angry 
Kev. yeah angry, for fuck's sake when can I stop apologising. 
Int. how do you mean? 
Kev. apologising all the time for being in pain for being in pain, for not being able 
to work, for not being able to kick a ball, going on holiday, going upstairs. 
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Kevin felt the need to conceal the true nature of his pain from others for fear of 
suffering severe social consequences. He likened it to a persecution and a 
delegitimising of people in pain, his choice of metaphor suggesting a comparison with 
those sent to the concentration camps during the Holocaust. These were not paranoid 
delusions as Kevin did not feel in fear of his life to that extreme, but he used it to 
emphasise the magnitude and ubiquitous nature of the distress and threat that was 
associated with his pain. 
Kevin's insecurity regarding the judgement of him by others left him angry and 
resentful. His account of his rage and the powerful use of metaphor suggested he 
was engaged in an ongoing and daily struggle for legitimacy and found it difficult not 
to judge himself as inferior too. There were things he felt an habitual need to 
apologise for, as if he too found it difficult to make sense of his situation in such a 
way that he could reject the notions of inferiority or culpability completely. 
Each of the participants felt in some way that having pain or an aspect of their 
experience of being in pain left them feeling inferior to others. Frank, unlike Kevin, 
did not feel as if other people saw him as guilty of having pain but he found his 
disability and the way it denied him the opportunity to fulfil his social roles 
distressing. To the extent that he described himself as a burden, having no social 
value: 
228 
Frk. I'm just useless, I can't help out my mother, can't kick a ball in the garden 
with the kids. I'm just a burden 
Int. a burden 
Frk. yeah, putting on everybody all the time, people have to do things for me 
Int. why is that so bad do you think 
Frk. its just bad what's the point if you can't contribute, you may as well not be 
there, everyone is missing out because of me. 
Int. do people make you feel unwelcome 
Frk. oh no its me not them, although I'm sure they get tired, its me feeling pointless 
because I can't do my bit, so you think what s the point why be there, there's 
no point if you can't do your bit, its only right. Now I need people, but they 
don't need me, in fact their life would be easier if I wasn't there, they'd have 
less to do, so I'm a burden. 
A Self that cannot be Understood or Controlled. 
The participants not only found it difficult to accommodate to the presence of new 
and undesirable aspects of their self with chronic pain, but remained confused and 
distressed at the lack of control or discretion they had over the processes of change 
involved. They felt they could not explain why their self-concept had changed, or 
predict how it would develop further. Whether their self-concept had changed, or a 
new `self with pain' had emerged, their new selves appeared to be outside of their 
conscious control. This compounded their distress and sense of powerlessness. 
Achieving control over the self was seen by the participants to be a separate task to 
pain-management and stood itself as a significant and sometimes dominant source of 
their distress. 
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Each of the participants were asked what they thought had caused them to change. 
Kevin typified their responses, describing both confusion at why he should think and 
behave the way he did and feelings of powerlessness to do anything about it except: 
I hate it and I know it's wrong but why it is who knows, I don't and I can't do 
much about it except say sorry or just keep it to myself, you wonder 
sometimes, what the hell is going on. 
For the participants this was a difficult aspect of their chronic pain to cope with. In 
the extract below Tony highlights his unsuccessful and daily struggle to manage and 
understand his destructive behaviour, `I wake up and pray in the mirror, `today I will 
not shout at the kids', you keep it up for a while and then you just don't, you get tired 
and your pain head goes on'. He remained mystified about why he had become like 
this and apprehensive at his own destructive potential: 
Int. that's what its like now? 
Tony. Yeah, sometimes ... can you tell me why? Because 
I don't know why, how 
ever much you promise yourself on a good day that you'll try harder and not 
be so sad and think positive and all that stuff ... I wake up and pray 
in the 
mirror, `today I will not shout at the kids', you keep it up for a while and then 
you just don't, you get tired and your pain head goes on and well. 
Helen expressed a similar inability to understand or exert any influence over the 
development of her self-concept. Like the others, this evoked feelings of 
powerlessness that complicated and compounded her distress. She became tearful 
talking about it during the interview, underlining both her despair at being unable to 
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control or predict her feelings or behaviour and her astonishment at the process of 
change in her sense of self that this reflected: 
Int. do you know why you feel that? 
Hel. I'm just full of it at times, but why?, no, I get like I want my doctor to have 
pain, I want you [becomes tearful] to have pain, sorry ... you 
just think, who 
are you? whats going on? 
The participants' perceived failure to influence the progression of their self-concept, 
resonated with the distress related to the uncertainty over the genesis of their chronic 
pain. They neither knew why they had pain, nor why they should have changed in the 
way they had. They separated the two phenomena, `its bad enough having the pain, 
but to watch yourself turn into this [pause] into this, `git' and be able to do nothing 
about it, its horrible' (Simon). They did not feel able to control themselves and 
managed the situation by reacting to it as they went along, making amends after 
episodes or outbursts of destructive behaviour that occurred due, in their eyes, to the 
dominance of their new selves. 
Lynette and Frank each described how they now lived without much control or 
understanding of their self-concept or it's expression. Living with pain now involved 
tolerating and managing their new potential for destructive and anti-social behaviour. 
Neither could predict how they would behave, or which aspect of their self-concept 
would dominate at any one time, ` Jeckyll and Hyde, which one's going to turn up 
today' (Lynette). Like the other participants, although they rejected and disapproved 
of the anti-social aspects of themselves that they displayed, they felt powerless to 
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influence them, `they say why do you do it and I say if I knew, I wouldn't do it'. The 
participants felt they now had to manage the destructiveness and unpredictability of 
their self-concept, just as they did their pain: 
Lyn. No when I do stupid that brings me to my senses and I can step in and do all 
the `oh I'm really sorry stuff and try and make up for it. 
Int. so what do you think happens? 
Lyn. I don't know I snap, something builds up and I don't know it, something 
inside gets to a point where you only have to get in my way and I'll blow, I'll 
lash out doesn't seem to matter what or where, I don't get to decide, that's not 
me I'm not like that ... people say what's 
happened to you, Jeckyll and Hyde, 
which one's going to turn up today, they say why do you do it and I say if I 
knew, I wouldn't do it. 
Frank appeared to engage in an ongoing dialogue or commentary on his behaviour 
and appeared more aware than Lynette of his emotions building up, but he also felt 
unable to stop them being expressed: 
Int. why do you think this happens? 
Frk. My wife summed it up, she said `what are you like? ', she wanted to know who 
was this bloke she was living with, the one who goes upstairs when people 
come round and doesn't seem to have any sense of humour and I say I don't 
know, nobody tells you you get like this, [pause] you don't want to be and you 
get into these rows or you get your pain head on and you're thinking `here we 
go again, off on one' but there's nothing you can do about it and you think, 
what is going on. why can't I just be like I was? 
Life in chronic pain for the participants involved a struggle for understanding over the 
processes defining their self-concept. For example, Kevin here expresses his 
mystification and frustration at being aware of the inherent destructive paradoxes in 
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his behaviour, but unable to influence it at the time. In his situation it compounded 
and exaggerated the uselessness and loss he felt due to the physical limits imposed by 
his pain: 
you know you get full of it, what you cat t do and being such a waste of 
space, so instead of being nice to make up for the fact that you can't cut the 
grass, you're mean, clever eh? 
The uncertainty and lack of influence over their feelings or behaviours left the 
participants pessimistic about the future. They could neither predict the course of 
their chronic pain, nor the development of the destructive aspects of their sense of 
self. This left their future threatened by the prospect of further physical, personal and 
social injury: 
Int. how does that affect you? 
Frk. You worry, what's going to happen? 
Int. whats going to happen 
Frk. Yeah, no-one will tell me why I've got pain, I've no idea why I'm like this, 
well it's the pain, but I don't know what to do about it, so you worry. 
Int. about anything in particular? 
Frk. What do you mean 
Int. what are you afraid will happen? 
Frk. It will just get worse I suppose and you know, what can you do about it, how 
long will people put up with it. 
The inability to influence their self-concept left the participants in fear that, as a result 
of their behaviour, they would suffer socially, be rejected and ultimately end up alone. 
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Their lack of a significant sense of self-control, left them fearing the social 
consequences of being in chronic pain in addition to any physical deterioration: 
Int. why do you think this is happening? 
Sim. I wish some-one could tell me because I'd like to know, it's not me that's 
doing this, it is but its not, its him [self-with-pain], I'd like to know how to 
control it because its spoiling things and I don't want it to. 
Int. how does that affect you? 
Sim. It just adds insult to injury, its bad enough having the pain, but to watch 
yourself turn into this ... 
into this, `git' and be able to do nothing about it, its 
horrible. I think I can live with the pain, but I'm not sure I know what to do 
about this. 
Int. how do you mean? 
Sim. What I just said? 
Int. sorry, how does that affect the way you see things going 
Sim. Well its dismal, I don't feel as if I know how to start turning things round. So 
who knows its hard to imagine it could get much worse, but who in their right 
mind would put up with me. 
Simon, like the other participants, found it increasingly difficult to find any value or 
regard in his contemporary self-concept. This was highlighted in his critical 
assessment of his social desirability and value, `who in their right mind would put up 
with me'. 
The participants confusion regarding their sense of self was a significant factor in 
their experience of living with pain and an important factor in their distress. They 
struggled to comprehend or feel in control of themselves and this compounded their 
feelings of hopelessness, fear and pessimism about their future. Their experience of 
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themselves was typified by uncertainty, they could neither predict their pain, nor how 
they might respond, think or feel at any point in the future. They had become 
unreliable and unpredictable and as they felt they no longer had executive control 
over themselves the participants could not guarantee that they might not cause 
themselves more and worse problems in the future. This experience of themselves 
resonated with their experience of the pain sensation itself, as a confusing, 
uncontrollable and destructive phenomenon and, as in earlier sections, could become 
the primary source of distress, over-riding the concerns about the pain as a sensation. 
A Body Separate from the Self. 
The inability to exercise control over parts of their body contributed to the 
participants feelings of distress and powerlessness. However, the relationship 
between their self and their bodies was not straightforward. Their accounts showed 
the extensive degree to which their self-concept had been affected by the change in 
their bodies and the pain they endured, but the internal workings of the body was most 
notable for its exclusion from the conscious appraisal of the self. The participants' 
lived experience of their bodies in relation to their self emerged as a form of dualism, 
where any dysfunctional or painful part of the body was placed outside of the self and 
felt to be `not me' and those parts of the body which functioned normally and 
therefore silently, were taken for granted and given little attention. Each participant 
reported giving little conscious attention to their body prior to the development of 
their pain, but had now become aware of it where it related to the pain. 
235 
For Lynette her body had changed from something she had only considered 
previously with regard to its appearance, but not its inner workings, to something that 
she was now aware of consciously on a daily basis. This was only the case for those 
parts of her body involved with her pain, it had not generalised to other parts of her 
body which she treated as she always had: 
Int. ok has your pain changed the way you see your body? 
Lyn. Sorry? 
Int. has it changed the way you see your body, think about it? 
Lyn. I suppose its made me think about it, before I thought about what it looked 
like, whether I was putting on weight or what make-up to wear, but never 
about what was going on inside, never gave it a thought, I still don't about the 
bits that don't hurt, but I know I've got a back now and a bum and left leg, 
because it hurts and you can feel it like a solid thing like something that's 
gone wrong. 
Int. a solid thing? 
Lyn. Yeah, like a mass a bit of leather, in your back getting in the way, you know 
where your back is all the time, this thing you carry with you now, giving you 
hassle and getting in the way. 
When Lynette described her body she retained the distinction referred to above 
between an original self and that which had emerged due to her pain, rejecting the 
notion that anything associated with the pain was a part of her original and preferred 
self. That which she termed the `real me': 
Int. so your body is different now 
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Lyn. Oh yeah, its in two parts, the old good bit and the pain bit, which has gone 
wrong. 
Int. how do they vary? 
Lyn. One bit works, the other doesn't, like a section has gone wrong, when it's bad 
and I can't move properly, its like its not part of me, it won't obey 
Similarly for Simon and Kevin, the parts of the body that were now associated with 
the pain and were no longer as easy to control, had become a discrete part of the body 
and something that was now carried around by them and not a part of them: 
Sim. I never thought about my body before, I just abused it I suppose, now I feel it 
and bits of it feel really weird, as if they're not part of me any more. 
Int. which bits? 
Sim. The numb bits and down the leg where it hurts and I can't move it like I could, 
they're somehow separate now. 
For Kevin, the parts of his body that were no longer considered part of him were those 
that felt different and could not be controlled automatically but required conscious 
effort: 
Int. and after the pain? 
Kev. now its me with this bit that doesn t fit, but its but its not me, it's a part of my 
body which doesn't belong.. 
Int. how is it different? 
Kev. well it feels different, you know about it, it tingles and burns some times, back 
and down my legs so you can isolate it, you can tell the part that doesn t 
belong to you, like its been infiltrated or somethinglike at the dentist, not just 
the pain but all the tingling and numbness and the fact it doesri t work as well, 
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I can lift my arm, no problem but you have to work harder to get the legs to do 
stuff, you have to make them. 
Int. you have to make them 
Kev. yeah, kind of because they're not me so I have to kind of make them 
Lynette, Simon and Kevin each described a fractured experience of their bodies, 
excluding from their self-concept the parts of their bodies that were now in conscious 
awareness or could not be controlled automatically, ` its not me, it's a part of my body 
which doesn't belong' (Kevin), `bits of it feel really weird, as if they're not part of me 
any more' (Simon) and `its not part of me, it won't obey' (Lynette). Those parts of 
their bodies that were unaffected continued to play no conscious role in their self- 
concept, i. e., `never gave it a thought, I still don't about the bits that don't hurt' 
(Lynette). Their accounts highlighted the contrast between the significance of the 
chronic pain on the participants' sense of self and the exclusion of the painful parts of 
their bodies from their conscious account of that sense of self. 
Other participants did not perceive any division in the way they saw their bodies. To 
them the body remained unified, but with pain. It was however, discrete from their 
sense of self. They had paid little attention to it prior to the development of their pain 
and continued to regard it the same way afterwards. 
Frank and Tony's descriptions of their bodies were consonant with those of their self- 
concept and reinforced their unitary but negative view of themselves. Tony did not 
consider the distinction between the parts of his body that hurt and those that did not, 
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as important, but viewed the whole body as essentially the same thing that now had 
pain, whilst Frank saw himself as a `crock' and his body in the same way. It acted as 
a symbol of this decline: 
Int. do you think of your body in a different way now 
Tony. no not really, it hurts but its still the same body, a bit gone wrong and painful 
but you never know it might put itself right. You don t think about your body 
unless it goes wrong and I used to think about it but I dori t know, I think 
about the pain but not my body, no-one has shown me anything about my 
body that says anything all the xrays and tests are normal they say, which 
doesn't help you just give up on thinking about it 
Int. has it changed the way you see your body. 
Frk. not really, I'm just a crock now, it hurts now when it never used to but I don't 
see it much different, except its broken and no-one can fix it. 
The participants' accounts of their experience of their physical bodies suggested that 
they played a paradoxical role in their self-concept, both influencing it in significant 
ways but remaining excluded from it. When with pain the associated parts of the body 
were felt to be alien and excluded from the self, whereas those parts of the body that 
functioned normally were given no attention. 
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Discussion. 
The emergent themes from this study confirmed the indications in the previous two 
that the self was a valuable focus for research into chronic benign low back pain and 
played an important role in its lived experience. 
As a consequence of living with their chronic pain the participants' self-concept had 
deteriorated. It continued to endure further assaults in the form of undesirable 
involuntary impulses and cognitions that could not be accommodated into any 
personal or shared social notion of a valued self. 
The participants described how their self had fractured and now involved the 
emergence of an additional `self with pain' that contained the new undesirable 
elements which were so incompatible with their preferred self, something they termed 
`the real me'. Participants varied according to the degree to which they perceived that 
the new `self with pain' dominated the preferred `real me'. To preserve their 
preferred self it had to be estranged from the newly emerged behaviours and impulses 
and either placed in conflict with a new self, or left as something from the past. The 
new aspects of their self-concept that the participants rejected and assigned to their 
new `self with pain' were those that they perceived to be both socially undesirable and 
unattractive. They were abhorrent to the participants and intruded into their conscious 
awareness most acutely when within a social or relational context. 
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The participants were confused and distressed at their lack of understanding or control 
over the processes related to their self-concept that they described. They could not 
explain why they had changed or predict how it would develop. This experience 
contributed to their sense of powerlessness and compounded their hopelessness in the 
face of their chronic pain. 
Their accounts indicated that their bodies played a complex role in their conscious 
appraisal of their sense of self. Their pain had affected their self, but they gave little 
conscious attention to their bodies when it was not in pain and the parts of their bodies 
that were in pain were excluded from the core sense of self. 
The participants perception of the changes in their self-concept was an important 
element in their experience of chronic benign low back pain and one which at times 
was more difficult to manage, or `unpleasant', than the pain sensation itself. 
Adopting a phenomenological approach provided a useful way of exploring this 
aspect of their lives with pain and highlighted some of the processes involved. In 
particular, the assault of chronic pain upon the self and what having chronic pain 
revealed about the nature of the self. 
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Living with an Unwanted Self : The assault on the self. 
There is evidence in the literature that supports the participants' accounts of the 
deleterious impact of their pain on their sense of self. Contrada and Ashmore (1999) 
explored the relationship between the self and physical health and argued for a key 
role for the self in the experience and quality of physical health. Pennebaker and 
Keogh (1999) and Leventhal et al. (1999) each concluded that the self could mediate 
the relationship between distress, chronic illness and disability. They emphasised the 
need to maintain or re-establish a coherent, valued and stable self-definition in order 
to best manage a chronic condition or endure trauma and duress and argued that 
where this was not possible and the self came under threat, the individual endured 
increased distress, disability and poor physical health. 
The experience of chronic benign low back pain for the participants was intertwined 
with their experience of their self. In study one in this thesis the work of Bury (1982, 
1988) and Williams (1984) was reviewed and emphasised how the disruptive nature 
of chronic illness obliged its sufferers to renegotiate their relationships and, in doing 
so, to review their biographies as a whole, sometimes rewriting their view of 
themselves in the context of their past and their illness. Kelly (1992) found this was 
also the case with regard to adjusting to radical surgery and contrasted the difference 
between the private experience of the self and the more public and inter-active 
phenomenon of social identity . Although the two phenomena are linked this 
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distinction helps to describe and explore the phenomenon and asserts the importance 
of the private self as well as social identity. 
The emergent themes in this study echoed those from the Aldrich and Eccleston 
(2000) q-sort study which highlighted the threat to the self that was inherent in the 
experience of everyday pain. Key to each of the factors that emerged in their study 
was how pain related to the self and its potential to change and overwhelm it. Pain 
represented a threat to the legitimacy of the self as rational and competent and 
introduced the possibility that control over the self could be lost due to the pain. To 
Charmaz (1983,1991,1999) the chronic illness sufferer's disability and limited 
lifestyle often left them unable to re-establish a valued self and exposed the degree to 
which, for some, the self was predicated on social values related to action and 
productivity. In contrast, Cuthbert (1999) rejected explicitly any implication that such 
a process was inevitable and gave many examples of chronic illness sufferers who had 
managed very successfully to maintain high levels of self-regard, action and 
productivity, despite their condition. 
Each of the studies described above highlighted the negative impact of chronic pain or 
illness on the sufferer's sense of self and how the self was implicated in the 
relationship between the disease and the associated distress and disability, but they 
were unable to explore how the intra-personal processes might unfold. The 
participants in this study gave personal accounts of their ongoing struggle to re- 
establish or defend any sense of a contemporary and valued personal self-definition 
and the further problems this caused. The themes `living with an unwanted self', `the 
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social aspect of the self: dealing with other people' and `a self that cannot be 
understood' revealed their struggle to retain control over their self and to continue to 
see it as something positive in the light of their new experiences. 
Since developing chronic pain the participants had experienced a variety of 
distressing, anti-social and aggressive involuntary impulses and behaviours that they 
felt unable to comprehend or control and which were incompatible with a positive 
self-concept. They were unable to assimilate or accommodate many of the new 
involuntary impulses, feelings and behaviours into their pre-existing self and appeared 
to reject them as a contemporary self that was not real, not the `real me'. To accept it 
as the self involved adopting a critical and negative set of self-definitions. Some of 
the participants did this and those who did often retained their past self as their 
preferred self in the form of an historical `real me'. 
The participants appeared to be engaged in an ongoing process of defending their self 
concept. They varied as to the extent to which the new `self with pain' dominated but 
it remained at all times unwanted and a private source of pressure. The lack of 
understanding or feeling of control over the new behaviours, affect and cognitions 
that threatened their positive view of themselves compounded their distress and left 
the self in the future at risk. The struggle to achieve Taylor's (1983) three tasks, that 
of achieving meaning, control and self-esteem to manage threatening events and 
illness progression (Taylor et al., 1998) and the descriptions by both Charmaz (above) 
and Kotarba (1983) of the struggle against a loss of a valued social identity were each 
evident in the participants' accounts. This was not just due to disability, to the 
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problems of an immobile body or being actively rejected or discredited socially, but 
also due to their difficulty assimilating and accommodating their chronic pain 
experience and the behaviours inherent in their chronic pain into a positive 
contemporary sense of self. 
A Self that cannot be Understood or Controlled: maintaining a coherent self. 
Maintaining a consistent, coherent self has been identified as an important theme in 
chronic illness and this was a task the participants in this study struggled to achieve. 
Corbin and Strauss (1987) referred to a process of identity reconstruction that took 
place during an individual's chronic illness trajectory that was directed specifically 
toward maintaining the continuity of the self that was known prior to the illness. As 
in this study they found that the experience of a chronic condition obliged the sufferer 
to integrate new experiences into their self-concept and to experience a different kind 
of self or selves. Yoshida (1993) referred to a similar process in spinal chord injury 
whereby the individual had to incorporate new `identities' with their former self and 
often struggled to do so, swinging in a pendular fashion between rejection and 
accommodation over time. These studies emphasised the resistance of the self and 
identity to certain kinds of change and its primacy in the individuals experience of 
their illness. 
Kotarba (1983) described how in chronic pain the self could become not just negative 
but uncertain and incoherent, `hopelessly unmoored' (p202). Charmaz (1991,1995) 
also argued that the self tended to resist dramatic change and as a consequence could 
become out of step with contemporary experience in chronic conditions. `Fictional 
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selves' would then emerge which were not reflective of the current situation but 
ensured that the preferred (usually past) selves remained unchallenged and preserved. 
This was problematic if the individual's everyday impairment clashed too much with 
the expectations linked to the `fictional' selves and the person attempted to do things 
that were no longer physically or mentally possible. The struggle of the participants 
in this study to establish any form of stable contemporary self appraisal supports this 
notion of their self-concept being `unmoored', not just persecutory but fragmented, 
incoherent and dissonant with their everyday experience. 
Helstrom's (2001) phenomenological study also underscored the task of maintaining 
the consistency of the self over time when in chronic benign low back pain. In 
common with the studies reviewed above and this study the participants in Helstrom's 
phenomenological study described their self-concept in a number of ways. As a 
nostalgia for a past self, highlighting a significant sense of loss; as a notion of a 
`projected self', where they felt defined by others and vulnerable to denigratory 
labels; and as an `entrapped self, where they felt isolated in the present and unable to 
communicate with others or progress, stuck in what Helstrom termed a `viscous' 
present where events could not be controlled or predicted. The primacy of 
establishing a stable and valued self-concept in the face of chronic benign low back 
pain was reinforced and Helstrom argued how when this often led to the development 
of an unrealistic or `spurious' self (like the `fictional self' escribed by Charmaz and 
the `real me' described by the participants in this study) which compounded the 
problem and prevented the individual concerned adapting constructively to their 
situation. 
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The participants in this study worked to construct a private sense of self that they 
could both manage and relate to in a helpful way but their preferred self, the `real me' 
that they had experienced little conscious awareness of before the onset of their pain 
emerged as a separate phenomenon. It now lived with a range of other selves similar 
to those described by Helstrom and others above and was often the sole preserve of 
any valued or positive meanings. It was alienated from much of the participants 
contemporary experience of being in pain and was an impediment to any change or 
adaptation they might make to that pain. 
The Social Aspect of the Self: dealing with other people. 
The participants' experience of their self when in pain revealed it to have a critical 
social dimension and their experience was best understood in a social and primarily 
relational context. The theme `the social aspect of the self: dealing with other people' 
showed how the participants distress was at its most acute and disabling when in the 
social domain and the involuntary impulses and behaviours that they experienced as 
incompatible with their self were inherently anti-social in definition. As a 
consequence they struggled to live with themselves and minimised their contact with 
others. 
The accounts of the participants showed their chronic pain and self-concept to be very 
social in nature. Radley (1999,1994) has published extensively on the social nature 
of health and illness and argued that the personal nature of an illness was such that it 
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was more than a biomedical disease, but was an experience situated within an 
historical, social and cultural context. He distinguished between a disease as a 
biological phenomenon and an illness as its more holistic, lived experience. In 
particular, Radley emphasised how, for the sufferer, the demands of a chronic 
condition for the sufferer involved resolving the conflicting demands of the body and 
its impairment with those of society (as embodied in role expectations and 
relationships). This conflict can cause problems of `discrediting definitions of the self 
(Bury, 1991), stigma (Goffman, 1990) and a struggle for legitimation, not just for the 
illness but for the person. Maintaining and securing a sense of personal virtue has 
been shown to be important in chronic illness (Williams, 1993) and highlights how 
much a chronic illness is a social and moral condition as well as a biomedical one 
(Kugelmann, 1997). Radley (1994,1999) identified that one of the distinguishing 
features of chronic illness is that the sufferer is obliged to continue to live in a world 
defined by healthy people and will be judged or defined in some degree according to 
their `normality'. Becoming discredited involved the threat of being defined and 
judged dominantly according to the illness and seen as `less of a person' (Williams, 
1993). The notion of normality was described as being enshrined in obligations of 
behaviour and expectations about roles and it was in this way that the participants in 
this study struggled as, in addition to their disability, the hostile and anti-social 
elements of their experience confused and surprised them and left them feeling 
abnormal and vulnerable to judgement. The struggle to be acceptable and normal in 
chronic illness is heightened when it takes place within a culture that values 
independence, productivity and beauty (Douglas, 1978). Radley (1999,1994) and 
Charmaz (1983) argued that adjustment to chronic illness was a function of loss and 
the retention of social engagement or participation (Radley and Green, 1987), but in 
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contrast, the participants in this study revealed how they also experienced a 
significant degree of active threat related to the self in a social context. They lived in 
disabling fear of being judged poorly, abhorred or pitied by both others and 
themselves. They struggled to relate to themselves in a constructive or positive 
manner and were influenced by their perception of how others thought of them. This 
was often to the extent that it dictated their behaviour and prompted them to either 
withdraw or over-do their activity according to the situation. The way they lived in 
the minds of others often pre-occupied their thoughts and influenced their behaviour. 
Ashmore and Contrada (1999) and Jussim and Ashmore (1997) emphasised the 
multiplicity of the self and how many of its essential elements were social. The 
position of symbolic interactionism also argues that it is through social interaction that 
we define the meanings that we use to define the self and our actions (Denzin, 1995). 
These include the beliefs of what others think of us and our perception of the 
differences between members of social groups that we do and do not identify with. 
Ashmore and Contrada asserted further that the fundamentally social nature of human 
beings could be both a source of support and threat and as such had important 
implications for damaging psychological stress and health behaviour. The experience 
of the participants in this study would support that conclusion. Jussim and Ashmore 
further subdivided the social self to include the idea of multiple selves as opposed to 
that of a single identity and asserted that the social aspect of the self contained within 
it as many selves as there were important others in the person's life. 
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The participants endured the kind of self-definitions and self-judgements that made 
social contact and intimacy aversive and threatening and prompted them to withdraw 
from relationships and conceal their private experience of living with pain. They 
judged themselves harshly and feared the consequences of the opinions of others. In 
addition they could not guarantee sufficient self-control or regulation to predict their 
behaviour in public. In this way they appeared to endure a significant degree of 
shame in relation to their experience of living with chronic pain. They were both 
ashamed of themselves and feared the judgements of others. 
The concept of shame is a useful one in this regard as it places the private experience 
of the individual within a social context. It has been described as the `affect of 
inferiority' and is associated with major disturbances of the self (Kaufman, 1989). 
Shame has been defined as the anxiety derived from beliefs that create a negative self 
image in the eyes of potential evaluators (Beck et al., 1985). Lewis (1987) proposed 
that self-other comparisons were central to shame whereby in shame one saw oneself 
as inferior. Gilbert (1989,1992) added to this by broadening the concept to relate it to 
a pre-disposition toward rank and status judgements and the consequences of such 
judgements. Lewis (1987) argued that self-other relationships were central to shame 
and it was this particular aspect, how they believed they would appear in the minds of 
others that was important and threatening for the participants. Gilbert et al. (1994) 
defined the threat inherent in shame as: 
In shame one sees oneself in the inferior position. Shame is characterised by 
the self being unable, the helpless object of another's ridicule, scorn or 
punishment. (p25) 
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Shame-prone individuals feel inferior, powerless, bad in comparison to others, 
vulnerable to punishment and unattractive. Shame promoted concealment and 
resentment and has been shown to be related to distress and social anxiety Gilbert 
(2000). It incorporates the individual's evaluation of their relationships with others, 
their appraisal and anticipation of the beliefs of others about them and their evaluation 
of themselves in relation to others. It places the individual's self-judgements and 
definitions firmly within a social context and shows how that can be inherently 
threatening and distressing for the individual. 
The participants' accounts in this study showed how in addition to the loss of social 
value there was a significant degree of shame inherent in their experience of their 
chronic benign low back pain. This was not just because they could no longer do 
things or fulfil particular social roles but also because their involuntary experiences 
left them vulnerable to feelings of shame that were, at times, more uncomfortable and 
unbearable than enduring the simple sensation of pain. 
The concept of shame is useful as it enables the participants' experience to be 
described as something that is private and personal, but also set within a social 
context and it provides a bridge between the two. Crandall and Moriarty (1995) 
found that diseases that were perceived to be severe or under personal control were 
most likely to lead to social rejection. Kotarba (1983) referred to this as `victim 
blaming' and it represents another example of the negative implications of chronic 
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benign low back pain for the self in that it can also be held responsible for the cause 
and maintenance of chronic benign low back pain. 
On this theme, Eccleston et al. (1997) showed in a q-sort study that responsibility, 
blame and the protection of identity were important themes in chronic benign low 
back pain. The sufferer emerged as feeling blameworthy and described a need to 
resist personal responsibility for the presence of chronic benign low back pain both to 
themselves and healthcare professionals. Making sense of a condition with no clear 
or socially agreed biological utility or value shifted the focus of responsibility toward 
the person whose social identity was then challenged, weakened and at risk of being 
shamed. Kugelman (1997,1999) also focused on this aspect of chronic benign low 
back pain and emphasised how difficult it was for some-one to relate to their pain 
without having to defend themselves from accusations of responsibility or culpability. 
Having pain was exposed yet further as more than a biological disease, but a social 
and moral condition which had the potential to place the self in jeopardy. 
The participants' anxieties about their socially undesirable and destructive behaviour, 
their social withdrawal and self-criticism suggested that they were both ashamed of 
themselves, embarrassed about their situation and felt vulnerable to criticism and 
punishment as a result of being in chronic pain. 
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Living with a Body Separate from the Self: The self and the body in pain. 
The experience of the participants in this study suggested that their body and the 
chronic benign low back pain located within it was fundamental in their experience of 
their self, but their lived experience was such that the relationship between them was 
defined by alienation and exclusion, rather than any conscious sense of integration. 
When free of symptoms the participants' body disappeared to them and was not a 
source of criteria used to define the self, beyond, possibly, its functional capacity or 
image. Retaining a self that contained only that which was useful, functional, 
coherent and valuable emerged again as a key task in the endurance and management 
of chronic benign low back pain as any part of the participants body that was 
associated with the pain was placed outside of the self and termed `not me'. 
The participants in the studies by Helstrom (2001) and Kleinman (1988) had also 
developed a dual relationship with their bodies, viewing them as something both 
strange and separate from their self. Additionally, Vrancken (1989) described how 
pain could produce a split within the person that added to the fragmentation referred 
to above and caused the self to be divided in two, into an `I' and `an it' (the body). 
Kelly and Field (1996) argued for a more `bodily' approach to chronic illness as they 
felt biological facts were neglected and of critical importance to the self. They 
advocated a movement to `bring the body back in' and not exclude it from the 
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individual sufferer's experience. Williams (2000) also made an interesting distinction 
between the bodily `disappearance' in the absence of pain and the bodily `dys- 
appearance' when in pain, whereby the body only entered the consciousness in the 
event of it dysfunctioning. This was the case for the participants but what remained 
constant was that whether present or absent the corporeal body was almost always 
excluded from the self. 
This separation and dislocation between the body and the self was also explored by 
Bendelow and Williams (1995) in their argument for a more embodied account of 
peoples' experience of illness. They noted how although the study of pain required 
the application of a multi-dimensional model and a level of thinking and analysis that 
went beyond any kind of dualism, by contrast at the experiential and subjective level 
the lived experience of pain actually reinforced those dualisms. This left the sufferer 
aware consciously for the first time of a contrast between their body and themselves. 
Bendelow and Williams (1995), like Williams (2000), described how the experience 
of pain challenged and disrupted the unconsciousness of the body and its 
`disappearance' in everyday life. As a consequence pain could render the body 
`disharmonious' from the self and contributed to the kind of fracturing of the self that 
was evidenced by the participants accounts in this study. To the participants the 
painful parts of the body were separate objects, things that were no longer part of 
them or the `real me' as they referred to themselves and had become estranged and 
alienated from the self. Unfortunately for them they were forced to live within the 
limits imposed upon them by their bodies and an ongoing source of conflict persisted 
as they were unable to transcend their bodies. This relationship between the body and 
the self was inherently problematic as the participants had to live according to their 
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bodies and not their preferred selves which appeared to exclude any reference to a 
painful or impaired body. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the study. 
As with the two previous studies this study highlighted the value of adopting an 
idiographic response and the manner in which it provided a contrasting perspective on 
the experience of chronic pain that complements other research approaches. It is 
limited by its focus on one source of data and one interview per participant which, it 
could be argued, gives a narrow view of the personal experience of the participants. 
As with the other studies, the influence of the dual role of the researcher as clinic staff 
member and of conducting the interview in a clinical setting are areas in which the 
work could be advanced and improved. 
Conclusions. 
The notion of the self emerged in this study as a valuable element in the experience of 
chronic pain sensation, distress and disability. It was an important factor in the lived 
experience of the participants and served as a useful vehicle to reinforce yet further 
the multiplicity and multi-dimensional nature of the participant's experience of pain. 
Chronic pain assaulted and undermined the participants' sense of self and the process 
of losing a valued sense of self was, at times, more distressing to them than enduring 
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the physical sensation of pain. The assault on the self involved the participants' 
difficulties in assimilating the involuntary impulses, behaviours, affects and 
cognitions that they experienced into a valued contemporary sense of self. These 
experiences were abhorrent, incompatible with their pre-existing sense of self and a 
source of significant feelings of threat, shame and self-criticism. 
The participants' experiences highlighted the inherently social nature of the self and 
the utility of adopting a relational and social perspective to the self, which emphasised 
its connectedness to other social and cultural domains. The way the participants 
related to themselves and perceived the opinions of others towards them was 
problematic and a factor in their disability and distress. The emergent behaviours 
they found difficult to manage and which were incompatible with positive self- 
judgements or self-definitions were all inherently anti-social or socially undesirable. 
The participants felt in danger of being judged as inferior by others and they saw 
themselves as inferior and vulnerable to rejection and punishment. They lived 
negatively in their own minds and in the minds of others and as such endured 
significant intra- and interpersonal distress, withdrawal and disability. The presence 
of such chronic fear, shame and sensitivity to punishment or rejection emphasised the 
degree to which their pain was laden with an ongoing sense of threat to the self. 
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Chapter Nine. 
Conclusions and General Discussion. 
The participants' accounts in each of the studies revealed the complexity and 
individual variety of their chronic pain experience. Despite their struggle to 
understand it they gave rich and thick descriptions of what it was like to have chronic 
benign low back pain, as evidenced in the extracts used in the analyses. 
In study one the ongoing confusion of this type of pain emerged. Despite exhibiting a 
strong drive to understand their situation and construct an acceptable sense out of it, 
the participants shared an inability to explain its persistent presence in any way that 
was meaningful. Although they had suffered pain for a considerable time, sometimes 
up to fifteen years, they were not experts in their condition and did not know what to 
do for the best. This absence of clarity was evident in the many different kinds of 
social and personal comparisons they employed to give an account of their situation. 
The particular social comparisons that were selected gave an insight into their 
personal appraisal of their situation but served poorly as coping strategies. In the 
context of this `senselessness' the participants were unable to establish any legitimacy 
or shared understanding of the chronic nature of their pain. Their attempts to make 
progress, to do more or look better whilst still in pain often created confusion and was 
problematic. By looking `ill' their pain was acknowledged more easily as `real', i. e. 
medical and physical, but displaying pain behaviour was also difficult as this left them 
vulnerable to feelings of pity or rejection. As a result of this situation, despite its 
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omnipresence and disabling dominance in their lives the participants avoided talking 
about their pain, masked it as much as possible and tended to withdraw from social 
contact. 
In the second study the aim was to examine the personal experience of chronic benign 
low back pain from a different perspective and look at the pain itself in more detail by 
exploring it as it went through a process of change. In contrast to the previous study 
the participants described their pain as a discrete object in more depth and employed 
imagery and metaphor that revealed a range of additional meanings related to their 
pain. 
Each participant had developed a personal classification system which they employed 
to rate and rank the variable quality and intensity of their pain. Each system described 
the pain in two broad forms; `pain at its worst' and `pain at its best'. There was a 
uniformity about the quality of the participants' `pain at its best' related to its 
chronicity and persistence, but accounts of the pain `at its worst' revealed the personal 
and individual nature of the fear and intimidation they felt in relation to their pain. 
The participants' imagery for their pain reflected more its threatening meaning, rather 
than the level of their technical understanding of any causal processes. It extended 
beyond an unpleasant sensation or restriction in movement toward something that 
influenced their self-concept and inter-personal relationships directly. 
The participants described a beneficial change in their experience of pain after the 
intervention, although this was not related to its explicit content. No change occurred 
in the participants' taxonomy or causal pain-imagery indicating that their 
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representations and beliefs about their pain remained the same. Although no 
suggestions had been included in either intervention toward developing greater self- 
efficacy or self-regard, it was in these areas that the participants perceived an 
improvement. Their attributions and self-perceptions had become more adaptive and 
as a consequence their health anxieties were less intrusive or catastrophic and they 
were less disabled. The therapeutic effect was independent of the specific content of 
the intervention, although the pain-specific context of each was important. The non- 
specific elements shared between the interventions emerged as the most active 
therapeutic ingredients. 
The first two studies in this thesis indicated that the participants' sense of self was an 
important element in the lived experience of their pain. This became the focus of the 
third study and the themes that emerged suggested that the participants' sense of self 
was indivisible from their experience of their pain. Their accounts showed that as a 
consequence of living with their pain their self-concept had deteriorated. It now 
contained new elements that were uncomfortable to tolerate and a source of distress. 
Their experience was of an ongoing struggle to defend and maintain a preferred and 
valued self-concept and this had a disabling effect on their everyday lifestyle. Making 
sense of and evaluating themselves was a key and potentially mediating factor for the 
participants in their experience of their pain. 
Employing IPA helped to illuminate the different ways in which chronic benign low 
back pain operated as a dynamic and multi-dimensional phenomenon and emphasised 
the importance of the interaction of the personal, social, cultural and physical 
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elements involved. Chronic benign low back pain is an example of a dynamic, multi- 
dimensional experience that exposes the inherent process of sense-making and the 
construction of knowledge particularly well. The emergent themes in this thesis 
emphasised the various different ways that pain could be unpleasant, senseless and 
social. It revealed its disruptive nature and the manner in which it frustrated the 
attempts of those who endured it to divine some coherent meaning within it from 
which to select action. In this context, `senselessness' referred to the absence of any 
coherent personal or social value to the experience; the participants' pain did not lack 
palpable meaning but was notable for its threat, loss and confusion. 
Many of the themes described in this thesis underscored how chronic pain was not 
confined by medical and personal parameters but was also social and relational. The 
`socialness' of the participants' pain emerged throughout the thesis; social 
comparison, the presence of shame, withdrawal, difficulty being believed and the 
social nature of the self emphasised how much of its meaning and experience 
unfolded within a social and cultural framework. 
For the participants, their condition was medically benign but from a personal and 
social perspective the experience was of a malignant process involving a significant 
degree of threat to the self. The notion of the fear-avoidance of movement in chronic 
benign low back pain has been identified as a causal factor in its disability and the 
sensitisation of the pain-gate system. The complex and dynamic nature of the threat 
to the self within the participants' chronic pain experience suggests that it could also 
play a similar role in its disruptiveness, senselessness and unpleasantness, promoting 
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a heightened vigilance toward the pain and reinforcing its place within the 
consciousness of the sufferer. 
The themes and conclusions in the three studies in this thesis can be related to the 
broader literature on pain in a range of ways. They highlighted the senselessness and 
uncertainty of chronic low back pain and how it frustrated the participants' need to 
establish a coherent understanding of it. They emphasised the social component of 
the pain experience, the manner in which its unpleasantness was more than just a 
sensory or discrete psychological phenomenon and how chronic pain exists within a 
social context (Radley 1994). Viewing chronic benign low back pain from the 
participants' personal experience emphasised the degree to which it operated within a 
symbolic, moral and cultural framework and reinforced the value of adopting a 
multidimensional, biopsychosocial framework and model to explore it (Gatchell and 
Turk, 1999). 
From a cognitive-behavioural perspective, in addition to the more pain-specific 
beliefs described in the literature, the beliefs the participants held about themselves, 
their self-concepts and how they felt others saw them also appeared to play an 
important role in their pain experience. Similarly the lack of a shared coherent, 
constructive or socially-valued understanding of chronic pain within the participants' 
social network influenced their everyday interpersonal interactions in a manner which 
compounded their pain and disability. The `common-sense' models (Leventhal, 
Meyer and Nerenz, 1980) that they and those around them held about their pain failed 
habitually to explain their illness. The participants' pain behaviour was as much a 
reflection of their struggle with the confusion, uncertainty and misunderstanding of 
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their pain, either within themselves or those around them, rather than the product of a 
particular pain-specific belief or discrete reinforcement contingency. For example 
although they were fear-avoidant of movement (the incorrect belief and anxiety that 
movement caused tissue damage and rest was required) they would often engage in 
excessive and painful activity, in defiance of this belief, as a result of their appraisal 
of the demands of their social situation and other beliefs about themselves. 
Much of the qualitative work on chronic pain highlights the loss associated with it and 
the problems of achieving or maintaining a valued social identity over time (Charmaz, 
1983; Kotarba, 1983; Hellstrom, 2001). The participants' accounts in this thesis echo 
those findings but also introduced the notion that the experience of chronic benign 
low back pain also involved a significant degree of threat. The threat of movement 
inherent in fear-avoidance (Crombez et at., 1999) was matched by the threat inherent 
in both social rejection and a persecutory self-view. Self-criticism is a cognition or 
"" attribution that has been associated with chronic pain (Haythornthwaite et al., 1991) 
along with the problems caused by catastrophisation and other cognitive distortions or 
passive coping strategies (McCracken and Gross, 1993) related to low self-efficacy, 
low self-esteem or an external locus of control (Gatchell and Turk 1999). The nature 
of the individual's self-concept and the related self appraisal could be a factor in the 
selection of particular responses or coping strategies and in the degree to which they 
are able to accept or adjust to the presence of their pain. 
The notion that chronic benign low back pain contains within it an additional source 
of threat could both reinforce the ability of pain to capture the attention of the sufferer 
and maintain the levels of fear, worry, rumination and hyper-vigilance that have been 
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reported in association with chronic benign low back pain and which operate to retain 
and consolidate the pains position in the consciousness of the sufferer (Aldrich et al., 
2000). The study of the self and how it is maintained over time have has had little 
prominence in the study of chronic pain and it represents perhaps the most significant 
contribution of this thesis. Recently, Pincus and Morley (2001) proposed the idea that 
a key feature of the presentation of chronic pain is the extent to which self and chronic 
pain can become enmeshed and interact. They argued that a core process in the 
maintenance, successful relief and management of chronic pain was to enable a 
separation of the self from pain. The participants' accounts of their self-concept in 
study three and their wide and varied use of social comparison in study one showed 
evidence of their struggle to retain a stable or coherent self-concept that was not over- 
whelmed by their pain. One particular process, social comparison (Festinger, 1954), 
which has received considerable attention as a potential coping strategy was shown 
to be equivocal in that regard and appeared to be best seen as a core self-appraisal 
process rather than a useful pain management tool. 
Quality in Qualitative Work. 
It is important that the criteria by which a qualitative study is judged is appropriate. 
Some of the qualitative approaches adopt different epistemological viewpoints to each 
other and they each contrast with those of the mainstream quantitative approach 
(Smith et al, 1995b; Murray and Chamberlain, 1999). The rejection of the notion of a 
stable, measurable and objective truth means that the outcomes of qualitative research 
cannot be validated using constructs from the natural sciences and different criteria 
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are required to establish the value and quality of qualitative work (Yardley, 1997a, 
2000; Smith, 1996b). 
A number of authors outlined ways in which the validity of qualitative research can be 
assessed (Smith, 1996b; Conrad, 1990; Stiles, 1993; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994; Yardley, 2000; Elliot et al., 1999). Smith (1996b) suggested 
several criteria to assess the internal validity and reliability of qualitative research and 
they were adhered to closely in this thesis. Two important ones were `internal 
coherence' and `presentation of evidence'. `Internal coherence' referred to the need 
to concentrate on whether the argument presented in the study was internally 
consistent and justified by the data, whilst `presentation of evidence' demanded that 
sufficient verbatim evidence from the data should be presented in the paper to allow 
the reader to interrogate the analysis. 
Other authors have also suggested similar criteria that could be used to assess 
qualitative studies (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Guba and Lincoln, 1995; Elliot et al., 
1999; Yardley, 2000). 
Yardley (2000) offered perhaps the broadest range of criteria that can be applied to 
evaluate a study. They were divided into five main areas: 
1. Sensitivity to Context - showing evidence of a theoretical grounding, relevance to 
extant literature, the presence of adequate empirical data, a recognition of the 
socio-cultural setting, commitment to the participants perspective and a respect for 
ethical issues. 
2. Commitment - showing evidence of a prolonged engagement with the topic, 
competence and skill in the methods used and an immersion in the relevant data. 
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3. Rigour - related to the completeness of the data collection and analysis, 
triangulation (using a number of different sources of data to form a statement) and 
the presence of sufficient data to allow the reader to make judgments. 
4. Transparency - in the form of clarity and cogency as evidenced in the rhetorical 
power and persuasiveness of the write-up and the degree to which all relevant 
aspects of the research process were disclosed. 
5. Impact and Importance - including the utility of the study and impact on the beliefs or actions of other people. This was considered by Yardley to be a 
decisive criterion. 
It is hoped that the research presented in this thesis observed each of the criteria 
outlined above. 
The measures that were taken during the research for this thesis are described below 
in relation to the Yardley guidelines: 
1. Sensitivity to Context. Evidence for this shown in the introductory chapters 
which aim to establish the position and commitment of the researcher both to 
the subject, that is exploring the participants' personal view of the topic and 
the approach that was adopted. The analysis is presented in such a way as to 
highlight the value given to the participants' words and in each of the 
discussion sections care is taken to evaluate the findings in relation to the 
literature from a wide range of research approaches. 
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2. Commitment. Care was taken in these chapters to show that this was not a 
casual research interest but a serious attempt to: develop our understanding of 
chronic benign low back pain through a focus on its subjective experience; 
establish the case for adopting IPA as a method; explain the reasons for the 
specific focus of the research and show evidence of an in-depth understanding 
of the area. Describing the research process and method in detail is also 
intended convey the depth of immersion and level of engagement with the data 
this involved. The findings from the studies were related closely to the extant 
research from both quantitative and qualitative studies to reinforce their 
applicability and highlight the utility of the approach. 
3. Rigour. The use of triangulation and the presentation of sufficient data to 
support the statements in the studies were important criteria within each of the 
analyses and a valuable audit tool for quality. Triangulation took the form of 
showing evidence for each emergent theme in the transcripts of several 
different participants. By using the accounts of different participants the 
variation within each theme could also be explored and articulated. IPA 
studies are notable for their commitment to using extensive examples of data 
within the analysis and that principle was adhered to in each of the three 
studies in this thesis. The step by step process of the analysis ensured that at 
each point the themes could be related back to the transcripts and the notes 
were available to my supervisor and colleague to help explain how particular 
themes were selected and provide material for an internal audit of the process. 
4. Transparency. To ensure that the emergent themes were both coherent and 
grounded in the data the transcripts were looked at independently by both my 
supervisor and a work colleague during the analysis. With my supervisor we 
discussed our readings of the interviews and came to an agreement on the 
theme categories before the analysis proceeded. The second reader acted as a 
check on the emergent analytic account, particularly to monitor for clarity, 
persuasiveness and the degree to which the themes were evident in the data 
that was presented. Making the analytic process transparent was also the 
reason, in part, for describing the analytic method in detail and providing 
extensive examples of data in the analysis sections of each of the empirical 
study chapters. 
5. Impact and Importance. To support a case for the impact of this research the 
emergent themes in this thesis were related to the findings from a broad range 
of approaches to chronic pain research. The aim was to show the relevance 
and applicability of the findings and to emphasise the degree to which it 
offered a new and useful perspective on the subject. The utility of the research 
is also evident in part in the section below which discusses the implications of 
the findings for further research and clinic work. 
Personal Reflection on the Thesis. 
A notable aspect of this thesis is that although all the data was collected by mid-July 
1996, it has taken a long time to finish. Study one was finished by the end of 1994, 
the analysis for study two was in its first rough draft by the end of 1995, and the 
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interviews for study three were recorded in the first half of 1996. After that, progress 
was slow. Much of this was due to the competing pressures of home and work, 
changing jobs and having babies. However, my experience has been that it takes time 
to develop your ability and confidence with qualitative research and I'm not sure this 
thesis and the themes within it would have been the same if I had done it any faster. 
The research has tracked the development of my clinical work with people in pain and 
although this thesis is not a piece of clinical research, it has been very informative and 
influential in that regard. 
At the start of the thesis I was beginning to work with people in chronic pain in a 
clinical capacity. The research offered me an opportunity to gain an insight into 
chronic pain that was not available from the literature and to learn about the 
qualitative approach to psychological research. Up to that point I had little experience 
of qualitative methods, had not come across phenomenology in any of the formal 
teaching I had received and had been actively dissuaded from using the approach 
during my training. 
I found the experience of researching chronic pain in this way invaluable and 
challenging in ways I had not anticipated. Gaining a working knowledge of 
qualitative research that helped to demystify it was satisfying but applying it showed 
me how much more, in contrast to statistical analysis, it constituted a test of self- 
confidence. The researcher's personal interpretative potential is integral to the 
analysis and rather than relying on the statistical properties of the data to establish its 
power and quality, it was my ability to produce a coherent and selective interpretation 
that was tested. This felt much more personal and intimidating to begin with and was 
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replaced in time with a confidence in the method and in the data. It also took time to 
develop the confidence that the themes themselves would actually emerge and to 
suppress the experimental urge to look for things based on an `a priori' hunch. The 
number of themes I found myself attending to which, at the beginning, I would not 
have predicted proved to me that themes do emerge in this approach. I had not 
anticipated at the outset that I would focus on social comparison (study one), non- 
specific factors in reducing the threat of pain (study two), or the emergence of the self 
as themes in the personal experience of chronic benign low back pain. 
At the time I began this thesis it felt as if qualitative research still had to prove that it 
was both psychological and scientific. I approached the data in this context and at 
first this was also quite paralysing as it felt that the pressure was on to produce 
something exceptional immediately. As if each analysis had to produce a grand 
unifying theory, find something revolutionary and relate it in a lyrical and entertaining 
way. This was not the case, but it disabled the analytic process at first as there was 
the compulsion to snatch at the analysis and jump to grand but superficial conclusions 
too early, rather than build up a rich interpretative account. This receded as the 
richness, value and power of the participants' accounts became clearer. The 
qualitative approach to research also appeared to become more accepted within 
psychology over the same time period. More qualitative publications appeared in 
mainstream psychology journals and the first qualitative study (Walker et al 1999) 
was published in `Pain', the journal of the IASP. In parallel, more qualitative papers 
were presented at annual conferences and it felt as if the tone of the debate between 
the two camps was becoming more conciliatory. The criteria for evaluating quality in 
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qualitative research were defined more clearly and as a consequence the requests as to 
how one could establish the `validity' and `reliability' of qualitative work dwindled. 
Another issue of relevance to the process of analysis was the influence of the 
relationship that was developed with the participants. It was much closer than in 
quantitative work and a factor in enabling them to talk about their experiences 
comfortably. The participants become important to me and I recalled their voices as I 
read their transcripts. At first it was difficult to address themes in the data if I felt 
they might cause offence to the participants should they be taken the wrong way, 
particularly as at the time many applied psychological theories of chronic pain were 
quite persecutory toward the sufferer. Good supervision and peer review was 
essential to avoid the problems of `going native', whereby feelings toward the 
participants dominated and obscured the analytic process as you were unable to step 
away from the data enough to give an analysis that was grounded in the data. 
With hindsight many of the difficulties I had in the research may have been avoided 
had I better appreciated the demands of the work. Were Ito go back and do it again I 
would focus more at the beginning on developing my expertise in the research rather 
than focusing on the subject. This would have been frustrating but a stronger 
grounding in qualitative analysis and an appreciation of the history of phenomenology 
and symbolic interactionism earlier in the process would have been valuable. Having 
a clinical background was helpful to a certain degree but I found that a qualitative 
health psychology research interview was very different to a clinical one. Your 
clinical instincts have to be contained and you have to learn to develop a different 
style of enquiry, one that facilitates the participant telling their story rather than 
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guiding them toward particular areas. Therapists have often suggested to me that their 
experience and training qualifies them as a qualitative researcher but I found that not 
to be the case. There was a danger that if you were wedded too much to a particular 
model or theory it could restrict the focus of the interview and analysis. 
Were Ito repeat the thesis I would also not attempt to do the work based on only one 
day per week. The competing demands of clinical work and research were difficult 
and using the last day of the week for research was problematic as it caused problems 
of fatigue. The work was not exhausting in a dramatic sense but it made it difficult to 
maintain the required level of attention and quality. 
I found IPA to be very useful in this research and its idiographic focus suited my 
aims. My experience would support the conclusions drawn by Shaw (2001) that an 
IPA study could reflect the breadth and diversity of the topic under study and its 
interactive multi-dimensional nature: 
both the subjective unshared aspects of experience, i. e. those that are internal 
and unique to an individual, and the shared aspects of experience, i. e. those 
that are constructed by external forces within a culture or sub-culture' p5°. 
It is difficult to draw clear conclusions about the limits of IPA as it is so early in its 
development and embraces a wide variety of perspectives within the analytic method. 
Certain areas could perhaps be developed to see if IPA could uncover yet more from 
the data. A commitment to the words people use means that IPA has tended not to 
focus on other aspects of a transcript such as the things people do not say, the 
absences in the data and the themes which are embedded within much lengthier 
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passages in the transcripts. A focus in IPA on the lived and conscious experience of 
the participants could be seen to limit the analysis of more unconscious processes that 
might emerge from a focus on, for example, the patterns of dysfluency or dissonance 
in the participants talk. This is not meant to imply that IPA should transform and 
become a kind of discourse analysis but to suggest areas where it could be expanded. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Thesis. 
The particular strengths and weaknesses of each study were reviewed in the respective 
chapters and those that relate to the thesis as a whole will be reviewed here. The 
commitment to articulating the participant's personal experience and the flexibility of 
the inductive and idiographic approach enabled both new themes to emerge which 
were important in the experience and management of chronic benign low back pain 
and provided a useful perspective on established concepts. The findings could also be 
related to a wide range of other studies into chronic pain and illness and this 
reinforced the value of integrating and adopting IPA and the qualitative approach 
further in the study of chronic pain. 
In confining itself to one method of data collection, (the individual interview), one 
researcher and one method of analysis (IPA), the thesis could be criticised for 
adopting too narrow an approach to the study of the personal experience of chronic 
benign low back pain. Equally it would have been valuable to interview pain 
sufferers other than those considered to have chronic pain syndrome and this is 
mentioned in the section reviewing the implications for further research. Utilising a 
broader source of data, possibly including pain diaries or journals could have added 
272 
weight to the analyses and increased the opportunity for triangulation. With the 
exception of study two the studies were cross-sectional and had it been possible it 
would have been useful to take a more longitudinal focus that could explore the 
participants' experiences over time. This would also have provided for the intriguing 
possibility of engaging the participants in the research process by giving them 
feedback on the emergent analyses and inviting them to collaborate in the study, or by 
exploring the utility of theoretical sampling as employed by grounded theorists and 
using the emergent themes to guide subsequent interviews. A contextual difficulty 
was the dual role of the researcher as clinic staff member and, in the case of study 
two, also as therapist. This could have had an inhibitory or biasing effect on the 
participants' responses during the interview and it would have been helpful to either 
have had a greater level of independence as a researcher or, more importantly, to have 
paid more explicit attention within the interviews to the participants' awareness of this 
theme and its influence upon them. None of these difficulties invalidate the findings 
of the studies but represent potential limits to the thesis and areas which, with 
hindsight and had resources allowed, could have been addressed. 
Clinical Implications. 
The studies in this thesis highlighted how the experience of chronic benign low back 
pain was typified by its senselessness, an assault on the self and the related personal 
and social problems that this could cause. Each of these themes could be attended to 
usefully in a pain management intervention and would complement the focus on 
pacing, goal setting and fear-avoidance that typify the pain management approach. 
The idea that the self is important in chronic benign low back pain and that such pain 
could represent a chronic threat to the self is not one that has received much attention 
in the development and application of psychological interventions for chronic benign 
low back pain management. The close relationship between the self-concept and 
chronic benign low back pain that emerged in this thesis suggests that the status and 
appraisal of the self would be an important thing to assess in patients that were 
referred for help. The development of interventions that address the difficulties 
people might endure in their attempts to maintain an acceptable self when suffering 
chronic benign low back pain would be useful. 
Chronic benign low back pain develops out of an initial six month period of acute 
pain (IASP 1986,1994) and much could be done before that transitional phase to 
highlight the potential for problems to develop. Better patient information and good 
counsel in this regard to help people understand the multi-dimensional and disruptive 
nature of the experiences that constitute chronic pain could be beneficial. Teasdale et 
al. (1995) described this as helping the patient to cope with their situation as well as 
possible by developing and nurturing their `mindfulness' or therapeutic appraisal of 
their experience. In this way the manner in which chronic benign low back pain 
sufferers felt and thought about their situation would then be as constructive as 
possible. Patients would not pathologise their own experiences or see them as an 
indication of a weak or inferior self, but as the product of an individual doing their 
best to manage an unpleasant and unfortunate situation. 
This approach has been described as the development and application of a `normal 
psychology of pain' (Eccleston, 1997) which takes into account the inherent 
disruptiveness and unpleasantness of pain. To do otherwise would be a reflection of 
the kind of `victim blaming' that Kotarba (1983) described and an institutional form 
of the `actor-observer' effect (Brewin, 1988) whereby the cause of someone's 
misfortune or adversity was attributed exclusively to the person. Ogden (1995) 
expressed a similar concern that the development of a focus on the intra-personal self 
within a society that valued self-reliance and independence could lead, in error, to the 
sufferer being held responsible for morbidity that was more a function of a complex 
biopsychosocial process. The potential for further shame in that context is 
considerable and anti-therapeutic. 
Adjustment (Kerns, 1997; Jensen et al., 2000) and acceptance (McCracken, 1998) in 
chronic benign low back pain have been identified as important constructs in pain 
management and each could be enhanced by incorporating an understanding of the 
self. The research to date into both areas has not identified the processes involved 
that help people to make therapeutic progress. The implications of the findings from 
this thesis suggest that such progress requires the maintenance of a stable and secure 
self and that any change, however useful, that involved a perceived threat to the self 
would be resisted. 
It has been acknowledged that although chronic benign low back pain management 
programmes are effective our understanding of what works for whom and what the 
most active ingredients are in general is limited and in need of further study (Morley 
et al., 1999; Gatchel and Epker, 1999). Brewin and Power (1999) (referenced in study 
two, chapter seven) argued that particular themes related to the self were important in 
the therapeutic transformation of meaning in psychotherapy and there is reason to 
275 
speculate that this could also be the case within a pain management intervention. 
Making more of an explicit reference to the nature of the senselessness and impact of 
chronic pain on the self during a programme would be very helpful. It has the 
potential to improve the levels of adherence, attrition and rapport throughout the 
programme as a key aspect of the patients' experience would be addressed and not 
ignored. 
In assessment prior to the programme it would be valuable to review the patient's 
situation with regard to their understanding, self concept and the degree of shame and 
threat they felt in relation to having chronic benign low back pain. Pincus and Morley 
(2001) considered this was particularly important with regard to self-worth, although 
as the self is inherently idiosyncratic it would be important not to be too restrictive or -- 
prescriptive about what dimensions to review: -- 
it seems to be important to separate patients with chronic benign low back 
pain who are distressed about the situational constraints consequent to the pain 
from those who have the additional burden of believing that the negative 
consequences of pain mean that they are flawed and worthless. (p613) 
Study two in this thesis showed that the social context of an intervention was an 
important therapeutic agent. Addressing the relationship between the patient and the 
professional more explicitly could increase the power of a therapeutic service, enable 
a greater degree of the patient's most difficult fears to be contained (Casement, 1985) 
and guard against pain professionals compounding a patient's sense of shame and 
inferiority inadvertently. It also emphasises the importance of including as many of 
the sufferer's family members and associates in the therapeutic endeavour as possible. 
The participants' pain involved a significant sense of ongoing threat and arousal. This 
raises the question as to whether techniques and approaches from the field of 
psychological trauma, such as eye-movement desensitisation and reprocessing 
(EMDR) (Shapiro, 1995) or critical incident stress debriefing (Mitchell, 1983) could 
be applied usefully to the management of chronic benign low back pain to mitigate its 
intrusive nature. Vlaeyen and Linton (2000) in addressing pain fear-avoidance as a 
phobic phenomenon have shown the added value of using cognitive behavioural 
techniques such as graded exposure and cognitive rehearsal, in addition to the simple 
graded exercise programmes used in pain management programmes to address the 
disabling fear in chronic pain directly. 
Future Research. 
It appears to be in the nature of qualitative research that it highlights the inherent 
diversity and complex nature of the subject under study and generates an exponential 
number of further research questions. Each theme in this thesis could be followed in 
finer detail and used as the starting point for further interviews. One question in 
particular could be to look more in-depth at the nature of the `senselessness' of 
chronic benign low back pain and how that related to the other personal and social 
themes that unfolded. 
It would also be very useful to explore the relationship between the self-concept and 
chronic benign low back pain much further. Ashmore and Contrada (1999) concluded 
that the concepts of self and identity were powerful causal, mediating and moderating 
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agents in the pathway between disease and illness but hesitated to conclude too 
strongly about how this process unfolded as the study of self and identity in this 
context was undeveloped and at an early exploratory stage. 
The limits of this study are that such that it has not been possible to take a 
longitudinal view of the participants' experience of their chronic benign low back 
pain, or review the contribution of other related biographical experiences that might 
contribute to the participants' ongoing struggle to retain or reconstruct their self- 
concept and manage the social problems related to their pain. Both of these aspects 
could be explored further. 
The idiographic approach employed in this study has shown that the personal and 
subjective experience of the chronic benign low back pain sufferer is a valuable area 
of study and highlights active elements of fear, threat and shame that could contribute 
to the ongoing activation and sensitisation of the pain-gate. Further study to explore 
whether freedom and relief from shame and self-denigration left the individual in less 
pain would be fascinating. 
It would be interesting to explore the nature of the relationship between pain and the 
self in people who felt they had made significant and long term progress with their 
chronic benign low back pain and see if this involved a similar contemporaneous 
development in their self. Similarly, to see how those who reported lower levels of 
pain sensation, distress and disability described their experience of their self-concept. 
One option might be to revisit the work of Turk and Rudy (1988) who defined 
particular sub-populations of chronic pain patients according to the profile of their 
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pain, distress and disability. Three profiles emerged which were: `dysfunctional' 
(DYS), `interpersonally distressed' (ID) and `adaptive copers' (AC). It would be 
interesting to see whether the concept of shame or the self might help to differentiate 
meaningfully between the different groups. 
Conclusions. 
The accounts of chronic benign low back pain in this thesis showed it to be a 
complex, multi-dimensional and dynamic phenomenon that operated within a 
biographical, social, cultural and physical context. Using IPA to articulate the 
participants' personal experience of their pain gave a valuable insight into its 
idiography and phenomenology that would not be possible using more quantitative 
methods. The unpleasantness enshrined in the definition of pain was shown to be 
more than a noxious sensory or physiologically offensive phenomenon but one which 
was experienced in a wide range of personal and social forms. The participants' pain 
was typified by its senselessness, its social nature and the manner in which it was 
intertwined with their sense of self. 
Despite having endured their pain for a minimum of five years with no relief, the 
participants' attempts to construct any helpful or coherent understanding of it 
remained frustrated. This left them disabled in their ability to control or predict it, to 
relate to others about it, select a clear or helpful course of action to manage it, or 
maintain a stable and valued self-concept. The `senselessness' of the pain represented 
the absence of any positive personal or social meaning to the behaviours, impulses, 
cognitions or affect that marked its presence in their consciousness. Their pain was 
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associated with a significant degree of both social and personal threat and confusion. 
This served to maintain the participants at a level of fear and vigilance to pain that 
ensured and reinforced its place within their consciousness and compounded the 
relationship between their pain sensation, distress and disability. 
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APPENDIX. 
The following three pages include: 
Copy of ethical approval letter. Unfortunately the original letter was lost 
during relocation. The copy attached was kindly supplied by the secretary of 
the Doncaster LREC. 
Patient information sheet. 
Patient consent form. 
DONCASTER LOCAL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
Medical Teaching Centre, Doncaster Royal Infirmary. Armthorpe Road, DONCASTER DN2 5LT 
Secretary: Mrs C Cooper Tel: 01302 366666 Ext: 3704 Fax 01302 553113 
E-mail: chris. coopcr@dbh. nhs. uk 
Hours of Work: Wed 8.30 - 4.30 Thurs 8.30 - 10.30 a. m. 
CHAIRMAN: Mr N Thomas 
. 
With Compliments 
From: Chris Cooper 
Secretary 
Doncaster LREC 
.. ý1 ~ 
26 November 1993 
Mr M Osborn Ext: 3583 
Research Clinical Psychologist 
Psychology Department 
Doncaster Royal Infirmary 
Dear Mr Osborn 
I am pleased to tell you that the Ethics Committee has studied and approved 
your project no. 93/41 entitled "Evaluation of a multi-disciplinary back pain 
clinic". This is for patient inclusion into the study up until July 1996. 
Yours sincerely 
Dr JR Lambert 
Chairman 
Local Research Ethics Committee 
JRL/WMJ 
Patient Information Sheet 
We are constantly trying to improve the care that is given to patients with your 
condition to offer you the best treatment that is available 
To do this it is necessary for us to understand as fully as possible what it is 
like to have chronic pain and how having back pain affects people. 
At present we are running an evaluation of the service for people with back 
pain and as part of that evaluation we are interviewing people about their 
personal experience of their pain, to get an idea of what it is like in their own 
words. 
We would be grateful if you would agree to take part in one of these 
interviews. 
Your involvement is voluntary. Should you decide not to take part in the study 
your treatment by and relationship with the clinic staff will not be affected. 
Should you agree to take part you may withdraw your consent at any time, 
without jeopardising your future treatment. 
The interviews will be confidential and anonymous. They will be tape 
recorded and transcribed (written out in full). Anything in the transcript that 
identifies you will then be removed to guarantee your anonymity and the tape 
will either be erased or returned to you according to your choice. 
Consent to Inclusion in Research Study 
Patient name. 
Address. 
I have read and fully understand the patient information sheet. 
The nature of this study, its objectives and treatment options have been fully 
discussed with me by ........................................................................... 
I understand that refusing to take part in this study or withdrawing from this 
study at any time, for any reason whatsoever, will not prejudice my further 
treatment. 
I agree to voluntarily participate in this study and I understand that this 
consent may be withdrawn by me at any time. 
Patient signature ............................................................ 
Researcher's signature ............................................................ 
Date ........................................................... 
